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Abstract  
Introduction   
This thesis examines the impact of two special cases of release of quality  information on 
patient utilisation:  three NHS trusts heavily publicised as being poor providers of care 
(the scandal trusts) and NHS trusts highlighted as being the best or worst places for 
maternity care (the maternity trusts). It also draws on analyses of patient surveys of the 
information used in making healthcare choices, and whether patient reported quality 
improved in the maternity trusts. 
 
Methods 
(1) Analysis of a survey of 2,181 patients recently referred for an outpatient 
appointment. Logistic regression examined socio-demographic factors associated with 
information use, as well as the likelihood of attending the “local” hospital for 
treatment.  (2) Difference-in-difference analysis of patient numbers between the scandal 
and maternity trusts and comparison groups using data from Hospital Episode Statistics. 
(3) Analysis of three patient reported quality measures from two surveys of maternity 
patients. 
 
Results 
High-profile reports into the quality of care in the scandal trusts had an impact on 
patient utilisation for only one out of the three trusts, which disappeared six months 
after report publication.  
 
In the maternity trusts there was no change in patient utilisation in trusts highlighted as 
the best or the worst providers of care.  On two out of three measures of patient 
reported quality trusts publicised as the worst providers did not improve at a faster rate 
than providers with similar scores at baseline. 
4 
 
Discussion 
Neither the scandal nor maternity trusts experienced declines in levels of patient 
utilisation. This lack of effect from high-profile reports, which were unequivocal on the 
quality of care, casts doubt on whether other forms of information reporting will have 
an impact on patient utilisation. The limited findings on patient reported quality 
suggest that in the absence of changes in patient utilisation, reporting on specific clinical 
areas is not associated with improvements.  
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Chapter 1 – Publication of performance data 
1.1 Brief overview and outline of thesis 
In this thesis I will examine two instances of information release in the English NHS 
and investigate whether these were associated with changes in patient utilisation at the 
organisations concerned. The instances I will examine are the publication of 
investigation reports by the healthcare regulator into three NHS hospital trusts between 
2007 and 2009, and the release of information on the best and worst hospital trusts in 
England for maternity care in late 2007.   Both of these instances overcome at least of 
two of the barriers identified to information having an impact on patient utilisation – 
that patients were not aware of the information, or that it was too difficult to 
understand [1]. I will also present findings from analysis of a patient survey on what 
factors are important to patients when choosing a hospital, how they access information 
to inform these choices, and whether these factors impact on their likelihood of 
attending their “local” hospital. I will also investigate whether the information released 
on the quality of maternity care was associated with changes in the distances patients 
travelled for treatment, or the quality of care received. 
 
Chapter 1 will cover the main background to the public release of performance data in 
healthcare, as well as the theories and evidence underpinning this. Chapter 2 sets out 
the health policy background in England, covering the main developments relevant to 
the area. Chapter 3 sets out the aims and scope for this work. Chapters 4 to 6 set out the 
substantive parts of this thesis. Chapter 4 gives the detail of a study using a patient 
survey to examine the information which is important to patients when choosing a 
hospital and if this relates to the hospital they attended for treatment. Chapter 5 
provides the detail of an examination of patient utilisation at three NHS trusts (the 
scandal trusts) which received negative publicity in the wake of healthcare regulator 
investigations. Chapter 6 provides the detail of an examination of patient utilisation at 
NHS trusts publicised as being either the worst or the best places in England for 
11 
 
maternity care (the maternity trusts). Chapter 7 provides a discussion of my findings, 
considers how these fit into previous research and provides reflections on fruitful 
avenues for future research. 
 
1.2 Publication of performance data 
Public reporting of health care performance has been increasing in recent years, with 
such information being made public in the U.S. as early as 1986 in the form of “report 
cards” or “consumer profiles” [2, 3]. The official release of performance data requires 
the development and dissemination of standardised reports on the quality of care and 
allows comparisons either over time, against targets, or between organisations [3]. 
While the origins of public reporting in healthcare can be traced back to Florence 
Nightingale’s highlighting of the differences in mortality rates between hospitals from 
1861 [4], it is in the U.S. in the late 1980s that they first achieved their recent 
prominence. Public reporting is now increasingly used to provide accountability and 
stimulate quality improvement in health systems worldwide [3]. It commonly presents 
data on outcomes such as mortality rates for individual surgeons performing specific 
procedures, or overall mortality rates at the healthcare provider level. Aggregate 
measures constructed from data on both processes and outcomes are also common, and 
some indicators are constructed from patient surveys. It can be considered as a 
systematic attempt to quantify healthcare quality at the individual or organisational 
level, and may also include efforts at ranking different providers on the quality of their 
care. In general, they aim to reduce the problem of information asymmetry between 
patients and those providing care, which has been cited as a central problem in many 
settings [5]. 
 
Some of the impetus behind the increasing release of such information can linked to the 
World Health Report in 2000. This focused on health system performance and 
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presented an index of how every country was performing in terms of achieving good 
health, being responsive to the expectations of their population, and the fairness of 
financial contributions [6]. The report categorised performance into the three 
dimensions of quality, efficiency, and responsiveness, and considered these separately 
in analyses of how well countries were meeting these goals. This prompted a range of 
strategies to deal with these problems by governments across the world, one of which 
was to use market competition and patient choice to improve performance in these 
areas [7]. These reforms were in turn associated with increases in the public release of 
performance data in healthcare. Through a series of comparative graphs on various 
measures between different countries, the report also brought about the idea that poor 
performance was relative to how others were performing.  Additional impetus came 
from a rising general sense of consumerism in society, as well as a focus on lowering the 
costs of insuring employees in the U.S. [8]. 
 
This public release of performance data has not occurred in a vacuum, and the policies 
and initiatives encouraging such information release have also been accompanied by a 
wide range of other policies. In the English context, these have mainly been reforms to 
increase the degree of choice which patients have over where they receive elective care, 
and to create incentives for hospitals to treat more patients. Together these reforms 
were intended to drive up quality across the NHS as a whole. 
 
1.3 Three pathways to improvement 
Underpinning the public release of healthcare quality data is a theoretical model of the 
relationship between the release of information and healthcare quality, as proposed by 
the Berwick model of health improvement [9]. This states that public reporting of 
performance can improve quality of care via two mechanisms, both connected to each 
other by provider desire to maintain and extend market share. The first of these 
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mechanisms (Pathway I) is selection, where patients (as well as others acting on their 
behalf, such as health insurers or referring doctors) use publicly reported information to 
make decisions on where they will receive care. This in turn should motivate providers 
to improve through patients preferentially attending better performing organisations at 
the expense of those publicised as doing less well. Adding this “contestability” to the 
healthcare market is intended to trigger improvements in efficiency and responsiveness 
via the threat of patient exit and monetary loss for providers, as patients preferentially 
select the best providers [10].  
 
The degree to which patients are able to make use of performance information when it 
is available, and exercise choice over where to be treated is subject to considerable 
debate. This pathway assumes that there is variation in quality in different providers 
and also that patients are free to choose where they are treated. It has additionally been 
argued that the assertion that patient choice will drive up quality across the whole of a 
healthcare system is flawed as patients may sort vertically (towards the highest quality 
providers), or horizontally (towards the providers who best meet their idiosyncratic 
needs and desires, but are not “better” per se [11]).  This may not lead to changes in 
service provision which are in the interests of the whole of society if these idiosyncratic 
needs are primarily catered for, and not those of wider society.  
 
The second pathway, change in care delivery (Pathway II), in the Berwick model is 
improvement through changes in care, where the publication of performance data 
allows providers to better target their improvement efforts, primarily through process 
changes [9]. This second pathway relies on organisations having an internal impetus to 
improve the quality of their services once they are aware of their performance. The 
change pathway relies on providers for any improvements, implying that they must 
both understand the process of delivering high quality care, and be able to improve 
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upon current processes. The change pathway can change performance in three ways: 
remediation (where poor providers improve); restriction (where providers limit or 
restrict their practice in areas where they have performed poorly); and removal (where 
low quality providers exit the health care market [12]). Berwick was writing in 2003 in 
order to inform the development of the American National Quality Measurement and 
Reporting System, which had the core aim of improving quality across the whole of the 
U.S. healthcare system, and he argued that understanding the link between 
measurement and improvement was critical to ensuring that any system of quality 
reporting was well designed and functioned as intended. 
 
These two pathways may be linked by both positive factors (such as market share or 
praise) but also negative ones (such as embarrassment, or de-selection) [9]. There have 
been claims that negative reports may be more likely to have an impact than positive 
reports [13], as issues of capacity may prevent those reported as being high quality 
providers taking on more patients.  If there is no mechanism to deal with this over-
demand at “good” providers, then many of the benefits of the public release of data 
may not be realised [14]. Some evidence from the healthcare insurance market in the 
U.S. has indicated that patients may indeed avoid “bad” providers, but not 
preferentially attend “good” providers [15], which is consistent with findings that 
framing information using a negative risk message may improve how patients 
understand information [16].  
 
A third pathway theorising that the public release of information improves quality 
through reputational damage has proposed by Hibbard [1]. The reputational damage 
pathway is based on the idea that it is not actual changes in patient utilisation which 
stimulates organisations to improve. Rather it is individuals’ fear for the reputation of 
themselves and their organisation which motivates improvements. So in this pathway 
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publicly releasing information on quality can still be beneficial, but this does not rely on 
patients choosing certain organisations. Instead, these improvements will occur as 
individuals wish to perform better on rankings and assessments than their peers.  
 
These three pathways of improvement rely on different mechanisms to link public 
reporting and improvements. The selection pathway (Pathway I) relies on a complex 
series of events linking the publication of performance data to quality improvements: 
patients need to be able to access accurate information, to obtain it, to interpret it 
correctly, and to successfully switch providers. All of these together should then 
appropriately increase the market shares of high quality providers [17]. There can be 
obstacles at every step in this chain, including difficulties in interpreting such 
information and being able to switch provider. Change in care delivery (Pathway II) 
relies solely on providers to use the performance data they are presented with to better 
target their efforts, and not on external actors. In the reputational damage pathway the 
form of public reporting is of vital importance. In order to have an effect reporting 
should ideally meet the four criteria of: being a ranking system; being published and 
widely disseminated; being easily understood by the public; and finally being followed 
up at a later point in time [1]. There is no simple dichotomy however between the 
change and reputation pathways, as performance reports may also have effects on the 
reputation of providers. In turn the reputation pathway may motivate quality 
improvements through the desire of providers to maintain and enhance market share, 
which may be increased by paying attention to their reputation. Reputation may also 
affect access to resources such as networks and community support, which may in 
themselves lead to improvements [18, 19].  
 
Berwick noted that in 2003 in the U.S. the dynamics of neither the selection nor the 
change pathways were working well [9]. For both of these he identified not just a lack of 
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simple, reliable measurements, but also a lack of capacity among organisations and 
individuals to develop and respond to this information. He noted barriers to the 
optimal working of the selection pathway including: what is being measured not 
matching what is important to patients, difficulty in understanding measures, a weak 
belief in variation in quality, patients only considering their local area and not fully 
taking into account the full range of available quality, price trumping all other factors 
and patients being unable to personalise the information [9]. Pathway II (change in care 
delivery) relies on organisations having an ability to make systemic changes. This 
requires a variety of factors from education in process improvement, alignment of 
incentives, reliable info and leadership. He noted that neither the public nor payers had 
fully developed mechanisms to deal with the public release of performance 
information, although this may have changed since the time he was writing. 
 
1.3.1. Concern over potential negative impacts  
The idea of publicly releasing quality information on providers has not been without its 
critics. A review article in 2005 set out many of these possible negative effects and  
cautioned that with a lack of evidence that these policies were improving quality, their 
use should be reconsidered in light of their possible unintended consequences [12]. The 
concerns mainly focus around the public release of performance information leading to 
those being rated avoiding sicker patients (who would be damaging to their ratings); 
these measures encouraging inappropriate interventions; and overriding both patient 
preferences and clinical judgement. For example, evaluation of two large schemes in the 
U.S. (in New York State and Pennsylvania) concluded that at least in the short-term, 
both schemes encouraged hospitals to select healthier patients, leading to an a decline in 
outcomes for the sickest patients [20].  There is also some evidence to suggest that 
public release of indicators can have a mixed effect on the quality of aspects of care not 
reported on, and may lead to a deterioration in care for these unmeasured aspects 
among poor performers [21].   
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Further potential negative effects of publishing performance data include tunnel vision 
– where what is being measures is focused on to the detriment of all other aspects of 
care, a misplaced emphasis on short-term goals over longer term aims, and a fixation on 
the measures themselves, rather than on the wider objectives they are designed to 
achieve [22]. “Gaming” has also been noted as a concern – which is where organisations 
may apply a variety of strategies in order to perform better on published measures than 
they are in practice [23, 24]. 
 
There are further concerns that hospitals may compete on attributes which are not 
entirely in the best interests of the patient. Increases in patient volumes have been 
linked to hospitals having better amenities, where amenities were defined as good food, 
attentive staff, and pleasant surroundings [25].  Research on Medicare (the U.S. national 
social insurance program mainly for those over 65 years old) pneumonia patients in 
greater Los Angeles found that a one standard deviation (SD) increase in a composite 
amenities score could raise demand by 38.4%, while the corresponding increase for 
clinical quality (pneumonia mortality) was associated with only a 12.7% increase. This 
implies that it is worthwhile for hospitals to compete on these amenities and that this 
may be more effective in terms of attracting patients than focusing on clinical quality.  
 
1.4 Evidence for each of the three pathways  
The majority of the research evidence on the effects of publicly releasing performance 
data is from the U.S. and suggests that public reporting may have limited impact on 
patient behaviour and patient utilisation (that is, the selection pathway). A systematic 
review of nine studies on choices of hospital published in 2008 found that overall there 
was no evidence of an effect of publishing performance data on selection of hospital by 
patients, but that such publication may nonetheless drive quality improvement efforts 
[26]. There was better evidence for selection of individual surgeons by intermediaries, 
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such as health insurers in the U.S.  Here I focus on the results on the selection of 
hospital trusts by patients, although some of the research is on selection by 
intermediaries such as insurance companies. Overall the findings on choice by 
intermediaries are less relevant to my thesis, although they may relate to choices by 
organisations such as Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and others. These issues 
will be considered in more detail in the discussion. The review in 2008 updated a 
previous study from the year 2000, which had similar findings, albeit based on fewer 
studies [3], as well as a review in 2010 which included more studies [27].  Details of 
specific studies will be reported below in discussion of the particular reporting schemes.  
 
A recent Cochrane systematic review of the effect of releasing performance data on the 
behaviour of healthcare users or professionals aimed to synthesise evidence from only 
the most robust study designs. Although this review identified  51 studies for full text 
reading, only four studies met the inclusion criteria, with the majority being rejected on 
the basis of study design [28].  To be included studies had to be intervention studies 
with a Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT (or cluster RCT)) design, interrupted time 
series or controlled before and after studies, and assess improvements on the selection 
pathway or the change pathway. Three of these studies addressed the issue of whether 
public reporting was associated with patient selection (although two of these were on 
the selection of health insurance plans), and concluded that there was no consistent 
evidence of the release of performance data driving patient utilisation. As this Cochrane 
review identified a small number of studies which meet the strict inclusion criteria, and 
these provided mixed evidence, the strength of this evidence was graded as low, with 
further research likely to change the estimate of no consistent evidence of patient 
selection. Both of the RCTs, one in Iowa [29] and one in New Jersey [30], sent booklets 
with quality rating information to Medicaid (a U.S. health care program, which 
provides support for low-income families who would otherwise not be able to pay for 
healthcare) and found no impacts on patient utilisation. Both of these studies did note 
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that only a minority of patients receiving this information actually read it, but that for 
those who did there was the potential for the information to affect their choices, 
although this was based on experiments asking patients if they intended to use this 
information, rather than on actual choices made. 
 
The reputational damage theory was devised after an influential controlled study in 
Wisconsin compared hospitals which were given a public performance report with 
those who only received a private report and finally a group with no report at all [1]. 
The study included a total of 111 hospitals in the Wisconsin area, 24 of which had their 
performance information made public as part of a report known as QualityCounts. The 
QualityCounts report was specifically designed to be easy for patients to understand and 
gave information on surgery, non-surgical care, knee operations, cardiac operations and 
maternity care. The reports represented performance in three categories of “better than 
expected” (represented as a plus sign), “as expected” (represented as a circle), and 
“worse than expected” (a minus sign). The information was disseminated by a large 
purchasing cooperative (representing around 75% of the insured population in the 
area), which sent the report to homes, inserted it into a local newspaper, and 
encouraged media interest in the report itself. Focusing on changes in quality on 
reported measures approximately nine months after report publication, the study noted 
that there was some support for the change in care delivery pathway, and that giving 
hospitals information on performance privately did result in some improvements. 
There was however, added value in making this information public. Hospitals where 
performance was made public made greater strides in quality improvement than those 
who had this information reported privately to them alone [31]. For example, on the 
maternity indicators, over one third of the public report hospitals made significant 
improvements after report publication, compared with approximately one fourth of 
private report hospitals, and even fewer of the no-report hospitals. Findings were more 
pronounced for those hospitals which had worse than expected performance at baseline 
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– here seven out of eight of the public report hospitals had improved within two years, 
compared with almost six in ten for both the private and no-report hospitals. 
 
Later interviews with managers at the hospitals involved found that while they were 
concerned that a negative public report would affect their reputation, they believed it 
would have limited impact on their market share [31]. Hospitals performing less well 
were more likely to say that the reports would negatively affect their public image, and 
were more hostile towards the reports. Hospitals in the public report group were also 
more likely to be attempting to make improvement efforts than either those receiving a 
private report, or no report at all. This differentiates the improvements noted here from 
the change pathway – it was fear for their reputation, rather than market shares, which 
drove improvements. The QualityCounts reports were also linked to an increased ability 
among the public to identify good and poor providers, and this effect was found to 
persist for between two and four months after release of the report [18]. 
 
1.5 Major case studies in public release of performance information 
1.5.1 The New York Cardiac Reporting Scheme (NYCRS) 
The New York State Department of Health has published data on risk adjusted 
mortality following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft surgery (CABG – a form of surgery 
involving diverting blood around blocked arteries to treat coronary heart disease 
(CHD)) by hospital every year since 1990. From December 1991 this data was released 
at the individual surgeon level, the issue being forced by a legal action over access to 
the data by the newspaper Newsday under Freedom of Information legislation. The 
organisers of the scheme had concerns that small numbers would bias the results, and 
since 1992 have published data averaged across three years for individual surgeons, to 
assuage these concerns [32]. The scheme involved a steering group including clinicians 
and patients and released crude, expected and risk adjusted mortality rate information 
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to both clinical teams and the public.  The information released to the public was 
initially mainly through media coverage of the report (for example, in the New York 
Times), although a website was produced in later years. Original media coverage was 
criticised by the New York Commissioner for Health as “misleading” with too great a 
focus on rankings [32], which prompted efforts to educate the media on the reports and 
the methods used in producing estimates of quality. 
 
As this was the first programme to produce data on the outcomes of cardiac surgery 
across a whole American state, the bulk of the research evidence on the impact of the 
release of performance data pertains to it [33].  The NYCRS was associated with 
significant improvements with the mortality rate from CABG surgery falling 41% from 
3.58% to 2.78% between 1989 and 1992 [34], and this increase in quality was greater 
among those initially highlighted as being poor providers [35].  
 
Seven papers have examined the impact of the NYCRS on market share and patient 
utilisation and the results of these studies suggest modest or null effects. One early 
study which did not adjust for potential confounders did suggest that there were higher 
patient utilisation growth rates  in both providers and surgeons with better outcomes, 
although this effect did decline over time, suggesting that it was primarily new 
information which was important [36]. The study examined changes in market share for 
the first three years of the reports, and found that an increase of 1% in the risk adjusted 
mortality rate was associated with a 1.8% decline in patient numbers for CABG surgery 
in the first year. For an average hospital, this represents 8.4 patients out of 466 
operations performed every year. Further research using annual data from 1989 to 1992 
investigated changes in patient utilisation after devising two groupings, one based on 
risk adjusted mortality in 1989, and another based on outlier status in 1989 [35].  This 
found that the unadjusted volume of operations was remarkably consistent over time, 
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and that this was true for both whole hospitals and individual surgeons. The authors of 
this study hypothesised that the lack of observed effects were likely due to the referral 
patterns of cardiologists. They note that a minority of cardiologists felt that the reports 
were of no value, and speculate that those who felt these reports did add value were 
likely to already be referring their patients to high quality providers. Others have also 
claimed that the lack of effect across the whole state may have been due to large 
differences in the healthcare systems between upstate New York and the rest of the 
state [36]. 
 
Later work on this reporting scheme using annual data from 1991 to 1999 found that 
low performing hospitals lost CABG patients to their better performing competition, 
and that this shift was mainly driven by loss of the less clinically severe patients [37]. 
This paper estimated the effect of being flagged as a high mortality hospital at around 
10% of CABG patients, which they estimated as around 5 patients per month for an 
average hospital. These effects did not persist beyond one year after reporting (after 
which effects were not statistically significant), and there were no corresponding 
increases in operations for hospitals flagged as having low mortality rates.  A further 
editorial piece by the ex-healthcare commissioner for New York in 1998 was 
unequivocal in his view that “market forces played no role” in driving the 
improvements in clinical outcomes in New York [38].  He noted that the reports were 
not used by managed care companies (which control large budgets and have 
considerable purchasing power) to either reward hospitals or to direct their patients. He 
further noted that the changes in market share which were evident were small (all 
around the one percent level) and that in less than half of cases were these in the 
“expected direction.” That is, in less than half of all cases did hospitals with better 
performance gain market share at the expense of those performing less well, and vice 
versa.  Statistical tests of this data however, were not presented.  
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A further study with more follow up information (from 1989 until 2002) concluded that 
there was no evidence of this public release of data having any significant impact on the 
market share of hospitals involved [39]. This study used linear regression to assess 
changes in market share associated with the reports and found no association between 
performance rank and market share. Changes in patient utilisation were similar for both 
the worst and best performing hospitals, and this result held until the end of the study 
period. Their analysis was conducted both for individual surgeons and for hospitals, 
and found the same results for both. This study also highlighted that around one in five 
of the low performing surgeons ceased practice or moved location within two years of 
being publicised as low performing. This both underscores the importance of publicly 
released data being risk adjusted, with sufficient sample size, and provides a possible 
mechanism by which outcomes may improve. Analysis of outcomes by the volume of 
surgeries performed by individual surgeons found that mortality improved for 
surgeons who initially conducted low numbers of procedures at a faster rate than for 
high-volume surgeons. There was a decline in the overall percentage of surgeries 
performed by these low-volume surgeons, which the authors attribute to efforts by the 
New York Department of Health to educate providers on the relative risk of surgeons 
performing low numbers of operations. This provides support for the theory that 
improvements were due to there being an exodus of these low volume surgeons. This 
analysis concurred with previous findings that there was no evidence of patient 
selection as measured by higher performance equalling improved market share [40].  
 
One analysis of the NYCRS contrasted effects on patient volumes for CABG in New 
York with volumes for acute Myocardial Infarctions (MI - heart attacks) and lumbar 
diskectomies (a form of back surgery on the vertebrae in the spine) in California [41]. 
The comparison in California was the California Health Outcomes Project, which first 
released information on mortality rates for acute MIs and complication rates from 
lumbar diskectomies in 1993. In the first year of reporting there were only two 
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categories of “better” and “not better” than expected, although in subsequent releases 
(from 1996) this second category was divided into “worse” and “neither better or 
worse” than expected.  The study employed time series data across these three 
operations in the two states using linear regression after adjusting for autocorrelation 
terms. Autocorrelation refers to the fact that in data collected over time, those data 
points which are closer together in time are more similar to each other than those which 
are further apart. Using data at the quarterly level, hospitals in California were found to 
have 18% more MI patients in the third and fourth quarter after report publication if 
they were flagged as a low mortality hospital, equating to approximately 13 extra 
patients over these six months. These effects were quantified as 1.7% more MI patients 
in the third quarter, rising to 2.8% in the fourth quarter.  There was also indication that 
the hospitals badged as having low complication rates for diskectomies received more 
of these patients in some quarters after the information was released. These effects 
however, were all less than a percent of patients, representing less than one extra 
patient per quarter. As the majority of MIs are emergency admissions, it is not clear by 
what mechanism any effects would have been achieved. The analysis on New York was 
based on monthly data and found inconsistent effects. The hospitals publicised as 
having low CABG mortality had a much larger increase in patient utilisation (13.4%) in 
the first month after report release (equating to around 15 extra patients in that month), 
but after this there were no statistically significant changes. Hospitals publicised as 
having a high mortality rate had 7.1% fewer patients in the second month after report 
publication, but effects in the first, third or fourth month were not statistically 
significant. This decrease equates to approximately eight patients in the first month. 
Together, these effects can be characterised as inconsistent and transient, although the 
authors do acknowledge that the small numbers of hospitals classified as outliers meant 
that their statistical power was limited.  
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The degree to which the New York findings are generalisable to other settings is 
debatable.  Even compared with other states in the U.S., New York is a special case – it 
has a much heavier regulatory regime than many other  states [38]. For example, 
hospitals need to apply to provide heart surgery and the state has explicitly limited the 
number of hospitals which can perform CABG (there were 30 hospitals performing the 
surgery during the study periods for the above studies). A greater issue is that these 
changes did not occur in isolation, and so any effects attributed to the scheme may have 
been due to other interventions, such as the extensive efforts in information technology 
and education. That the majority of evidence relates to New York presents problems in 
anticipating what may happen in other areas with different healthcare systems and 
regulatory regimes. 
 
 
1.5.2 Research on other reporting schemes 
Other American schemes which have been subject to evaluation in terms of their impact 
on market shares or patient utilisation examined include the Greater Cleveland Health 
Quality Choice Programme, the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 
and the Health Care Financing and Administration ((HCFA, now the Centres for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services)) mortality information.  The Greater Cleveland Health 
Quality Choice  Programme utilised the collective clout of local employers to demand 
data from hospitals in order to produce reports for employers and their employees, and 
released every six months from 1990 [42]. Data was reported on adjusted mortality, 
patient satisfaction, length of stay, Caesarean section (C-section) deliveries and vaginal 
birth after prior C-section delivery, on all 30 non-Federal hospitals in the area.  The 
information was easy to interpret, giving three categories of “better than expected”, “as 
expected”, and “worse than expected”, each represented with an arrow (e.g. pointing 
up was better than expected).  Hospital mergers and around one third of hospitals 
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subsequently ceasing to provide the requisite data led to the program being closed in 
1998.  The move away from 30 independent hospitals to these being controlled by larger 
federations which pulled their support brought the programme to an end. Specifically 
one large federation claimed that supplying data to the programme was a prohibitive 
cost and their refusal to participate signalled the end of the scheme. Commentators 
have pointed out that this group of hospitals was ranked particularly well in another 
national reporting scheme (see below) but not as well in these local reports. Some have 
claimed that with this in mind, this large hospital group preferred to use their collective 
clout to close down the Greater Cleveland Health Quality Choice Programme, which 
was less positive regarding their performance. Analysis of hospitals’ market share and 
risk-adjusted mortality from 1991 to 1997 at hospitals participating in this scheme found 
that hospitals which were high mortality outliers did not experience a significant 
decrease in their adjusted market share [43]. The five hospitals with the highest level of 
mortality did lose on average 0.6% of market share however, although this was not 
found to be statistically significant (95% Confidence Intervals -0.6% to +1.9%). This 
evaluation also found limited effects on quality among participating hospitals, which 
the authors attribute to the lack of effects on market share (for example, none of the 
high mortality hospitals lost any large contracts as a result of this data) providing a 
limited incentive for improvement.  
 
Pennsylvania followed New York to be the second U.S. state to release data on cardiac 
surgery outcomes and since 1992 the Health Care Cost Containment Council has 
published cardiac care report cards for CABG surgery providers. Reports on the 
aggregate outcomes of patients undergoing this surgery were made available to 
hospitals, surgeons, libraries, businesses, the media, and anyone who requested the 
information. This data was then posted on a website from 1998 to enable more people to 
access it. There were three ratings of “worse than expected”, “as expected”, or “better 
than expected”, and these were published for both providers and surgeons meeting a 
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minimum threshold of procedures (of 30 operation per year). Analysis of the impact of 
this scheme on patient utilisation has attempted to estimate the effects of the reports on 
volume of CABG patients by constructing models of each patient’s actual choice in 
comparison to the choices which were available to them [44]. This found no effect of 
any rating on the volume of patients treated at the provider level. At the individual 
surgeon level there was a reduction in volume of poor performing and unrated 
surgeons' volume but no effect on more highly rated surgeons The authors of this work 
contend that this may be expected, as there are more surgeons available to choose from 
and greater responses to this information should be expected than for hospitals where 
there are few alternatives to choose from.  Reconciling the findings of effects at surgeon 
but not hospital level, the authors contend that while patients may end up at a poorly 
rated hospital that once they are there they choose the best performing surgeons.   A 
much cited survey of cardiologists and cardiac surgeons and their views on report cards 
was also conducted on the reports from Pennsylvania scheme [45]. This surveyed 50% 
of all cardiologists and cardiac surgeons active in Pennsylvania in 1995. This found that 
awareness of the reports was high (82% of respondents were aware of its existence), but 
that it was not viewed positively. 87% of respondents replied that the reports had no 
impact or a limited impact upon their referral decisions, with the most common 
concerns being a lack of information on aspects of care other than mortality and 
suspicion of the data and risk adjustment used. 
 
Further analysis of the Pennsylvania scheme compared the proportions of CABG 
patients treated by high quality versus low quality surgeons in Pennsylvania to the state 
of Florida (which does not have such information release). This work examined the May 
2002 release of data in Pennsylvania and analyses referrals to cardiac surgeons before 
and after this information was made public [46].  This found that in Pennsylvania there 
was a shift towards high quality surgeons and away from low quality after the report 
came out. These effects however were small, and when compared with the concurrent 
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changes in Florida (using a difference-in-difference framework) these effects were not 
statistically significant.  By examining the proportions of patients referred to low quality 
surgeons in advance of this report being published, this work suggests that irrespective 
of this report patients were unlikely to be referred to a low quality surgeon. This study 
ascribes the lack of effects of the report on patient utilisation to the fact that referring 
doctors were already knowledgeable about the relative quality of different surgeons, 
suggesting that it would be unrealistic to expect changes in these circumstances.  While 
this study included data from five quarters in advance of the report being published, it 
only includes patient utilisation for two quarters after publication.  This means that it 
remains possible that there may have been longer term effects, although as these reports 
were published every six months, a longer follow up period longer would have 
included later report publications, introducing additional methodological issues. 
 
1.5.3 The HCFA “death list” 
In March 1986, the American Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) released 
information on the actual and predicted death rates at all providers of Medicare 
services, based on patients discharged in 1984. The initial list included 269 hospitals 
which were classed as high mortality outliers, and the data was the subject of much 
news reporting and editorial comment after a press release on the findings. Two studies 
have examined the impact of the HCFA data release. The first of these focused on the 
impacts of this data on New York hospitals [47]. The hospitals performing worse than 
expected were dubbed the “death list” by journalists, and the study examined 
occupancy rates for hospitals in the three groups of better; worse; and as expected, in 
the 5 quarters before and 3 quarters after the reports were released, using one-way 
ANOVA analysis. This found significant differences in occupancy rates in the three 
groups, but the direction of effect for those doing worse or better than expected was the 
opposite of what would be assumed with higher quality not equalling higher patient 
utilisation.  
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The second study of the HCFA information release found a very small, but statistically 
significant effect of the information release. Overall this study found very small effects 
of the HCFA data on patient utilisation, for example a hospital which had a death rate 
twice that expected experienced a decline of less than one admission per week in the 
first year [48].  This small effect for one of the worst performers was echoed for other 
hospitals, and the average decrease associated with being a high mortality outlier was 
46 patients a year, or less than one patient a week. Press reports of single, unexpected 
deaths however, were associated with an average 9% reduction in hospital discharges 
within one year. This suggests that the reporting of mortality rates may not be as 
effective in changing patient utilisation levels as high-profile incidents, and that isolated 
anecdotes such as this may stimulate more dramatic changes than even sensationalist 
news reporting. The HCFA release was beset by the methodological limitations one 
may expect from an early reporting scheme, and was published with a large list of 
caveats and disclaimers, which may have contributed to the lack of effects found. In 
1993 the decision was taken not to continue to release the data as the HCFA 
administrator lamented that it had become primarily a “consumer publication” [48]. 
The authors of this evaluation concluded that the HCFA was justified in stopping the 
release of this data in light of the large efforts it took to collate, as neither providers nor 
patients seemed to be using it [48]. 
 
1.5.4 Public reporting schemes in Europe 
The Netherlands began public reporting of comparative information on their hospitals 
in 2005, and a government sponsored website (www.KiesBeter.nl translated as “make 
better choices”) contains information on a variety of outcome measures. These include 
information on treatment for specific conditions as well as overall hospital quality and 
measures are published with a one year time lag. Research on angioplasty (the use of a 
30 
 
balloon to clear narrowed or blocked arteries, also known as Percutaneous Coronary 
Intervention (PCI)) patients concluded that relative to the mean readmission rate (8.5%),  
hospitals publicised as having a 1% lower readmission rate were found to experience as  
increase in demand for these operations of 12% [49]. This work attempted to separate 
out the effects of quality indicators for the hospital overall (for which they used a 
measure of the percentage of patients with pressure sores) from quality for this specific 
group of patients (PCI readmission rates within three months). They also used 
information published by a Dutch magazine on the reputation of the hospital, again for 
both the hospital overall, and for cardiology specifically. The magazine publishes a 
ranking for both of these separately, based on interviews with relevant clinical leaders, 
and these rankings were assumed to impact upon hospital reputation.   As well as the 
finding that a decrease in the readmission rate leads to more PCI patients, this work 
concluded that increases in hospital reputation can lead to more admissions. These 
effects were found to be larger than for effects of improved readmission rates on 
admissions, for example a 1% increase in reputation for cardiology was found to be 
associated with a 53% increase in patient admissions. This study is cross sectional, using 
data for 2006, which is only one year after the Netherlands began publishing 
information on the relative quality of angioplasty providers. It may be that if this 
research was carried out using later years, these same large effects would not be found. 
Also the Netherlands is a small country and there are only 19 providers being able to 
provide this surgery there at the time of this study, so the applicability of this work to 
larger areas is questionable.  
 
1.5.5 Studies in other clinical areas 
Much of the previous research on the issue of whether the public release of performance 
information results in changes in patient utilisation and quality comes from schemes 
releasing data on specific procedures or conditions, most commonly cardiac care [50]. 
While the release of data for specific conditions or procedures has the advantage that 
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they may more accurately pinpoint where issues may be, these schemes are not directly 
comparable to schemes on different conditions or patient groups [50].  Some research 
outside of cardiac surgery has included work on fertility clinics. Reasons to focus on 
this area specifically are that these patients may be younger, wealthier and more 
educated than those with other conditions and that they are more likely to otherwise be 
healthy [51].  The results from these studies on fertility clinics are inconclusive, and two 
studies have focused on information released by the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology in the U.S. This gives both basic information on the types of treatment 
offered at different providers and common comorbid conditions among those treated 
there. It also gives “success rates” (number of pregnancies per 100 cycles, and number 
of live births per 100 cycles) for different procedures at each provider, broken down by 
age groups. One study [52] examined data from all US states from 1994 to 2003  and 
found that clinics with higher birth rates had larger market shares after the adoption of 
report cards than before. It also found however, that clinics which were treated a high 
proportion of younger or healthier women saw a decline in their patient utilisation after 
this information was released. This was interpreted as women attending for fertility 
treatments being both responsive to these reports on quality of care, and aware of the 
more nuanced issues that some clinics may have high success rates by targeting “easier 
to treat” women. As the effect of age on fertility is well known, it may have been that 
this information was easy for women to incorporate into their decisions, but this may 
not be the case for other aspects of case-mix such as the effect of comorbid conditions. 
Additionally, the data released on fertility success rates (such as number of live births 
per 1,000 cycles) is potentially easier to understand than other information.  A second 
study was on the 307 U.S. assisted reproductive technology clinics which continuously 
reported performance data to the Centres for Disease Control from 2003 to 2008 [53]. In 
contrast to the previous study, this work focused on the number of cycles performed, 
rather than the number of women (one woman can have more than one cycle of 
treatment). This found that overall there was no association found between a clinic's 
most recently reported success rate and its cycle volume. Analysis of whether year to 
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year changes in success rates were associated with changes in patient utilisation gave 
the same null results.  
 
There is also some published research on the impact of the public release of 
performance data on nursing homes [54] as well as schools [55]. The nursing home 
evidence is primarily based on a system of releasing information on the quality of 
nursing homes in the U.S. known as Nursing Home Compare [56], although there has 
been some research on rating of care homes by the regulator in England [57]. The 
schools evidence centres on the promotion of school choice by the New Labour 
Government in the 2000s [55]. Neither of these cases will be considered here, as they are 
outside the scope of this thesis 
 
 
1.6 Explanations for the limited impact of public reporting 
1.6.1. On patient utilisation  
A number of reasons have been proposed for the limited impact of public reporting on 
patient utilisation. These can mainly be divided into patients not being aware of the 
relevant information, the information not being understandable, it containing no novel 
content, other information sources outweighing the official publicly released 
information and aspects of care other than those reported on being more important. 
 
Awareness of information 
A review of information across seven countries (England, the U.S., Germany, Denmark, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, which all implemented quality reported systems in 
the early 2000s) on the availability and use of health service quality data concluded that 
in six out of the countries, patients were unlikely to search out information on quality, 
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and that this was because the available information did not meet their information 
needs [58]. An early pilot of patient choice for patients with CHD found that the 
provision of information on the quality of care at different hospitals was lacking [59] 
and evaluation of further pilots of patient choice in London had similar findings [60]. 
Although not specifically aimed at patients, indicators on the quality of care did not 
penetrate the public consciousness in Scotland [61], and awareness has been noted to be 
low in the U.S., even among patients undergoing high-risk surgical procedures [45, 62]. 
 
Understanding of information 
Being able to understand the relevant performance information is a necessary precursor 
to choosing a higher quality provider [63, 64]. A systematic review on the use of 
performance data noted both that easy to understand formats improved understanding 
of the information as well as increasing the likelihood of choosing a more highly ranked 
(i.e. better quality) option [65]. Early releases of quality information were commonly 
criticised for their reliance on overly technical measures, particularly the use of complex 
numerical indicators [66] which people commonly  have difficultly interpreting [67]. 
Evaluation of a scheme to release performance data in Scotland also noted that there 
was low use of the information by the public, partly due to the fact that it was not 
tailored to use by individual groups [61]. An editorial to accompany a systematic 
review which found no impact of public releases on patient utilisation noted that such a  
finding was to be expected in light of the fact that these schemes relied on patients 
expending much cognitive effort in interpreting the information presented to them [19].  
 
Do they tell people anything they do not already know? 
There has long been an interest in the accountancy literature on the “information 
content” of annual accounts of company performance, that is, the extent to which they 
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tell people anything they don’t already know.  These ideas were initially applied to the 
effects of reported annual earnings on stock prices, variation in stock prices, and 
measures of trading volume. The literature was first stimulated by work in 1968 which 
examined the share price effects of unexpected earnings announcements, and found 
that while these did lead to changes in share price, that by the time of the earnings 
announcements, the market had already taken into account much of the information 
contained in the announcements [68]. This work estimated that of all the information 
released about individual companies in a given year, half comes from the reports of 
annual earnings while the other half came from sources such as media reports which 
are much timelier than the annual reports. The key issue emerging from this literature is 
that the release of information in the form of annual reports may not be important if 
these things are already known (or suspected) by decision makers. So it is the novel and 
unknown “news” contained in these reports that are important, and it cannot be 
assumed that all reports are the same in this regard. Similarly, later work in 1986 
showed that announcements from the Federal Reserve Board had only a weak impact 
on market prices, primarily because the information contained in them was previously 
expected by the market [69]. This literature on the impact of accountancy reports on the 
share prices of companies can be thought as analogous to work which has examined the 
impact of performance rating systems on the numbers of patients at healthcare 
organisations reported on. 
 
Until recently, none of the research on healthcare performance information made 
attempts to take account of the fact that information in these reports may already be 
known (or suspected) by patients or those acting on their behalf. Recent research on the 
NYCRS has attempted to quantify the effect of reports containing such novel “news” by 
creating a model of patients’ own prior belief of the expected utility at a given hospital, 
and contrasting this with their expected utility after learning of the details in the reports 
[70]. These measures of utility were constructed from the travel time to the hospital for 
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each patient and demographic data such as their age and sex. After accounting for prior 
beliefs, there was an effect of the release of quality of care information on market shares 
if the information released contrasted with prior beliefs about quality, rather than 
merely reinforcing them. This effect however, was primarily due to avoidance of poor 
quality providers, rather than patients seeking out higher quality providers [70].  It is 
worth noting that this work was based on 18 hospitals in the New York area, whereas 
the majority of previous research was based on all 30 hospitals providing this surgery in 
the state. This work was on the first year after the release of this data, when there was a 
significant investment in publicising the ratings, and it is unclear whether any effects 
may have persisted. 
 
Other information is more important 
Work on enrolment into Health Maintenance Organisations in America between 1994 
and 2002 found that patients were switching to high quality providers independently of 
the release of performance reports, a trend which is referred to as market based learning  
[71]. This work made a distinction between the effects of the information found in these 
report cards and “market based information” (i.e. the information that patients would 
have found out in the absence of the report cards), and found that they patients did 
learn from both of these sources, but that the effect was larger for the “market based 
information”. This found that the effects of report cards were driven by responses to 
satisfaction scores, rather than more technical process measures such as mammography 
rates.  Nonetheless, after controlling for this market based learning this analysis 
concluded that there was still an effect of official releases of information on market 
shares, and that this was most pronounced when the variation between providers was 
large. It may be the case that any observed lack of impact of performance reports on 
levels of health service use at affected organisations may be because patients were 
already aware of the information contained in the reports, and so performance 
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reporting may not have added anything over and above what patients already knew. A 
similar issue, where quality reports were found to have no impacts on patient 
utilisation as those referring patients were already aware of the information, was noted 
in examination of releasing performance data on Pennsylvania on cardiac surgery [46]. 
Other research has attempted to separate out whether official releases of information 
are more or less important than such informal sources, but the results concluded that 
both were equally important [72]. These issues may be interlinked however, as the 
official release of performance information may impact on the relative importance of 
these less formal sources of information, and vice versa [73]. 
 
Patients may trust and prefer to use other sources of information more than public 
reporting.  Early focus group work to inform the display of information by the 
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) in 2003 found that many patients 
distrusted government statistics, dismissing them as “spin” and that they preferred to 
have more detailed locally relevant information than general pronouncements on 
quality [74]. As expected by policy architects, the GP is the main source of information 
on where to attend for patients, selected as important by 43% of patients [75]. The next 
most important sources of information were experience of themselves or family and 
friends (29%), and official sources such as leaflets were found to be used by only 6% of 
patients. Data from decision choice experiments (which typically attempt to elicit the 
decisions people would make using experimental conditions) has highlighted the 
importance of the GP, although it should be noted that it does not completely override 
other sources of information – such as travel times, and possibly performance indicators 
[76]. Interviews of patients seeking antenatal care and those with dementia or 
lymphoma has noted that discussions with professionals, rather than more static 
information, was the most popular method of deriving health information in these 
groups [77]. Some commentators have noted then that patients are only likely to use 
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official performance information in certain circumstances, where it may not be possible 
(or difficult) to seek advice from a trusted care professional [78].   
 
 
What aspects of care are important to patients? 
While patients are interested in the quality of care they will receive, their idea of this 
can differ greatly from what is reported on [18]. Between May 2006 and February 2010 
the Department of Health monitored both how the policies of patient choice of provider 
were being implemented and what factors were important to patients using the 
National Patient Choice Survey (NPCS). The final survey in February 2010 found that 
among patients offered a choice by their GP, being close to their home was the most 
important factor for patients in choosing where to have treatment (selected by 38% of 
patients) [75].  In all of the surveys, factors relating to travel and location ranked highly.  
Surveys from pilots of patient choice in London came to similar conclusions, finding 
that patients place the greatest emphasis on issues such as location, waiting times and 
the experience of their family and friends [60]. Personal experience (selected by 12%) 
and having had a previous good experience (6%) were also important factors [75].  
Information from experimental conditions does indicate that quality is important to 
patients, and that clinical quality is the most important element of this when it comes to 
choosing a hospital [76]. Pilots offering choice of treatment at an alternative provider 
with shorter waits for patients requiring CHD surgery also noted that patients are 
interested in the reputation of the hospital where they will be treated [59].  
 
While much focus is on the “hard” outcomes (such as mortality rates) patients may well 
be interested in “softer” aspects of care than those traditionally focused on by many 
health professionals and researchers. For example, work in the Netherlands found that 
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patients considered patient experience-based information, such as physician 
communication at least as important as other measures such as waiting times for 
surgery [79]. Previous work has highlighted the importance of staff kindness in 
Germany [80] and a “friendly atmosphere” in the Netherlands [81].    
 
In addition to the issues it has been claimed that the architecture for choice has not 
taken account of what is known from behavioural economics (in England as well as in 
other places). Behavioural economics provides firm  guidelines on when provision of 
choice is expected to translate into choice being exercised, social welfare and satisfaction 
being maximised [82]. One of these is that people have stable preferences about what 
they hope to gain from their encounter with the health service [83]. This assumption has 
been questioned, and recent work on designing a web-based system to “nudge” people 
towards making high quality choices found that the lack of stable preferences was one 
of the barriers to this [84].  
 
1.6.2. On quality 
These caveats around the use and understanding of performance information do not 
mean that such schemes necessarily have no impact on quality. Julian Le Grand in his 
influential book The Other Invisible Hand [85], has argued that it only takes a small 
number of people to “vote with their feet”. He claimed that activity shifts of 5 – 10% 
should to motivate organisations to make whole system improvements, and that these 
improvements, although likely to be driven by the middle classes, would benefit 
patients from all socio-economic backgrounds. In postulating his original theory on 
pathways for improvement, Berwick himself also noted that the selection pathway 
could work not only through actual selection, but also through the threats, promises 
and consequences of selection taking place [9].    
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While there is research on the impacts of the use of performance information on quality, 
again much of this is from the U.S. and focuses on cardiac care.  A systematic review 
concluded that although there was limited evidence for the impact of public release on 
patient utilisation, there was better evidence that it stimulated quality improvement 
[26]. The NYCRS was credited with improving the mortality rate for cardiac surgery in 
New York by 41% [34] and the original reputational damage studies did note some 
improvements in quality from the public release of data [1]. More recent analysis of MI 
mortality rates in U.S. states with and without public information releases have found 
that the mortality rates were the same in states using, and those not using releasing 
such data [86]. Similarly, a large program known as Hospital Compare for Medicare 
patients has not been found to improve mortality rates for heart attacks or pneumonia 
[87]. This study did note small declines in mortality for heart failure, but called into 
question whether these falls were large enough to justify the large amount of effort 
which goes into collecting and disseminating the data.   
 
 
A recent cluster RCT of 86 hospitals in Ontario, Canada has provided additional 
evidence of the impact of public performance data on process of care measures for 
cardiac care [88]. This scheme released a public report card on the quality of cardiac 
care, and hospitals were randomised to either receive this report as part of an early 
group, or a late one (18 months after the early group). Examining 18 processes of care 
indicators for both MI and Congestive Heart Failure, this study found that overall these 
indicators did not improve. A 2.5% decline in the 30-day mortality was however, noted 
for hospitals in the early report group however. These small effects were in the context 
of the majority of clinicians surveyed at the hospitals involved claiming to support the 
initiative to collect and release such data, although they did have concerns around the 
issues of data coding [89].  
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There is some evidence on the impacts of the public release of data on quality of care in 
England, such as interviews with NHS hospital managers which have found that at 
least some managers were responsive to published quality information [90]. While it 
was difficult to disentangle public reporting from patient choice, together these were 
found to encourage providers to attempt to make quality improvements. There was also 
a view that a decline in patient numbers was not needed to spur these improvements, 
but rather that improvements would be good for the hospital reputation, and that this 
would in turn secure future patients. Econometric work on the relationship between 
market-like competition for patients in the NHS in England has identified that the 
patient choice reforms were associated with modest falls in MI mortality [91].  This was 
linked to patients becoming more responsive to quality after the advent of patient 
choice [92], implying that they were aware of the relative differences in quality between 
providers. The authors contend that these improvements were due to the greater 
availability of information on quality meaning that sicker patients became more likely 
to choose better hospitals for their care, which improved their (and by extension 
overall)  survival rates. 
 
1.7 Amplification of public reporting through the media 
Much of the previous research focuses on the effects of formal releases of information 
by governments or their agencies. Such information is often amplified by the news 
media, which can have a significant impact on the degree to which the public pay 
attention to information [93]. There is limited research on the degree to which public 
reporting, amplified by the news media, has impacted on patient utilisation. In 1990, the 
US News and World Report began reporting on hospital quality based on a survey of 
physicians by the newspaper. From 1993, they began using a different ranking system 
based on data collected from individual hospitals, and highlighted “America’s Best 
Hospitals.” This is currently conducted on around 5,000 hospitals with 16 adult 
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specialties (http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings), with the majority of 
hospitals not being featured for all specialties, but a “roll of honour” highlights those 
scoring top of the scale in at least six of the included specialties. Evaluation of the 
impact of this publicity on patient utilisation between 1998 and 2004 has focused on 
non-emergency, Medicare patients and concluded that on average, a one place increase 
on this list (i.e. from second best to first best hospital) in an individual specialty would 
equate to almost 0.9% more patients for that specialty [94]. On average a hospital moves 
between five and six places in the ranking between years, so this work estimated that an 
average hospital could expect a 5% change in patient numbers every year, driven by the 
release of this information. 
 
Scandals in healthcare, which are often widely reported on, and may when they first 
come to the public’s attention contain much novel “news”, present a good opportunity 
to study the effects of these information releases on patient utilisation at affected 
providers. They are also a focus for news media reporting. Work in the U.S. found that 
reporting of actual death rates was associated with minimal changes in patient 
utilisation, but that press reports of single unexpected deaths had a much larger impact 
[48].  In England there has been research on the impact of public ratings by the 
healthcare regulator upon staff at the organisations affected [95]. This found that being 
rated as one of the worst hospitals in the country was extremely damaging for staff 
morale and also that it stimulated some negative consequences such as bullying among 
staff members. There is no research however, on the impact of such publicity on patient 
utilisation at the organisations affected.  
 
1.8 Summary of key points in this chapter 
Governments have increasingly turned to the introduction of choice and competition to 
improve performance of healthcare systems. This has led to a large increase in interest 
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in publishing information on the quality of different providers, which is theoretically 
linked to quality improvements by three pathways of patient selection, change in care 
delivery and reputational damage.  There is however, limited evidence that such 
reporting has an impact on patient utilisation at the organisations involved, that is, 
whether the selection pathway is in operation. Although a change in patient utilisation 
is not required to bring about improvements in quality, without this the incentive for 
providers to improve is seriously weakened. Possible reasons for the observed lack of 
effects include that patients do not see, or understand publicly released information, 
that other information is more important to them, or that these reports do not tell them 
anything which they do not already know. Despite these caveats, the explicit or implicit 
idea of the selection pathway retains great popularity among policy makers. 
 
 
Much of the research on the public release of performance data come from the U.S. and 
focuses on a few key schemes, with a particular emphasis on reporting for various 
forms of cardiac surgery. There is a lack of research evidence on the impact of such 
reporting on patient utilisation in England as well as a lack of data on the impacts of 
releases on specific areas on quality of care. As much of the previous work has focused 
on a few schemes there is also a lack of research on the degree to which high-profile 
reporting, amplified through the media rather than other channels, may impact on 
patient utilisation at the organisations involved. 
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Chapter 2: English health policy background  
2.1 A brief history of the release of performance information in the U.K.  
The Journal of the Royal Statistics Society published the mortality rates for metropolitan 
hospitals from 1861 to 1865 [4] until the scheme was derailed by the hospitals involved 
withdrawing their support. This scheme gave information on the number of 
admissions, deaths and average durations of stay and involved little in the way of 
interpretation. After the cessation of publishing this mortality data a lengthy hiatus 
ensued until mortality rates for English hospitals were released from 1992 to 1996 [96]. 
Despite being easy to interpret and providing the relative rank of different providers, 
these Health Service Indicators received little publicity and were widely ignored.  The 
Health Service Indicators developed from earlier measures - beginning in 1983 the 
Department of Health and Social Security published indicators on staffing, ambulance 
services and clinical activity. These were accompanied by various warnings on the 
validity of the data on which they were based and were designed to be used by those 
within the service only. From 1992, a mortality indicator was added to the list, giving 
the number of deaths standardised against the expected pattern for England.  The 
mortality data was covered only in the newspaper The Times, which received 
widespread criticism for its coverage and was forced to later issue an apology to NHS 
staff [96]. While these mortality indicators received little publicity, more performance 
indicators announced in the Patients Charter of 1991 would be published in 1994 [97]. 
These would focus on waiting times, day case procedures and cancelled operations, 
rather than factors such as clinical quality [8]. The mortality data from the Health Service 
Indicators were discontinued by the Government in 1996.  
 
At a similar time to England’s release of mortality data through the Health Service 
Indicators, Scotland began releasing clinical outcome indicators collected by their 
Clinical Resource and Audit Group (CRAG) [98]. There were 38 indicators across 
separate clinical areas, all based on at least three years of data and standardised (where 
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appropriate) for case-mix factors such as main diagnoses or previous admissions to 
hospital. These indicators were not part of a formal assessment framework and the 
Scottish Executive was keen to highlight that they should not be looked upon as the 
definitive judgement on quality of care. Despite the concerns of some of those involved, 
the coverage of these indicators in the media was informed and responsible and there 
was little evidence that they caused widespread public unease [98].  This however, may 
be related to the fact that they had low penetration into the consciousness of either 
professionals or the public. They were criticised for a low level of impact -  they were 
rarely used to stimulate direct improvements at NHS trusts, which was attributed both 
to their design as well as the lack of belief in their usefulness [61]. Although these 
indicators were not directly focused or aimed at patients, when 16 local health councils 
were asked how many enquiries they had received from patients on the CRAG 
indicators, all but one replied they had received no inquiries, and they felt that patients 
were much more likely to rely on informal information from their GP. While around a 
quarter of GPs claimed to consult the indicators, most were more likely to use waiting 
times and local audit data as the primary source for decision making [98]. 
 
In both of these instances in England and Scotland, resistance to the publication of this 
information by the medical profession was something of a constant. The collegial model 
of self-regulation for medical professionals had long been in existence [99], but by the 
late 1990s things were beginning to change. While there had been medical scandals in 
the past, in the 1990s the profession was rocked by a series of scandals closer together in 
time than previous events. These included the well-known cases of Harold Shipman 
and Rodney Ledward, but also others perhaps less well remembered, including GPs 
and psychiatrists sexually abusing female patients [99]. The New Labour government 
subsequently turned away from self-regulation, spurred on by both these scandals, as 
well as by the Bristol Inquiry.  
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Upon coming to power in 1997 the New Labour government announced significant 
reforms in their first White Paper on the NHS - The New NHS, Modern Dependable [100]. 
This announced a new survey of patient experience, new measures of performance, as 
well as a guarantee for national standards of excellence. The standards against which 
the NHS would be measured and how these would be monitored were set out in A 
First-Class Service – Quality in the NHS [101] and the NHS Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF) [102]. It was the Performance Assessment Framework which first brought 
high-profile national indicators to the English NHS and it had the dual purpose of 
assessing performance and encouraging quality improvements. These were followed up 
by The NHS Plan in 2000, which heralded the government’s “historic commitment to 
increase the funding of the NHS over the next four years”[103]. There was commitment 
to bringing health spending up to the European Union average, as well as supporting 
the pledges made in the Performance Assessment Framework to improve outcomes across 
a range of services. It pledged to give patients better information on which to choose 
their GP, as well as a concordat with the private sector aimed mainly at bringing long 
waiting times down.  The NHS Plan stated the aim that by 2005 patients would be able 
to book all of their appointments and elective hospital admissions at a time convenient 
to them, rather than one convenient for the hospital alone. These ideas were further 
built upon in 2002 by Delivering the NHS Plan, which promised an increase in capacity, a 
decrease in waiting times and a focus on supply side reform [104].  Delivering the NHS 
Plan also pledged to create the incentives for Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to choose the 
most appropriate provider, and to introduce a new, tougher regulator for healthcare. 
Together, these reforms were aimed at giving patients more information in order to 
choose their care providers, using the selection pathway to motivate improvements in 
care. 
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2.2 Main providers of performance information in the English NHS 
Performance information on healthcare in England is currently provided by a number 
of sources, including the government sponsored NHS Choices website [105], the private 
sector (where the main provider is Doctor Foster [106]), and the national quality 
regulator for health and social care, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) [107]. Each of 
these purveyors of information has different remits and presentational styles. The NHS 
Choices website was launched in July 2007 as part of a wider agenda of stimulating 
patient choice in the NHS. Though its “find and choose a service” function patients can 
compare the location and mortality rates at local hospitals, as well as reading user 
ratings of care at hospitals, general practices, dentists and a range of other services. 
Doctor Foster produce an annual report on the NHS which names their “trusts of the 
year”, as well as producing report cards for different hospitals, and a consultant guide 
with detail on the qualifications and experience of consultants in both the NHS and the 
independent sector.   Doctor Foster began releasing such data in 2001 and are 
acknowledged to have brought a greater appreciation of the importance of the format of 
data presentation [108]. 
 
The CQC is the independent regulator for health and social care in England, and as part 
of their regulatory remit they are responsible for granting licenses to practice to 
healthcare providers, as well as assessing them against various standards of quality and 
safety. In their web based “Care Directory” patients can look up their local hospital 
trusts, and access information from patient surveys, inspections on infection control and 
other regulatory information such as performance against a range of standards. The 
CQC is the successor to the Healthcare Commission (HC), which between 2004 and 
2009 carried out similar activities in healthcare to the CQC, while also performing an 
Annual Health Check on hospital trusts every year. This rated healthcare trusts 
separately for quality of services and financial management as weak, fair, good, or 
excellent.  The results were often accompanied by significant media attention as well as 
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being published on their website. The HC was preceded by CHI which was established 
in 2000 to regulate quality of care in the NHS until it was replaced by the HC.  
 
Until recently the majority of the information released about quality of care in the 
English NHS has been at the hospital trust level. This is with the exception of the 
Society for Cardiothoracic Surgeons which has released benchmark and performance 
data on cardiac surgery since 1977 [109].  Until recently there was also little available 
performance information on specific forms of surgery. This changed however when the 
NHS began publishing consultant level information for ten medical and surgical 
specialities in June 2013 [110]. The NHS has also recently begun to publish information 
from the Family and Friends test, with the explicit intention that these scores are used 
by patients to inform their choice of provider [111].  
 
2.2.1 The special case of regulators 
The Bristol Inquiry into paediatric heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary and Bristol 
Royal Hospital for Sick Children began in 1998 and the final report was published in 
2001 [112]. Amid the recognition that there was a proliferation of units not up to the 
complex task of paediatric heart surgery, Bristol had been designated as a “Supra 
Regional Service” for this type of surgery in 1984. Concerns about the adequacy of the 
service began to be raised from the late 1980s, and the death of Joshua Loveday in 
January 1995 is now considered now to have been the catalyst for action at Bristol. In 
1998 one of the cardiac surgeons and the Chief Executive of the Trust were found guilty 
of serious professional misconduct by the General Medical Council and removed from 
the medical register. In 2001 analysis of routine data indicated that the mortality rates 
for under 1 year olds at Bristol did indeed make it an outlier, and found no statistical 
reasons why this may have been the case [113].  The inquiry was established by the 
Secretary of State for Health and covered the period from 1984 to 1995.  The report was 
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highly critical of a large number of aspects of care both in Bristol and throughout the 
whole of the NHS [112].  
 
On the issue of whether the deaths at Bristol could have been prevented the final report 
noted that that there had been a lot of unpublished data held by various organisations, 
but that this was never acted upon [112]. It also noted that data held by the Department 
of Health on mortality in hospitals was not recognised as being a potentially important 
source of information on hospital performance. The report recommended the 
establishment of an independent Office for Information on Performance of Health care 
which became part of a newly designed CHI. The ideas put forward in the Bristol 
report, that information should be shared with patients, and that specific organisations 
should be set up to do this, proved influential. A response to the crisis at Bristol is 
viewed as one of the main catalysts to the Labour government announcing that 
mortality rates for every hospital would be released in 1998 [96], and Bristol was 
directly mentioned when mortality tables were announced [114]. Also, analysis of the 
media coverage surrounding Bristol noted that there was high degree of hostility to the 
ideas of self-regulation and highlighted the role of the media (sometimes sensationalist) 
coverage in determining public confidence in the NHS [115].  
 
In 1998, the establishment of CHI  was announced in A first class service: Quality in the 
new NHS [101] and it opened in 2000.  The remit of the CHI was to regulate quality of 
care in the NHS, to identify and spread best practice, and to root out poor performance. 
As part of this work, they published “star ratings” where NHS providers were scored 
from zero stars to three stars as a global measure of their quality of clinical services. 
These ratings were first published centrally by the Department of Health in September 
2000, and at the time were lauded as a key element of the government commitment to 
provide comprehensive yet understandable information on the relative performance of 
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healthcare providers to the public [95]. Star ratings gave the public a simple four way 
categorisation of how well a provider was doing, from zero to three stars, with zero 
starred organisations having the lowest achievement levels against key targets. These 
star ratings were high-profile - in 2001 the 12 hospital trusts rated as zero stars in the 
star ratings exercise were dubbed the “dirty dozen” , and half of these chief executives 
subsequently lost their jobs [116]. The system of star ratings was explicitly designed to 
inflict reputational damage on trusts and gained a lot of publicity, which has been 
claimed to be a large reason for their effects [117]. 
 
CHI were well aware of the possibility of using public opinion and the release of 
performance information to stimulate improvements - writing an editorial on the scope 
of the new organisation, members of CHI claimed that perhaps the most effective 
sanction they had against organisations was to put their findings into the public domain 
[118]. The hope was to reflect back to local people when services were performing well 
and also to inform them as to mechanisms for accountability. For the NHS the 
regulatory model focused on supporting organisations, and it lacked the “big sticks” 
available to OFSTED (the regulator for schools), such as directly removing heads of 
schools [119]. On 1st April 2004 the HC was formed after being announced in the Health 
and Social Care Act 2003 [120] and replaced CHI.  It had the responsibility of 
“encouraging improvement in the provision of health care by and for NHS bodies” in 
England and Wales” [121] and was designed to sit alongside other systems “with a 
stronger focus on the commissioning of services [and] greater choice for patients” [121]. 
The HC evolved the star ratings systems into Annual Health Checks, which were 
similarly designed to rate the performance of organisations and make this information 
available to the public. 
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In addition to their work reporting on the general quality of care at healthcare 
providers, the HC also investigated allegations of serious failings at organisations, 
particularly focusing on patient safety. The central aim of this program of investigations 
was to help organisations to improve, to build public confidence in the NHS and to 
ensure a safe level of care throughout the whole system [122]. These investigations and 
their associated reports often gained a high degree of media coverage, often more so 
than other forms of reporting, due to their serious and rare nature [121]. Candidates for 
investigations were brought to the attention of the HC through a variety of 
mechanisms, and only a minority of these resulted in a full inspection. A national 
helpline fielded requests and concerns from a variety of sources including the public, 
MPs, journalists, the police or from staff at healthcare organisations. The Secretary of 
State for Health also had the opportunity to request an investigation. In the first three 
years of operation, the HC received over 200 requests for investigations, and only 13 of 
these resulted in investigations [122].  
 
This was in part due to the staged nature of the HC approach, reserving investigations 
for only the most serious of incidents where it was felt that sufficient efforts were not 
being made by the organisations involved to correct these [122]. Requests were first 
screened by the staff on the national helpline, before the investigation team assessed 
whether the request met the criteria for an investigation. If these criteria were met, there 
would be initial consideration of the issue – this would involve a closer examination of 
the concerns, scrutinising statistical information on outcomes and patient surveys, 
talking to individuals affected, and assessing the declaration by the organisation on 
their attainment of core standards. The HC could decide at all of these stages that a full 
investigation was not warranted. If they considered that the organisation was not doing 
all it could to ensure safety, but that the organisation could rectify the issue themselves, 
they could intervene, which was one step below an investigation. Finally, it there was 
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credible information suggesting serious failure, an investigation would be held to 
identify the root causes and issue recommendations. 
 
The HC also published reviews of the provision of care for specific areas. These focused 
on elements of the health service used by vulnerable groups and on pathways of care, 
for example older people, diabetes care and maternity [121]. Over their lifetime, the HC 
conducted 30 of these reviews, each of which generated recommendations for the whole 
of the NHS on improving care. An important part of these reviews was to design 
methods for the benchmarking of services at different providers, and the construction of 
indicators for use in the monitoring of services. This allowed providers to be ranked 
and was an important part of the efforts to shed light on the variations in care between 
different organisations. Reviews typically did not name providers individually but 
scores from these could be used as part of the ongoing program of monitoring quality of 
care. 
  
2.3 Main policy developments 
The increasing release of performance information to the public was accompanied by a 
number of other supporting policies. Simon Stevens, health policy advisor to Tony Blair 
describes three marginally overlapping phases in English health policy over time. This 
started with what he termed “provider support” after the recognition that compared 
with other similar countries the NHS had lower levels of funding. Large increases in 
funding were announced and this strategy involved investing in increasing the size of 
the clinical workforce and in infrastructure. The NHS Modernisation Agency also 
redesigned a number of key services during this time alongside a focus on learning and 
education for frontline staff.  Recognising that more resources by themselves would not 
be enough to drive up quality, there was then an increase in centralisation, through 
what Stevens called “hierarchical challenge” but what has been termed by others 
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“targets and terror” [23]. This increased the role for the Department of Health in the 
setting of targets (perhaps most notably in waiting times) with tough sanctions and the 
introduction of new regulatory bodies to drive improvements. Performance 
management to ensure that providers were meeting these targets was a common feature 
during this period. It was also during this time that “naming and shaming” of poorly 
performing organisations became common and league tables of performance became a 
common feature.   
 
These two phases gradually gave way to what Stevens termed the “localist challenge” 
phase – an attempt to use the incentives offered by making money follow the patient 
and emphasising quasi-market principles to set in place a positive cycle of 
improvement. Although the Labour government had dismantled the internal market in 
healthcare upon coming to power in 1997, this period saw the re-introduction of such 
market-like aspects to the NHS. The best way to ensure improved quality in the NHS 
was claimed to be through the use of market-like mechanisms and these initiatives were 
implemented alongside, and were often a driver of, greater public release of 
performance data to its current ubiquity. In keeping with the New Labour Third Way, 
these reforms were planned to use the best elements of command and control as well as 
the market in driving improvements for the NHS. Under this system, the release of 
performance data was viewed as an integral lever to allow patients to choose the best 
care and stimulate improvements. The reforms are well captured in Figure 1 below, 
from the Department of Health publication Health reform in England, update and next steps 
[123]. 
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Financial reforms such as Payment by Results (whereby hospital trusts were paid a 
fixed price for defined procedures) were designed to enable money to follow the 
patient, and create incentives for providers to attract patients to them [124]. The system 
developed a national tariff to set how much money an organisation would receive for 
each patient, which was based primarily on what they were admitted for under a 
system known as Health Resource Groups. This was designed to create the incentives 
for providers to extend their market share, as more patients would equal more money, 
which could then be re-invested in improving services.  
 
 Supply side reforms included an increase in provider numbers (such as the 
introduction of privately run Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) from 1999), 
with more freedom from the government (embodied in Foundation Trusts, which were 
semi-autonomous from government control). ISTCs were first set up in 2003, providing 
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certain operations and diagnostic services and aimed both to drive down waiting lists 
and to extend the capacity for the NHS as a whole [125].   Foundation trusts were first 
created in 2003 and they were designated as “public benefit corporations” meaning that 
they enjoyed greater freedoms than other NHS trusts. For example, they are able to 
enter joint ventures with the private sector and were part of an “earned autonomy” 
ethos, where high performing organisations would be inspected less often and could 
eventually apply to enjoy the freedoms of being a Foundation Trust.  Rather than being 
accountable to the Department of Health, they were intended to answer to their local 
communities, through their elected board of governors. 
 
Demand side reforms were supported by the NHS Choose and Book  electronic booking 
system implemented in 2006 [126, 127] which was designed to give patients choice of 
provider at the point of referral, and was later accompanied by the NHS Choices 
website. This was accompanied by allowing patients to choose where they were treated 
for secondary care.  In 2003, all patients waiting more than six months for surgery were 
offered a choice of place for their procedure, while in January 2006 a choice of four or 
more providers was offered to all patients [128]. Finally all patients were offered a 
choice of any provider from April 2008 [129], and this choice of provider was enshrined 
as a right for patients in the NHS Constitution in 2009 [130].  
 
Together, this system of an increased number of providers, with more freedom to 
innovate and control their own budgets, in a system paying fixed prices for treating 
patients who were able to choose their provider, was designed to improve the whole of 
the NHS. These reforms were also supported by a new system of regulation and 
inspection as well as new systems of management intended to guarantee value for 
money, among other objectives. 
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2.3.1 Developments since 2010 
When the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government came to power in 2010 
they inherited an NHS which had a large system to release performance data to the 
public and to allow patients a choice of their secondary care provider. The current 
government shows considerable enthusiasm for the further release of information (both 
in healthcare and in other sectors). The government has promised an “information 
revolution” – giving people more information, control and choice in their care [131]. 
The aspiration is that “patients will have choice of any provider, choice of consultant-
led team, choice of GP practice and choice of treatment” [132], and the expectation is 
that choice of both provider and of treatment will become the norm no later than 
2013/14.   It should be noted that while the new government plans extend to giving 
people choice over their treatment and other areas, previous policies were limited 
mainly to encouraging choice of provider and the timing of treatments. 
 
The latest update to the NHS Constitution emphasises that “providing information to 
support patient choice is a major priority for the NHS” [133, 134]. In addition, the 
operating framework for the NHS in 2013/14 states that “Measuring and publishing 
information on health outcomes are important for encouraging improvements in 
quality” [135]. This has been a policy ambition for some time and in 2008 High Quality 
Care for All [136] introduced the right for patients to choose both treatments and 
providers, as well as information on quality so that patients can make informed choices. 
It also committed the NHS to extending choice of General Practitioner (GP) practice, 
and states that “For the first time we will systematically measure and publish 
information about the quality of care from the frontline up. Measures will include 
patients’ own views on the success of their treatment and the quality of their 
experiences”. There have also been further developments of NHS Choices, which now 
contains free text moderated comments from people who have received care at 
individual providers.  
56 
 
This is in addition to the publication of the Family and Friends test from July 2013 [137]. 
This is a single question on whether patients would recommend the service they have 
received to their family and friends, with the aim of giving an easy to understand rating 
of the quality of care. There are also now individual surgeon level mortality rates 
available for ten selected specialties under NHS Commissioning Board new guidance 
[110]. Although there has been some criticism of the methodology used and the 
statistical power of the analysis [138], the aim is that this will allow patients to choose, 
and that it will stimulate the improvements witnessed following similar initiatives for 
cardiac surgery. A further website Care Connect 
(https://www.nhs.uk/careconnect/choices) has been launched, and billed as a TripAdvisor 
style website for the health service [139]. This initiative is part of a wider drive to 
encourage openness, and mainly focuses on patient complaints and resolving them, but 
also displays this information for other potential patients to use. In general then, there is 
a growing diversity of providers of such performance information. 
 
2.4 Patient choice pilots 
Much of the information on the implementation of patient choice policies in England 
comes from the London Patient Choice Project (LPCP), and the national CHD pilot. The 
LPCP  began in October 2002 and involved offering patients registered with a London 
GP who were approaching six months on a waiting list alternative choices of where to 
have their hospital treatment [140]. This applied to patients in one of 35 medical 
specialities with limited comorbid conditions, and hospital trusts were free to decide 
which patients would be offered a choice. By 2004, 80% of the patients in the pilot were 
in the three specialties of orthopaedics, ophthalmology and general surgery, with a 
wide variety of procedures accounting for the other 20% [140].This was in the context of 
new national waiting time targets and patients who accepted the offer of choice would 
be treated sooner than they would have been if they had not accepted. The rationale 
behind the system was that hospital trusts with long waiting lists would have an 
incentive to export some of their patients in order to bring these waiting times down. 
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Other providers which had spare capacity would have a corresponding incentive to 
import some of these patients in order to fill their capacity. The initial intention was that 
50,000 patients would be offered a choice within one year, but offering of choice was 
much lower than this. Between October 2002 and June 2004 22,464 patients had been 
offered treatment at an alternative hospital, of which 14,833 (66% of those offered) 
accepted the offer.  The pilot was also against a backdrop of efforts to improve capacity 
across London, and part of the capital budget was transferred to the pilot team in order 
to allow more capacity to be brought online in time to be operating alongside patients 
being offered choice. By the start of 2004 all of the new capacity was in Diagnostic and 
Treatment Centres ran by NHS organisations, although some non-NHS providers 
became operational after this. The increases in capacity for operations were large:  a 14% 
increase for ophthalmology, a 14% increase for general surgery and a 25% increase for 
orthopaedics. 
  
Patients in the LPCP were asked about what factors would influence their decisions for 
where to have treatment in both hypothetical and real scenarios [60].  Over 2,000 
patients who were on the waiting list and nearly one thousand who had already been 
treated were surveyed to ascertain their reactions to choice and their information needs. 
When were asked before surgery the factor most commonly said to influence choice of 
hospital was “high success rates for operation” followed by “high standard of 
cleanliness” and then “good communication between hospitals and GPs.” These were 
cited as important by 86.7%, 86.1% and 82.6% of patients respectively. Practical 
concerns such as transport arrangements and hospital location were found to be less 
important to people from more advantaged groups, although there were no socio-
economic differences in the percentage of people who took up choice if offered.  
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It should be remembered that the patients in the LPCP were different to the population 
who were offered a choice once the policy was rolled out more widely. As well as being 
involved in the pilot with the particular focus on patient choice, they were facing long 
waits for specific types of surgery and were contacted specifically with the offer of 
choice, rather than being offered a choice at the point of referral by their GP.  An 
important aspect of the scheme which has not been rolled out in national policy on 
patient choice of provider is that in the LPCP many patients were offered free transport 
if they attended an alternative hospital. For example, on the journey to hospital 74% of 
those treated at an alternative hospital had some form of transport arranged and paid 
for by the hospital, which compares to fewer than 4% if they stayed at their original 
hospital [60]. 
 
The degree to which patients were offered choice of another provider was relatively 
low. Only one in three of the patients who were eligible for choice of an alternative 
hospital were found to have been offered it, and this was found to vary from 14% to 
42% across the five hospitals  involved in the survey [60]. This survey noted that while 
the reasons for this are not known, it seems likely that as awareness of the success of the 
scheme from the patients’ point of view grew, demand for choice from patients is likely 
to grow [60]. The scheme in London also involved Patient Care Advisors (PCAs) who 
were tasked with guiding patients through the process of considering whether to attend 
another hospital, and act as a link between the patients and the hospitals. These PCAs 
contacted eligible patients on the phone or by post to offer them a choice, talked 
through any questions patients may have on any aspects of the scheme and made any 
necessary arrangements. PCAs were popular among patients (93% of patients reported 
that they provided a “good” service or better) and were cited as a main source of 
information on the hospitals by a majority of patients. Neither PCAs nor the offer of free 
transport have been replicated as the policies of patient choice of provider have been 
rolled out nationally. 
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The national CHD pilot scheme began in July 2002 and meant that patients who had 
been waiting for more than six months for a heart operation at one of 24 NHS trusts 
nationally were offered a choice of an alternative provider.   Evaluation of this scheme 
using a survey of patients who had been involved found that 75% of those eligible were 
offered a choice of hospital and half of these took up the offer of choice at an alternative 
provider [59]. In terms of what was important to patients, this survey concluded that 
the reputation of the hospital was the most important factor for patients and was 
considered “very important” by 71% of respondents. Speed of treatment however, and 
the reputation of the surgeon who would perform the operation came close behind this 
in terms of importance at 67% and 64% respectively.  
 
There were also a number of other pilots of offering patients who had waited a long 
time choice of an alternative provider, although these were not subject to the same 
degree of research and evaluation.  A pilot in Manchester offered patients awaiting 
treatment for Ear, Nose and Throat, orthopaedic or general surgery, choice of an 
alternative provider after waiting for six months [141]. The pilot was conducted by NHS 
trusts serving a deprived community in Manchester and the alternative providers were 
three specific treatment centres in the local area. Other than a survey of patients 
undergoing the scheme however, there is a lack of other evaluation of the Manchester 
scheme [142]. The only pilot which offered patient choice of provider at the point of 
referral by the GP (as opposed to while on the waiting list) was a four month project ran 
in collaboration between the Department of Health and Doctor Foster [142]. Over a 
period of four months, 38 GP practices across three Strategic Health Authorities were 
randomised into being “choice” or “non-choice” practices. Patients were asked for 
consent when being referred and 593 patients consented to take part. Those in “choice” 
practices were given a booklet to explain the scheme and could make the choice of 
where to be treated with the GP upon referral or consult a website and telephone line 
which included comparative information on different hospitals. This found that only 
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one in five GPs reported offering choice to all or most of their patients, and that patients 
considered ease of access and quality more important than waiting times [143]. Adding 
this choice to the consultation was not found to make consultations take longer than 
previously, and there was no change in referral pathways, with the majority of patients 
still opting for treatment at their local hospital.  
 
In the LPCP the quality of the information they received was a central concern for 
patients [60]. One in three patients was not satisfied with this and would have liked 
more information on the experience of surgeons, success rates, as well as hygiene and 
safety. The majority of patients were satisfied with the amount of information they 
received on other aspects such as travel arrangements and there was some suggestion 
that a certain proportion of patients did not choose an alternative provider as they did 
not feel they had the relevant information to do so. Similarly, in the Department of 
Health/Doctor Foster pilot both patients and GPs involved in the scheme stated that 
they wanted more information on which to base their choices [143]. Again it was noted 
that with limited information, some patients may be reluctant to “leave” their local 
provider. This pilot also highlighted that historical performance indicators on technical 
measures are of limited value to patients. In contrast the majority of patients in the 
Manchester pilot were satisfied with the level of information they received, although 
the report did note that such information should be available from mainstream NHS 
services to avoid certain groups being disadvantaged by not being able to access it 
[141]. 
 
2.5 Evidence from national implementation of patient choice policies 
 
Since 2006, there has been an increase in the percentage of patients offered a choice of 
provider by their GP. The percentage of patients who recall being offered a choice by 
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their GP has risen from 30% in May/June to 49% in the final NPCS in February 2010 
[75]. There has also been a corresponding increase in the percentage of patients who 
were aware of their right to choose before visiting their GP – from 29% in 2006 to 49% in 
2010. 67% of patients responded that they were able to attend the hospital they wanted, 
although this was different between those who were and were not offered a choice. 88% 
of those offered a choice were able to attend the hospital they wanted, compared with 
47% of those not offered a choice. Interviews with GPs in four local health economies 
reveal that they offered almost all of their patients a choice of provider, even though 
this is not what is revealed in patient surveys [90]. In general, these interviews found 
that senior managers had a reasonable understanding of the relevant policies, and 
although few mentioned patient choice directly, they were aware that patients could 
choose where to be treated. Despite this, most of the focus of these managers was on 
maintaining their current market share, rather than extending it via performing well on 
ratings and attracting more patients.   
 
 
Some differences have been noted in the geographical breakdown of patients being 
offered and being aware of their right to choose. The NPCS found that offering of choice 
by Strategic Health Authority differed from 57% in the North East, to 44% in the South 
East Coast, against the national average of 49% [75]. Awareness of choice before 
attending the GP was also highest in the North East, at 68%, and lowest in the South 
Central area, at 50%.  Hospital providers have also noted that there are large differences 
between PCTs in the degree to which they promote patient choice of provider [90]. 
 
 
Resistance to, and issues with the electronic booking systems designed to support these 
policies have been noted by GPs [144], and similar issues were noted in the Netherlands 
when similar policies were implemented [145]. These issues are one of the reasons why 
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GPs may not have been offering choice of provider to all patients. In addition, local 
relationships have been noted to be very important and are preferred in many areas to 
more direct competition for patients [146]. It has also been noted that the patient choice 
policies were often subordinated to other aims such as reducing and managing waiting 
lists  and were not the highest priority for the majority of staff, who were more focused 
on other indicators such as waiting time targets [147]. 
 
The main sources of information on which patients were expected to base their choices 
are that on the Choose and Book system, and the NHS Choices website. Choose and 
Book is part of the National Program for Information Technology, and once a GP has 
made the decision to refer a patient, their IT system should link to it. Once they have 
selected the specialty, GPs can search either by distance/postcode or by waiting time. 
GPs can then confirm the booking during the consultation, or patients can do this 
themselves later, either on the internet, or by calling a telephone line staffed by booking 
advisors. Take up of the service was initially slow, and only 8% of GPs were using the 
system fully when it first came on line in January 2006 [78]. In 2007/08 it was still used 
to book less than half of all first outpatient appointments [145]. Use of the system is 
incentivised by payments under Local Enhanced Services schemes at the PCT level and 
this freedom for PCTs to decide on these incentives mean that they are not in place in all 
areas, despite the fact that GPs cite these incentives as a key reason to continue using 
the Choose and Book [90]. 
 
The NHS Choices website was launched in June 2007 and is designed to give 
information both to support choice of provider but also general health advice and 
information on different treatments. The website was initially criticised for providing 
only aggregate data on waiting times (which were indicative and averaged across 
whole trusts, rather than for individual hospitals) for patients to base their choices on 
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[90]. These were later supplemented by information on quality standards from the 
regulators, and the “find and choose” services function allowed direct comparison of 
different organisations after searching by postcode or provider name. More recently the 
NHS Choices website has been moving towards a system which aims to satisfy the 
desire of people to know how other people “like them” have evaluated and experienced 
care  [148]. For example, there are now free text comments on the quality of care 
previous patients have received. Although these are moderated for offensive or 
inappropriate content, patients can otherwise rate their experiences of care numerically 
and describe their reasons in a comments section. These comments and ratings are then 
available for other (potential) patients to see.  
 
Despite this rise in both awareness of choice and increasing information, there is little 
indication that official performance information is used by many patients in making 
their decisions.  As noted patients typically rate factors such as their own experience or 
that of their family and friends above more official performance information and place 
great weight on the opinion of their GP. In initially proposing his pathways linking the 
release of information to improvements, Berwick noted that people may be unable to 
personalise the performance information available to them, and that this can then lead 
them to listen to the narratives of their family and friends instead of official sources [9]. 
Nonetheless, in the February 2010 NPCS 83% of patients offered a choice of provider 
were satisfied with the amount of information available to them [75].  
 
2.6 Concerns and evidence of equity effects 
Part of the theory behind the reforms was that they would improve equity. The 
government expected that these policies extending patient choice of provider would 
have a positive impact on equity as they would bring the same choice of where to be 
treated, which the middle classes had always enjoyed, to everyone [149]. It was 
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intended that as the new system was designed to drive up standards at poorly 
performing hospitals, which are disproportionally in areas of socio-economic 
deprivation, care would be improved for those using these hospitals. Finally, the 
policies were designed to improve the whole system and encourage the middle classes 
to utilise the NHS rather than leave it for independent sector care, which would have 
positive impacts on solidarity more generally [150].  
 
There have however, been concerns that the public release of performance information 
coupled with the ability to choose where to be treated would mean that only the sharp 
elbowed middle classes would be able to interpret this information and use it to get 
better care.  Those less able to understand information may be disadvantaged by moves 
towards increased choice and competition in healthcare [151], or they may simply be 
less likely to be offered a choice than more affluent patients. These criticisms are 
bolstered by findings that much of the released information is difficult to interpret and 
that this difficulty may differ by patient characteristics such as education [64]. This has 
led to concern that certain groups may be less able to interpret and act on performance 
information which may lead to the exacerbation of inequalities [152]. In addition to this 
the very notion of introducing patient choice to the NHS has been claimed to be directly 
at odds with the ideals of a service designed as a collective system [153, 154]. A review 
of the likely equity effects, drawing on evidence from health as well as other sectors 
concluded that the more educated would be the most likely to benefit, although this 
could be offset by the provision of specific information and support for other groups 
[10]. Additionally, a review in 2005 concluded that specific measures of equity were 
needed to guard against these negative effects as the policies developed [155]. 
 
The research evidence on the impact of policies introducing patient choice and provider 
competition into the English NHS have generally found positive results, or at least a 
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lack of negative effects. Examination of availability of beds compared with demand 
found that in some areas of England (particularly the South East other than London), 
patients would have to travel further to exercise choice of non-local hospital [156]. This 
suggests that policies promoting patient choice of hospital may have differential 
potential for meaningful impact in different areas. Evaluation of the effects of the 
policies of patient choice found no evidence of an increase in socio-economic inequality 
in access to hospital care between 2002 and 2009 [157, 158].  The reforms were found to 
reduce waiting times overall as well as socio-economic inequalities in these [159], as 
well as having no detrimental impact on inequalities in hip replacements, 
revascularisations [160] endoscopies and cataracts [157]. In fact, increases in operation 
rates for these four procedures indicated that the reforms may have improved equity, as 
the rate at which they were performed increased at a faster pace in more deprived areas 
than in affluent areas [157]. Nonetheless, waiting times have been criticised as a poor 
marker for equity, as more well-off patients may still be choosing better quality 
hospitals, which in turn have longer waiting times due to their increased popularity 
[161]. 
 
Analysis of a patient survey from 2009 found that more affluent patients were not more 
likely to be offered a choice of provider [162]. These more affluent patients however, 
were more likely to travel beyond their local area for treatment which leaves the 
possibility that less affluent groups may be disadvantaged by these policies. This survey 
was conducted in four local health economies in England, chosen to give a cross section 
of areas with low/high penetration and potential for choice. Similar findings come from 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden where it has been noted that younger, more educated 
patients who have clearly defined treatment needs are more likely to attend a non-local 
provider [163].  
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Survey evidence from pilots of the patient choice scheme in London (discussed in more 
detail previously) identified few inequalities in the likelihood of being offered a choice, 
or in taking up the choice to attend a non-local provider [60]. People in paid 
employment were more likely to attend a non-local hospital than those not in 
employment (73% vs. 63%), although there were no differences across ethnicity, income, 
educational attainment or social class groups. National surveys conducted by the 
Department of Health have investigated the degree to which patients were aware of 
their ability to choose as well as whether they were offered a choice by their GP [75]. In 
February 2010 this found that older patients were more likely to be aware of their right 
to choose (e.g. among men 62% of those over the age of 65 years were aware of this, 
compared with 39% of those aged 16-34 years). There were few differences in the 
percentage of patients offered a choice across age groups (e.g. 48% of women aged 65+ 
were offered a choice, compared with 47% of women aged 16-34 years) or between 
those with and without a long term limiting illness. There was some suggestion that 
patients of White ethnicity were more likely to be offered a choice however (49% 
compared with an average of 43% for non-White groups).  
 
It has been suggested that some groups may need specific support, and perhaps patient 
advocates to assist them in making choices [164].  An audit of Patient Advice and 
Liaison Services provided nationally in 2005 noted that there was marked variation in 
the funding and function of these services between different NHS trusts, and so there 
may be unequal access to support for patients [165]. PCAs were introduced in pilots of 
these policies and proved popular with patients in assisting them to navigate the 
system and helping them to think about what was important to them [60]. These 
advisors have not been routinely in use however, since the national roll-out of these 
policies, where less intensive support is provided to those who are intended to choose 
[166] which presents concern over whether all patients have access to the support and 
information they need. 
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2.7 Summary of key points in this chapter 
Health policy developments in England have involved the public release of information 
on quality of care as an important part of efforts to create a self-improving health 
system. The main elements of this system were the public release of information, 
alongside incentives for hospitals to treat more patients and an increasing number of 
providers competing for those patients. There is thus an expectation that patients will 
be sensitive to this information and that this will drive improvements in care through 
the selection pathway. This has been increased as successive reforms have pushed the 
ideas of the public release of information and patient choice further up the political 
agenda, and from 2006 patients were eligible for the choice of four providers for their 
secondary care. In 2008 this was extended to include any provider in England. 
Information on quality is released by a number of organisations, of which regulators 
can be considered something of a special case as they often release high-profile and 
critical information. Information from pilots of these policies suggests that patients are 
more interested in factors such as personal experience than official performance ratings. 
Over the time period 2006 to 2010, implementation of the policies of offering patients a 
choice of provider has been improving, although there is variation in this nationally. 
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Chapter 3: Aims, scope and justification for this work 
 
3.1 Summary and justification for this work 
The public release of performance data in healthcare has been increasing in the last two 
decades. In combination with policies designed to create incentives for hospitals to treat 
more patients as well as offering patients a choice of where to receive care, this is 
designed to improve quality in the NHS. From a theoretical perspective, public release 
of information may improve quality through three main mechanisms, i) patients will 
preferentially attend better performing organisations and avoid poor performers, giving 
others incentive to improve, ii) organisations will be motivated (and able) to improve 
quality after learning their relative position, or iii) organisations will make 
improvements in care because they are worried about their reputation. Research into 
these issues has provided limited support for the idea that the public release of 
performance information is associated with changes in levels of patient utilisation 
although there is better evidence that quality of care may improve. Much of the 
published research evidence comes from the U.S. and focuses on a few reporting 
schemes, primarily focused on for cardiac surgery [33]. 
 
 
In England a variety of types of healthcare performance information are available to 
patients to inform their choices of where to receive care. These include routinely 
published information on issues such as mortality rates and free text information left by 
other patients on the NHS Choices website. Survey evidence suggests that patients do 
not pay attention to such information when making decisions on where to be treated. 
Instead, they are more likely to rely on information from their own experience, that of 
their friends and family, or from their GP. Healthcare regulation has been on the rise in 
recent years and these regulators frequently release information on the quality of care to 
the public. Some of the information released by regulators gives detail on the 
performance of different organisations, and these releases are often high-profile and 
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receive amplification through the news media. This amplification by the media means 
that patients may be more likely to be aware of these reports than other, more routine 
reporting. 
 
 
This thesis focuses on releases of information by healthcare regulators, rather than other 
forms of performance information. This work may therefore provide unique insights 
into how patients use performance information to inform their health care choices, and 
the impact of such information on NHS providers. Additionally, it has been argued that 
the role of the regulator in releasing performance data to inform patient choices has 
been under explored in both previous research and as a policy mechanism to encourage 
improvements [167]. I will focus on two areas, i) the public release of information on 
failings in care at three NHS hospital trusts (the scandal trusts) and, ii) public release of 
information on the quality of care for maternity (the maternity trusts).  
 
 
The scandal trusts were all the subject of investigations by the healthcare regulator, and 
when the resulting reports were published these painted a poor picture of quality and 
were widely disseminated by national and local media. These reports are different to 
routine forms of public reporting such as mortality rates as they were both easy to 
understand and widely disseminated. Scandals and the reporting on these by the HC 
and the media can be thought of as conveying news on hospital performance not 
previously known by the public and thus may be expected to affect levels of health 
service use. The very existence of an investigation by a healthcare regulator is, in itself, 
likely a sign of failings and may be interpreted as such by patients and the public. This 
means that they represent an opportunity to ascertain if there are changes in patient 
utilisation associated with what may in some senses be considered a “worst case 
scenario” for the organisations involved. 
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After a national report by the healthcare regulator, the media highlighted ten trusts 
each which were the best or the worst place in the country to receive maternity care (the 
maternity trusts). As there has been a dearth of research evidence on clinical areas other 
than cardiac surgery, and as women giving birth are typically younger than those 
attending for other forms of care, there are important differences between this and other 
research. Also, the existence of both a best and a worst group enables this work to 
examine both positive and negative public releases simultaneously, which has seldom 
been examined directly.  
 
 
These two case studies will be informed by the analysis of a patient survey on what is 
important to patients, what information sources they use when choosing a hospital, and 
their likelihood of attending their local hospital. This gives insight into what factors 
influence patient choice of provider and the degree to which interest in various aspects 
of care or information may make patients more or less likely to attend a non-local 
provider. One of the assumptions behind these policies was that at least some patients 
would be willing to travel to a non-local provider for their care, and patients choosing 
on the basis of quality is preferred for an increase in hospital competition [168]. 
Analysis of the patient survey also provides insight into whether there are socio-
demographic differences in what is important to patients and the information they use. 
There is some concern that certain groups of patients may be disadvantaged by policies 
relying on performance information to inform selection of the best providers, and that 
this may have a negative impact on equity. I will investigate whether both the average 
distance travelled by women to attend the maternity trusts changed after the publication 
of reports on their quality, as well as whether the percentage of women attending for 
whom these were geographically the closest hospital.  
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Those who first set out the three pathways listed above did note some preconditions on 
the release of information having an effect. It should be noted here that neither of the 
information releases studied here satisfied all of these conditions, although these 
conditions were in relation to whether information release is linked to improvement, 
and not changes in patient utilisation.  The architect of the change and selection 
pathway argued that to have an effect, patients must be able to access the information, 
obtain it, interpret it, and be able to switch provider [9]. For both of the cases examined 
here access to and interpretation of the information should not have been difficult as 
they were covered in the national media with unequivocal messages (such as a list of 
the ten best hospital trusts). The architect of the reputation pathway argued that in 
order to have an effect needs a ranking system, which is widely disseminated, easily 
understood and followed up [1]. Again, these information releases were easy to access 
and understand, but they were not followed up subsequently, or part of a ranking 
system.  
 
 
 
While the two cases I will study in this thesis overcome some of the issues of 
information being difficult to understand or learn about, there are additional reasons 
why performance information may not be associated with changes in patient utilisation.  
People have a limited time window in which to make decisions for example [169]. Also, 
more concrete information such as location may be easier to interpret than vague 
concepts such as quality [170], which are more difficult to evaluate [171]. A lack of 
perception that choice is available [45] and a lack of awareness of variation in quality of 
care between different providers [67] have also been noted. Choices in healthcare have 
been referred to as “unfriendly” -  being often high stakes decisions made under 
pressure, where many people may benefit from having a third party assist them with 
decision making [164]. Some patients even disagree with the notion that they should 
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have to “shop around” for the best quality care, preferring instead that  they “should be 
able to get it [good quality care] anywhere” instead [74]. 
 
This thesis will examine health service use at the hospital trust level, rather than 
examining patient choices more directly. This is because the focus of this work is on 
whether there is an effect of these reports for the organisations involved. Much of the 
policy focus is on the notion that information will create the incentives for organisations 
to improve through changes in patient utilisation and this will be the focus here. Also, 
for this reason I will not dwell on issues of whether patients themselves have chosen 
their hospital or whether this decision has been made by their GP or another advocate. 
This is as the effects of changes in patient utilisation are the same for the hospital trusts 
concerned, regardless of who makes these choices.  
 
 
Finally, it is debatable to what extent the information contained in the reports I will 
study offered “information content” or whether they simply told patients what they 
already knew or suspected. I will examine whether there were effects on patient 
utilisation in advance of the information being widely publicised. This should provide 
some insight into the question of whether changes in patient utilisation were caused by 
the spreading of informal information rather than the actual official release of 
information.  
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3.2. Aim 
     The primary aim of this research is to examine the effect of the release of high-profile 
performance information by the healthcare regulator on the numbers of patients 
attending organisations concerned.  
 
3.3. Objectives 
 
1. Examine socio-demographic differences in information used to choose a hospital and 
its sources, as well as the association between these and likelihood of attending a non-
local hospital. 
 
2. Examine whether in the absence of established barriers to using publicly reported 
data to inform choice (access to and interpretation of data), organisations affected by 
high-profile negative reports will experience a decline in patient utilisation. 
  
3. Examine whether public reporting in a specific clinical area (maternity) is associated 
with changes in levels of health service use for maternity patients.  
 
4. Examine whether the maternity reporting was associated with changes in patient 
reported quality among providers publicised as being the best or the worst providers of 
care. 
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Chapter 4:  Socio-demographic differences in information used to choose a hospital 
and its sources 
4.1 Introduction 
Health policy in England in recent years has focused on the provision of information on 
healthcare quality of care to patients, in order to create the incentives for hospitals to 
compete for these patients. Since 2006 all patients being referred for specialist elective 
care should have been offered a choice of where this care is delivered by their GP [128]. 
Initially patients were to be offered up to five providers, and this was extended to 
include any provider in the country from April 2008 [172]. Increased provision of 
information on the relative quality of different providers, having a choice of where to 
attend for hospital care, and incentives for hospitals to treat more patients have together 
been intended to create improvements in the NHS as a whole [108].  
 
Previous research indicates that the majority of patients do not use publicly reported 
performance data to inform choices of healthcare providers. Instead, they are more 
likely to rely on advice from their own experiences, those of their family or friends, or 
from their GP [75]. There are concerns both over what information patients may use to 
inform their healthcare choices, and also over the potentially negative impacts on equity 
of a system where well informed patients are intended to select the best care [152].  This 
has stimulated apprehension that policies relying on patient choice may benefit the 
more affluent at the expense of others [173]. This in turn has focused attention on 
making performance information more  understandable and relevant to patients, so that 
it is more likely to be utilised by different groups [174].  
 
This study examines the information used by patients when choosing a hospital for 
treatment and sources of information for choice and about healthcare performance in 
their local area. It also examines the socio-demographic differences in these. Finally, as 
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there is an expectation that some patients will need to be willing to be treated in a 
hospital other than that closest to them [175], the relationship between information used 
and whether patients attend their local hospital will also be explored. 
 
4.2 Methods 
Data Source 
The data for this study come from a larger survey sent to 5,997 participants conducted 
by the Picker Institute Europe between March and June 2009 [90]. Participants were a 
random sample of adult patients (aged 16 and over) referred to first outpatient 
appointments in four local health economies in January 2009. The questionnaire was 
initially piloted on a small number of patients during development [176].  Patients were 
contacted by a postal questionnaire which was followed up by two reminders, and 
patients were asked to consider the most recent time their GP referred them to hospital. 
All specialties where choice of provider was available were eligible for inclusion in the 
sample, so patients from sexually transmitted infections clinics, rapid access chest pain 
clinics, psychiatric outpatient clinics and two-week-wait cancer patients were excluded. 
Of these, 2,181 participants responded, giving a response rate of 36%, which is similar 
to a Department of Health survey on similar issues [75]. 88% of the referrals were for 
routine appointments, with the remaining 12% being urgent referrals [177]. More than 
40 specialties were represented in these referrals, although over 50% of cases were 
accounted for by: general surgery, dermatology, Ear Nose and Throat, ophthalmology 
and trauma and orthopaedics. The questionnaire is available in the appendix to the 
relevant report and in other published work [90, 178]. 
 
The four local health economies were selected to provide variation across potential and 
penetration of patient choice of provider. These were selected according to both the 
potential for choice and the recollection of choice by patients. Potential for choice was 
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assessed as  the number of NHS trusts within 60 minutes travel time, based on previous 
work [156], and recollection of choice was based on the Department of Health patient 
survey in November 2007 [179]. The rationale behind using this data source was to 
capture areas based on patient perception of the availability of choice, rather than other 
measures of competition in healthcare. 
 
NHS acute trusts which received more than five per cent of their outpatient referrals 
from the selected PCTs were invited to take part in the study. This measure was 
calculated using Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data for 2004/05 by the survey team. 
Apart from one specialist children’s hospital, all trusts which were approached agreed 
to take part in the survey. One independent sector provider was invited to take part in 
each health economy, and the choice of this was based on the recommendations of the 
PCTs. In total, a mixture of secondary care providers was included: five NHS hospital 
trusts, six NHS foundation trusts, two ISTCs and two independent sector hospitals.  
 
The trusts were based in a mixture of urban and rural locations outside of London. The 
sample sizes used were in proportion to volumes of referrals at these trusts, and a 
minimum of 200 questionnaires were sent to each trusts. ISTCs were oversampled 
however, so that they would be able to be compared with the NHS trusts in final 
analyses. This meant that the final sample here contained 5% of patients who had been 
treated in an ISTC, while the national figure at this time was less than 0.5% [177]. 
Survey weights were produced by the survey team to compensate for this oversampling 
of patients attending ISTCs. For each health economy, a weight was produced based on 
the relative volume of referrals received by different providers in the first half of 
2008/09. 
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The main analyses presented here are of the patients who replied “yes” to the question 
“Were you offered a choice of hospital” (1,033 patients). Results from analyses on the full 
sample of 2,181 participants are shown in Appendix 2.  
 
The issue of whether different patient groups are more or less likely to be offered a 
choice has been studied using this data previously. This work found that there were no 
statistically significant differences in being offered a choice in terms of age group, 
ethnicity or education, although those living in more rural areas were more likely to be 
offered a choice than those living in cities or large towns  [162]. Those with more 
educational qualifications were more likely to attend a non-local hospital. 
 
Outcome measures 
The outcome measures for this study were: 
 Important factors when choosing a hospital (responses of ‘essential’ or ‘very 
important’ to question 10 - “How important were each of the factors below in 
influencing which hospital you chose?”). 
 Sources of information used to find about performance of hospitals in your 
area (marking beside the relevant item in response to question 17 - “Have you 
heard about the performance of hospitals in your area from any of the following 
sources?”). 
 Sources of information used to choose the hospital attended (yes/no responses 
to question 8 “Which, if any, of the following sources of information did you use to 
choose the hospital?”). 
 Attendance at local hospital (yes/no responses to question 19 “Do you think of 
the hospital/treatment centre you are attending as your ‘local’ hospital?”). 
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Predictor variables 
Predictor variables for this analysis were age (grouped into 16–35, 36–50, 51–65, 66–80, 
81+ years), gender, ethnicity (white and mixed/non-white), self-rated health (Visual 
Analogue Scale from 1–100, divided into above and below the median of 75), number of 
GP visits in the last year (1, 2–5, 6–9, ≥10), educational qualifications (no qualifications, 
qualifications below degree level, qualifications at or above degree level), employment 
status (in paid work, not in paid work), area of residence (city/large town/suburbs, 
small town, village/rural area), and past experience of local hospital (generally good, 
generally bad, mixed, no previous experience). 
 
Statistical analysis 
Logistic regression was used to examine which socio-demographic variables were 
associated with factors considered to be important when choosing a hospital, what 
sources of information were used to find out about performance in the local area, to 
choose the hospital attended. Separate models were used for each outcome, e.g. stating 
that newspapers were an important source of information, or that they used a leaflet to 
choose the hospital they attended. All models were fully adjusted for the predictor 
variables mentioned previously. The analysis of attendance at the local hospital used 
the same fully adjusted models, with the relevant factor as the main predictor variable. 
Analyses presented here were weighted using sample weights to allow for the 
oversampling of ISTCs.  
 
4.3 Results 
The characteristics of the final sample can be found in Table 1. The sample contained 
more women than men (59% vs. 41%), and a majority of patients (52%) had visited their 
GP between 2 and 5 times in the last year. 43% of patients scored rated their own health 
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below the median of 75, and this data was missing for 115 people (11%). 31% of these 
patients had no formal qualifications, and 57% were in paid work. 69% of participants 
said that there experience of their local hospital was generally good, although 22% of 
people replied that this was mixed.  47% of the sample lived in a city/large town or 
suburb. Analysis by the survey team compared these figures to the national breakdown 
of first outpatient referrals in the NHS using HES. This found that the sample here 
included fewer young participants, a small percentage more women and had a similar 
ethnicity breakdown to the national picture [90]. 
 
Overall 70.4% of patients stated that they had attended their local hospital (and this was 
74.7% if including the patients who did not reply that they had been offered a choice by 
their GP). This data is not shown here. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the survey sample 
 Characteristic      Number % 
Age in years 16 - 35 110 11 
36 - 50 240 23 
51 - 65 329 32 
66 - 80 285 28 
80 and over 69 7 
Gender Male  427 41 
Female 606 59 
Ethnicity White  939 91 
Mixed and non-white 75 7 
Missing 19 2 
Self-rated health Below average 446 43 
Above average 472 46 
Missing 115 11 
GP visits in last years 1 or less 55 5 
2 -- 5 536 52 
6 -- 9 307 30 
10 and over 124 12 
Missing 11 1 
Employment status In paid work 593 57 
Not in paid work 358 35 
Missing 82 8 
Level of education No formal qualifications 318 31 
Below degree level 403 39 
Degree level and higher 150 15 
Missing or other 162 16 
Urban vs. rural area City/large town/suburbs 484 47 
Small town 310 30 
Village/rural area 195 19 
Missing 44 4 
Past experience of local 
hospital 
Generally good 712 69 
Generally bad 26 2 
Mixed 224 22 
No previous experience 61 6 
Missing 10 1 
 Total 1033 100 
*Median self-rated health was 75 
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Important factors when choosing a hospital 
 
The factors most important to patients when choosing a hospital were quality of care 
(93.3%); cleanliness (92.6%); standard of facilities (90.3%); and reputation (80.3%) (Table 
2).  Waiting time was selected as an important factor by 77.4% of patients. Quality of 
food was the factor selected by the lowest percentage of patients (39.3%). 
 
There were no statistically significant differences in important factors for hospital 
choices by age group. Women were more likely to report that personal experience 
(76.4% vs. 66.0%, p=0.007) and family experience (56.3% vs. 44.3%, p=0.001) were 
important than men. Non-white patients were more likely than white patients to report 
that timing of appointment was an important factor (79.7% vs. 62.2%, p=0.029). Those 
with no formal qualifications were more likely than those with a degree or higher 
qualification to report that personal experience (82.0% vs. 60.3%, p<0.001), location of 
hospital (74.3% vs. 65.3%, p=0.015), and timing of appointment (69.3% vs. 53.2%, 
p=0.003) were important when choosing a hospital. They were also more likely to 
respond that reputation of the hospital was an important factor (86.3% vs. 69.0%, 
p=0.002). There were no statistically significant differences across the number of GP 
visits in the past year, or across the areas in which people lived. 
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Sources of information where have heard about performance of hospitals in their 
local area 
 
The most commonly used sources of information on the performance of hospitals in the 
local area were personal experience (60.7%); family experience (52.7%) and the local 
media (28.3%) (Table 3). Official reports (6.4%) and the internet (3.9%) were the sources 
used by the lowest percentage of patients. 
 
There were few differences in information used to find out about performance of 
hospitals in the local area across age groups. Women were more likely to report that 
they heard about performance from personal experience (59.4% vs. 50.7%, p=0.024), 
from local media (30.7% vs. 24.8%, p=0.044) and newspapers (23.5% vs. 19.0%, p=0.024). 
Non-White patients were more likely to report having seen an advert for their local 
hospital than White patients (30.4% vs. 11.7%, p=0.034). Patients who had visited the GP 
more times in the previous year were more likely to have heard about performance 
from their personal experience (e.g. 61.2% for those visiting more than ten times vs. 
36.9% for those visiting only once, p=0.001), from the GP or from the internet. Those 
with a degree or higher qualification were more likely to report having heard about 
performance from family experience (59.8% vs. 46.4%, p=0.015), from the local media 
(39.5% vs. 21.5%, p=0.013) or from newspapers (25.7% vs. 17.9%, p=0.036). Patients with 
more qualifications were more likely to report having heard about performance from 
official reports (e.g. 13.5% of those with a degree or higher qualification vs. 4.0% for 
those with no formal qualifications, p<0.001). Patients from villages or small towns 
were more likely to have heard about performance from their GP than those from a 
city/large town or suburb (20.0% vs. 13.8%, p=0.012). 
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Sources of information used to choose the hospital attended  
The sources of information most commonly used by patients when choosing a hospital 
were their own experience (40.9%); their GP (36.0%); and family and friends (17.5%) 
(Table 4). 
 
Patients aged over 80 years old were less likely to use family and friends than those 
aged 16 – 35 years (11.6% vs. 26.4%, p=0.028).  Women were more likely than men to 
report that they had used their own experience (43.6% vs. 37.0%, p=0.002) and were less 
likely to have used staff at a referral centre (2.1% vs. 4.9%%, p<0.001). Non-white 
patients were more likely than white patients to report that they had used a telephone 
line booking advisor than white patients (18.7% vs. 8.4%, p=0.001).  Those who had 
been to the GP more than 10 times in the last year were more likely than those who had 
been to the GP only once in the last year to report that they used a leaflet (10.5% vs. 
1.8%, p=0.018), a hospital website (5.6% vs. 1.8%, p=0.011) or a referral centre (4.8% vs. 
0.0%, p<0.001). 
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Table 2: Important factors when choosing a hospital 
  Reputation 
Personal 
Experience Cleanliness 
Location of 
hospital 
Timing of 
appointment 
Waiting 
time 
Family 
Experience 
Quality of 
food 
Quality 
of care 
Standard 
of facilities 
Overall 80.3 72.0 92.6 68.1 63.3 77.4 51.2 39.3 93.3 90.3 
16 - 35 77.9 72.4 90.7 69.4 63.5 76.4 57.1 27.6 95.2 88.6 
36 - 50 77.5 69.4 90.3 69.6 65.6 76.7 53.8 31.7 90.0 87.3 
51 - 65 78.7 64.9 90.8 64.0 63.1 79.0 47.3 37.0 91.5 88.1 
 66 - 80 84.4 80.3 96.8 69.3 60.8 77.1 51.2 51.8 97.4 95.6 
81 + 87.0 84.3 96.5 75.9 65.4 74.5 47.8 61.2 94.3 96.1 
Male 80.3 66.0 91.2 64.9 61.2 74.3 44.3 39.5 90.7 88.8 
Female 80.3 * 76.4 93.6 70.3 64.8 79.6 * 56.3 39.0 95.2 91.5 
White 80.1 72.4 92.8 67.7 62.2 77.3 51.3 38.5 93.4 90.6 
Non white 82.5 71.2 89.2 69.7 * 79.7 78.5 50.0 47.6 93.7 90.3 
Below average self-rated health 80.1 73.5 93.4 67.7 63.8 79.6 48.1 41.7 95.0 90.3 
Above average self-rated health 79.1 70.4 91.1 68.3 61.1 * 75.1 52.1 34.7 92.1 89.9 
GP visits in last year: Once 74.5 57.8 89.6 63.5 70.8 80.0 59.6 26.1 85.7 82.2 
GP visits in last year: 2-5 times 78.3 71.5 92.0 67.2 60.4 75.3 51.6 36.2 92.2 89.0 
GP visits in last year: 6-9 times 84.6 71.8 93.1 69.1 64.8 80.8 48.2 46.2 95.8 92.1 
GP visits in last year: more than 10 79.8 77.6 94.6 71.9 68.4 76.8 52.4 39.3 94.7 94.6 
In paid work 82.8 74.1 93.5 68.7 61.0 76.6 50.0 46.6 95.4 93.0 
Not in paid work 76.1 67.8 90.0 67.3 66.5 * 78.9 53.8 26.8 89.0 86.0 
No formal qualifications 86.3 82.0 95.3 74.3 69.3 77.2 54.2 57.6 95.4 92.3 
Below degree level 79.7 * 69.1 94.4 * 63.7 * 62.6 78.9 49.7 * 33.5 93.9 90.4 
Degree level and higher * 69.0 * 60.3 * 83.6 * 65.3 * 53.2 78.2 45.9 * 18.9 86.9 87.6 
City/large town/suburbs 80.1 73.4 92.5 70.7 65.6 77.9 49.6 39.2 94.2 90.4 
Small town 82.4 71.2 92.2 67.4 62.4 77.3 54.3 37.9 92.9 91.7 
Village/rural area 76.6 67.5 93.0 61.0 57.8 76.5 50.0 39.7 90.7 87.8 
n 683 689 704 706 680 692 656 622 670 669 
*Indicates statistical significant difference at the 5% level. These derived from a logistic regression model also adjusting for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in 
the past year (one or less, two to five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large town/suburbs, small 
town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work). 
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Table 3: Sources of information used on the performance of local hospitals  
  
Personal 
experience 
Family 
experience 
Local 
media Newspapers Gossip GP 
official 
reports Internet 
Local 
hospital 
advert 
Other 
hospital 
advert  
Overall 60.7 52.7 28.3 21.0 20.3 15.2 6.4 3.9 14.1 11.8 
Age 16 - 35 58.5 59.0 26.8 17.5 16.4 15.8 5.5 6.6 14.6 18.1 
age 36 - 50 54.6 49.8 32.5 22.6 23.5 14.1 6.7 6.5 13.8 14.2 
age 51 - 65  52.4 52.7 31.7 * 22.7 22.6 10.8 7.0 4.0 11.7 10.2 
Age 66 - 80 58.0 51.6 25.2 * 23.2 19.5 13.4 6.8 * 0.9 14.4 10.5 
Age 80 + 60.2 51.6 20.4 17.2 16.3 16.7 7.2 0.5 9.1 9.1 
Male 50.7 48.9 24.8 19.0 18.6 12.0 6.4 2.5 13.6 12.1 
Female * 59.4 54.5 * 30.7  * 23.5 22.1 14.3 6.9 4.1 12.5 11.7 
White 56.3 52.8 29.0 22.3 21.7 12.8 6.9 3.1 11.7 10.3 
Non white  46.5 45.3 20.6 17.1 * 10.0 20.0 6.5 7.1 * 30.4 * 30.9 
Below average self-rated health 56.4 50.0 25.8 20.0 20.4 13.0 5.6 3.3 12.0 11.4 
Above average self-rated health 55.6 55.8 * 32.1  24.1 20.4 13.8 * 8.0 3.9 13.2 11.1 
GP visits in last year: Once 36.9 50.8 27.9 15.6 12.3 7.4 3.3 2.5 8.7 4.9 
GP visits in last year: 2-5 times * 55.0 56.2 28.5 * 22.9 * 21.3 10.9 7.2 2.9 12.3 11.8 
GP visits in last year: 6-9 times * 58.2 * 47.7 30.5 * 21.7 * 20.3 * 16.2 6.1 4.3 13.9 11.8 
GP visits in last year: more than 10 * 61.2 * 48.0 23.8 19.0 * 22.4 * 18.0 7.8 3.7 14.7 15.7 
In paid work 60.9 53.5 26.1 20.4 18.5 15.7 5.7 3.4 15.3 11.6 
Not in paid work 60.9 53.5 33.8 23.7 24.3 14.2 8.1 *4.7 11.9 11.4 
No formal qualifications 56.8 46.4 21.5 17.9 17.3 13.8 4.0 1.0 14.7 11.0 
Below degree level 55.7 * 55.5 30.1 * 23.3 * 22.8 12.5 * 6.4 3.7 11.9 11.2 
Degree level and higher 55.9 * 59.8 * 39.5  * 25.7 23.2 13.2 * 13.5 * 7.1 11.5 12.1 
City/large town/suburbs 63.0 52.7 27.5 22.7 18.6 13.8 6.0 4.1 4.4 13.1 
Small town 59.7 51.9 30.3 21.3 24.2 14.8 6.8 3.5 13.2 13.0 
Village/rural area *57.9 57.9 29.7 18.5 19.5 *20.0 7.7 3.6 4.5 6.5 
n 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 718 687 647 
*  Indicates statistical significant difference at the 5% level. These derived from a logistic regression model also adjusting for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in 
the past year (one or less, two to five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large town/suburbs, small 
town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work).  
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Table 4: Sources of information used to choose the hospital attended 
  GP Leaflet 
NHS 
Choices 
Hospital 
Website 
Other 
website 
Family 
and 
friends 
Own 
experience 
Someone 
else at GP 
Referral 
centre 
staff 
Telephone 
booking line 
advisor 
None of 
these 
Overall 36.0 6.1 4.3 2.7 0.8 17.5 40.9 0.9 3.3 9.1 6.5 
Age 16 - 35 40.0 6.4 5.5 4.5 2.7 26.4 37.3 3.6 2.7 9.1 7.3 
age 36 - 50 35.8 4.2 5.8 4.6 0.4 18.8 42.9 * 0.8 5.4 9.6 7.9 
age 51 - 65  34.7 7.0 4.3 1.5 1.2 * 14.0 41.0 0.0 3.3 11.2 6.1 
Age 66 - 80 35.4 7.0 3.5 2.1 0.0 18.6 39.6 0.4 2.1 7.7 4.9 
Age 80 + 39.1 4.3 0.0 1.4 0.0 * 11.6 43.5 2.9 1.4 2.9 8.7 
Men 37.2 7.5 5.2 3.0 0.9 16.2 37.0 1.2 4.9 9.8 6.3 
Women 35.1 5.1 3.6 2.5 0.7 18.5 * 43.6 0.7 *2.1 8.6 6.6 
White 35.0 6.0 4.2 2.8 0.6 17.4 41.5 0.7 3.0 8.4 6.8 
Non White  45.3 8.0 5.3 1.3 2.7 20.0 34.7 2.7 8.0 * 18.7 1.3 
Below average self-rated health 36.3 4.7 3.6 1.6 0.9 17.7 42.2 0.9 2.9 8.1 5.8 
Above average self-rated health 35.2 7.0 5.5 * 3.6 0.8 16.9 41.5 0.4 3.4 10.8 6.6 
GP visits in last year: Once 41.8 1.8 3.6 1.8 1.8 30.9 32.7 1.8 0.0 3.6 7.3 
GP visits in last year: 2-5 times 33.0 5.2 4.5 2.4 0.6 18.3 40.7 * 0.7 * 3.9 9.7 7.6 
GP visits in last year: 6-9 times 38.4 * 6.8 4.2 2.3 0.7 * 12.4 41.0 * 1.0 * 1.6 10.4 5.9 
GP visits in last year: more than 10 41.9 * 10.5 4.0 * 5.6 1.6 19.4 45.2 0.8 * 4.8 6.5 2.4 
In paid work 36.1 6.7 3.4 2.4 0.8 17.5 39.8 0.5 2.5 6.9 5.6 
Not in paid work 35.5 5.6 5.9 3.9 * 0.8 17.6 42.7 1.1 * 4.1 11.7 8.7 
No formal qualifications 38.4 8.8 2.5 2.2 0.3 13.5 34.6 0.6 3.5 7.9 5.7 
Below degree level 33.3 * 5.5 5.5 3.2 1.0 16.1 * 44.9 1.0 3.0 10.9 6.0 
Degree level and higher 43.3 4.0 5.3 3.3 1.3 22.7 44.0 0.0 3.3 7.3 9.3 
City/large town/suburbs 35.3 8.5 4.3 2.7 1.4 16.5 44.4 1.4 3.5 7.4 5.8 
Small town 36.1 5.5 3.9 2.6 * 0.3 14.2 36.8 0.3 2.6 * 12.6 7.1 
Village/rural area 38.5 * 2.6 5.1 3.1 0.0 22.1 39.5 0.0 2.6 8.2 7.2 
n 770 770 718 770 419 770 770 280 730 770 723 
*Indicates statistical significant difference at the 5% level. These derived from a logistic regression model also adjusting for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in 
the past year (one or less, two to five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large town/suburbs, small 
town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work). 
87 
 
Relationship between important factors when choosing and attendance at local 
hospital 
Results from logistic regression showing the association between what is considered 
important for hospital choice and attendance at the local hospital can be seen in 
Table 5. Patients who stated that personal experience was important were more than 
three times more likely to attend the local hospital than those who did not select this 
factor as important (Adjusted Odds Ratio (AOR) 3.01, 95% CI 1.92; 4.74). Patients 
who stated that cleanliness (AOR 2.68, 95% CI 1.43; 5.03), location (AOR 3.75, 95% CI 
2.48; 5.67), and quality of care (AOR 2.77, 95% CI 1.37; 5.62) were important were 
more likely to attend a local hospital than those who didn’t select these factors as 
important. Patients who stated that reputation was an important factor were more 
likely to attend their local hospital (AOR 1.70, 95% CI 1.05; 2.74). The only factor to 
be associated with being less likely to attend the local hospital was waiting time 
(AOR 0.61, 95% CI 0.37; 1.00).  
 
Relationship between sources of information on performance of local hospitals 
and attendance at local hospital 
The only factor associated with being more likely to attend the local hospital was 
reporting having seen an advert for the local hospital (AOR 2.22, 95% CI 1.07; 4.62) 
(Table 6). Patients who reported that they had seen an advert for other hospitals 
were not found to be less likely to go to their local hospital (AOR 0.70, 95%CI 0.36; 
1.37). Patients who reported hearing about performance from gossip (AOR 0.59, 95% 
CI 0.56; 0.91) and the internet (AOR 0.35, 95%CI 0.15; 0.83) were less likely to attend 
their local hospital.  
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Relationship between sources of information used and attendance at local 
hospital 
Patients who reported using their GP (AOR 0.64, 95% CI 0.44; 0.93), their family and 
friends (AOR 0.36, 95% CI 0.23; 0.57), staff at a referral centre (AOR 0.29, 95% CI 0.10; 
0.88) or a telephone line booking advisor (AOR 0.51, 95% CI 0.28; 0.93) were all less 
likely to attend their local hospital (Table 7). Patients who reported using their own 
experience (AOR 2.04, 95% CI 1.35; 3.07) were more likely to attend their local 
hospital than those who did not. Those who used none of these sources of 
information were more likely to attend their local hospital as those who reported 
using at least one of the sources of information mentioned (AOR 2.49, 95% CI 1.10; 
5.64). The percentage difference was reasonably large comparing those using NHS 
choice to those not (65.5% vs. 76.2%) but this was not statistically significant (AOR 
0.61, 95% CI 0.26; 1.45). 
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Table 5: Logistic regression model of attendance at local hospital by important 
factors when choosing a hospital 
Importance of various factors in hospital choice (n): 
% 
attending 
local 
hospital AOR * 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Reputation (652) No 65.6 --- --- 
  Yes 77.6 1.70 1.05 ; 2.74 
Personal experience (656) No 60.8 --- --- 
  Yes 82.2 3.01 1.92 ; 4.74 
Cleanliness (671) No 56.0 --- --- 
  Yes 77.7 2.68 1.43 ; 5.03 
Location of hospital (675) No 57.2 --- --- 
  Yes 84.9 3.75 2.48 ; 5.67 
Time of appointment (649) No 74.1 --- --- 
  Yes 77.2 0.77 0.51 ; 1.17 
Waiting time for appointment (659) No 80.2 --- --- 
  Yes 73.5 0.61 0.37 ; 1.00 
Family experience (626) No 73.6 --- --- 
  Yes 76.5 1.21 0.81 ; 1.82 
Quality of food (593) No 71.2 --- --- 
  Yes 81.4 1.47 0.92 ; 2.35 
Quality of care (638) No 55.1 --- --- 
  Yes 76.8 2.77 1.37 ; 5.62 
Standard of facilities (638) No 60.3 --- --- 
  Yes 77.2 2.34 1.22 ; 4.46 
* These results adjusted for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year (one or less, two to 
five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large 
town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work); and past experience of hospital 
(generally good; generally bad; mixed, no previous experience).  Only those patients offered a choice included in these analyses (N = 1033 
– 50.1% of responders). 
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Table 6: Logistic regression model of attending local hospital by sources of 
information on local hospital performance used 
Heard about performance of hospitals in your area 
from (n): 
% attending 
local hospital AOR * 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Personal experience (736) No 73.2 --- --- 
  Yes 77.4 1.04 0.71 ; 1.53 
Family experience (736) No 77.5 --- --- 
  Yes 74.2 0.84 0.57 ; 1.23 
Local media (736) No 77.0 --- --- 
  Yes 72.8 0.84 0.56 ; 1.25 
Gossip (736) No 78.4 --- --- 
  Yes 65.2 0.59 0.56 ; 0.91 
GP (736) No 75.8 --- --- 
  Yes 75.5 0.88 0.53 ; 1.46 
Internet (736) No 76.5 --- --- 
  Yes 57.5 0.35 0.15 ; 0.83 
Official reports (736) No 76.0 --- --- 
  Yes 72.1 0.85 0.41 ; 1.78 
Newspapers (736) No 77.3 --- --- 
  Yes 70.3 0.69 0.45 ; 1.07 
Seen advert for local hospital (657) No 73.4 --- --- 
  Yes 87.1 2.22 1.07 ; 4.62 
Seen advert for other hospitals (620) No 74.0 --- --- 
  Yes 77.7 0.70 0.36 ; 1.37 
* These results adjusted for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year (one or less, two to 
five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large 
town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work); and past experience of hospital 
(generally good; generally bad; mixed, no previous experience).  Only those patients offered a choice included in these analyses (N = 1033 
– 50.1% of responders). 
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Table 7: Logistic regression model of attending local hospital by sources of 
information used in choosing a hospital 
Sources of information used to choose hospital (n): 
% 
attending 
local 
hospital AOR * 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
GP (736) No 76.0 --- --- 
  Yes 73.9 0.64 0.44 ; 0.93 
Leaflet (736) No 75.7 --- --- 
  Yes 76.4 0.63 0.30 ; 1.34 
NHS Choices (736) No 76.2 --- --- 
  Yes 65.5 0.61 0.26 ; 1.45 
Hospital Website (736) No 76.4 --- --- 
  Yes 51.2 0.40 0.15 ; 1.06 
Other website (736) No 75.7 --- --- 
  Yes 89.8 1.40 0.27 ; 7.25 
Family and friends (736) No 79.0 --- --- 
  Yes 58.5 0.36 0.23 ; 0.57 
Own experience (736) No 71.4 --- --- 
  Yes 81.4 2.04 1.35 ; 3.07 
Someone else at GP (736) No 75.7 --- --- 
  Yes 87.1 0.56 0.03 ; 10.73 
Patient organisation (736) No 75.8 --- --- 
  Yes 73.7 1.56 0.20 ; 11.97 
Staff at a referral centre (736) No 76.4 --- --- 
  Yes 48.0 0.29 0.10 ; 0.88 
Telephone booking line advisor (736) No 76.5 --- --- 
  Yes 67.6 0.51 0.28 ; 0.93 
None of these sources (736) Used at least one 75.2 --- --- 
  Used none 83.9 2.49 1.10 ; 5.64 
* These results adjusted for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year (one or less, two to 
five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large 
town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work), and past experience of hospital 
(generally good; generally bad; mixed, no previous experience). Only those patients offered a choice included in these analyses (N = 1033 
– 50.1% of responders). 
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Sensitivity analyses 
Using the sample not restricted to only the patients who replied that they were 
offered a choice by their GP gave similar results (appendix 2). Important factors 
when choosing a hospital were similar, as were the sources of information used to 
find out about the performance of hospitals in the local area. There were some 
differences in the breakdown of sources of information used to choose the hospital 
attended (Table A4): a smaller percentage of patients said they had used their GP 
than in the main analysis (21.0% vs. 36.0%) and fewer patients had used their family 
and friends (8.9% vs. 17.5%) or a booking line advisor (4.6% vs. 9.1%).   
 
Associations between factors found important in choosing a hospital and attending 
the local hospital were similar, as were those for the relationship between sources to 
find out about performance in the local area. Associations between information used 
and attendance at a local hospital were broadly similar, although in this analysis 
patients using none of the named sources were not more likely to attend their local 
hospital (AOR 1.08 95%CI 0.61; 1.89) (Table A7). 
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4.4 Discussion 
Main findings 
When choosing a hospital the most important factors for patients were quality of 
care, cleanliness, standard of facilities and reputation. Those who stated that these 
factors were important were more likely to attend their local hospital for treatment, 
while those who stated that waiting time for an appointment was important were 
less likely to attend their local hospital.  
 
Sources of information such as official reports were seldom used by patients to find 
out about general healthcare performance in their areas. The internet was used by 
very few patients in this survey. The most important sources of information patients 
used when they were choosing the hospital they attended were their own experience 
and the opinion of their GP. Official sources such as leaflets and the NHS Choices 
website were not widely used by patients when choosing their hospital. Patients 
who used their own experience or none of the listed sources of information were 
more likely to attend their local hospital, while those who used their GP of family 
and friends were less likely to. 
 
Aspects of care and information sources  
The single most important factor when choosing a hospital for treatment was quality 
or care, and it seems possible that in the absence of objective information about this, 
patients may be using standard of facilities and cleanliness as markers for these. 
Also, in the absence of such information they may view reputation as another 
marker of quality. Discrete choice experiments to inform the LPCP found that 
patients wanted information on some of the “harder” aspects of quality of care, such 
as mortality and hospital-acquired infection rates [180]. The results of these studies 
do, however concur with the findings here that they place considerable weight in the 
opinion of their GP [180]. There has also been a growing recognition that patients 
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may also be interested in the “softer” aspects of care than those which tend to be 
focused on by researchers and professionals. For example, work in the Netherlands 
recently found that patients considered factors such as physician communication at 
least as important as other measures [79]. Previous work has highlighted the 
importance of staff kindness in Germany [80], as well as a “friendly atmosphere” in 
the Netherlands [181]. Together these findings suggest that patients may have a 
wide definition of what quality is [148] and that patients are interested in a variety of 
aspects of care, and cautions against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to releasing 
performance data, as has been noted previously [182, 183]. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, this work found that only 68% of patients stated that the 
location of the hospital was an important factor in their choice, which placed it 
behind aspects such as reputation. Surveys from the LPCP found that patients 
tended to choose hospitals closest to their homes [180], and that location of hospital 
was most frequently mentioned as an important factor [60]. It should be 
remembered however, that this LPCP work was designed to ascertain which factors 
would make patients more likely to choose another hospital in hypothetical 
scenarios, rather than reflect on previous choices.  Other work in older people on 
cataract surgery also found that a majority of patients opted for the hospital closest 
to them, although the most important factor was whether or not the operation was to 
be performed by a consultant [184]. It is possible that distance may be becoming less 
important as a determining factor and quality of care may concurrently be becoming 
more important when choosing hospitals [185].  
 
What information is used to inform choices? 
The single most used source of information for choosing the hospital which patients 
attended was their own experience, followed by the GP and experiences of family 
and friends. All other factors were cited as a source of information by less than 10% 
of patients, including referral centres and NHS Choices. This preference for using 
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own experience can be thought of as unsurprising - as personal experience is much 
more compelling than objective data, it may be used much more often [174]. In 
addition, the more interactive nature of talking to the GP or others about quality 
may allow patients to better evaluate information, which in turn can lead to more 
weight being given to these sources than written information [186]. 
 
A very low percentage (6.4%) of patients reported that they had heard about the 
performance of hospitals in their local area from official reports. While this question 
relates to general knowledge about the performance of hospitals, and not the specific 
information used to choose a hospital, this finding does make it seem unlikely that 
many patients in these areas were actively basing their hospital choices on such 
reports. I also find that the internet was used by very few people in order to find out 
about performance of hospitals in their local area (3.9%), which corresponds with 
what was found in the Department of Health monitoring survey (6% for 2009, the 
year for this survey) [75]. It is not clear where patients may look on the internet to 
find out about hospital performance, but the quality of some of the websites 
available to patients has been questioned, which may be another reason for the low 
use of the internet found here [187]. 65% of this sample had access to the internet 
[177], so this low amount of use is unlikely to be caused by a lack of access to the 
internet as a source of information. As this survey was conducted in 2009, levels of 
patients using the internet to search for information may have risen since this work 
was conducted (for example, between 2009 and 2013 the percentage of UK 
households with internet access has risen from 70% to 83% [188, 189]).  Additionally, 
a number of websites providing healthcare performance data have been launched 
since 2008, and both official and unofficial information is increasingly published here 
[84].  
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Perhaps comfortingly for policy architects, when it comes to choosing a hospital, the 
GP was the second most common source of information. This indicates the 
possibility that GPs may be able to use their greater knowledge of the system to steer 
patients towards providers, and thus the aims of these policies may be achieved by 
GPs acting as agents for their patients. However, previous work has found that GPs 
are extremely sceptical with regards to official performance information [78], which 
raises questions over how this may work in practice. Other work has questioned 
whether GPs do in fact have access to reliable information on quality, highlighting 
that they often base their decisions on their own experiences and knowledge of 
providers [90]. There is also evidence from Denmark to suggest that GPs do not use 
official sources of information on quality of care to guide referral decisions [190]. 
 
Socio-demographic differences in information used 
There has been a long standing concern over whether more advantaged groups are 
more likely to use information more effectively than other groups [169] and that this 
may increase inequalities [173]. Use of information sources was broadly similar 
across age and sex categories, although women were more likely to use their own 
experience than men. In terms of percentage differences, some factors such as 
reputation and cleanliness show an apparent gradient with age, but these are not 
found to be statistically significant, which may be due to small numbers of patients 
in each age group. 
 
Those not in paid work are more likely to use referral centres, and non-White 
patients are more likely to use telephone line booking advisors. However, the 
percentage of patients reporting use of these services was very low (<10%). These 
findings confirm previous research that patients have different information needs 
[64, 152]  and point to a need for differing levels of support. In early pilots of patient 
choice, PCAs were found to be highly valued by patients who used them [60, 166]. 
However, PCAs have not been in general use since the policy rolled out nationally, 
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which presents the possibility that some patients may find it difficult to access the 
information they need and would benefit form more support to make decisions over 
where to be treated. 
 
While not statistically significant, there did appear to be some differences across age 
groups in terms of using the internet to find out about performance of hospitals in 
the local area. Also, those with more educational qualifications were more likely to 
use the internet to find out about performance of their local hospitals. These two 
findings are consistent with national evidence that those with no formal 
qualifications or over the age of 65 are less likely to use the internet in general [191].  
 
Where do people attend hospital? 
I found that those who reported their choice was informed by their GP were less 
likely to attend their local hospital, as were those who reported seeking information 
from family and friends, telephone line booking advisors or staff at a referral centre. 
These findings echo those from the shared decision-making literature that patients 
may not have stable preferences about what is important to them in choosing a 
hospital, but that being guided through their choice with someone (such as their GP, 
or a booking advisor) may allow them to match their choice to their preferences 
[192]. This may in turn lead them to choose a non-local hospital for treatment. It also 
suggests that those who are more active in seeking information and advice from 
others are also more willing to consider travelling further to access hospital care. 
 
In the English NHS patient choice policy in recent years has been intended to create 
more competition between healthcare providers on the basis of their quality, and 
that this should correspondingly drive service improvements [129]. Overall in this 
analysis, the majority of patients (over 70%) attended what they considered as their 
local hospital. The analysis presented here has found that only those who think that 
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waiting times are important are less likely to attend their local hospital, and the 
effect found here was small. This also suggest that the more tangible possibility of 
being treated more quickly is more likely to affect moving than the more abstract 
notions of quality of care.  
 
I also find that that using the internet to search for quality information was 
associated with being less likely to attend a local hospital. While in previous work 
around one third of patients have claimed that they would look for information on 
hospitals on the internet, [60] the numbers stating they had heard about performance 
on the internet was much lower here, as were the numbers saying they used various 
internet sources to choose their hospital. The finding that those who used the 
internet were less likely to attend their local hospital may also reflect patients who 
are dissatisfied with their local services being more likely to search out information 
on alternative providers, although this data does not provide detail on this. 
 
The factors examined here are not the only ones to affect patients’ choices of where 
to go for treatment. Previous work using the same survey has examined these factors 
and found that patients aged 51–65, those living outside of cities and large towns, 
those educated to degree level, and those with a bad past experience of the local 
hospital are more likely to choose care from a non-local hospital [90].  Also, poor 
health and being reliant on bus transport was associated with greater loyalty to their 
local hospital; whereas those with higher education, internet access and a poor 
perception of the local hospital were more likely to choose a hospital further away. 
 
4.5 Strengths and limitations 
This study presents new analyses on differences in preferences and information use 
across groups and how this relates to choices made. However, there are some 
limitations which should be borne in mind. This work was based on the secondary 
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analysis of data already collected when this thesis began and so some aspects may 
have been changed if the study was designed prospectively. First, the study was 
limited to four areas of England and so cannot be readily interpreted as being 
nationally representative. Nonetheless, sites for this study were chosen purposively, 
in order to reflect both the penetration of patient choice policy as well as giving a 
mix of urban and rural areas outside of London. Second, the response rate to this 
survey was 36%, which may be criticised as being low. In defence, this is similar to 
the response rates found in the Department of Health official surveys monitoring 
patient choice [75]. While it is difficult to say whether this low response rate may 
have introduced bias into these findings, the characteristics of responders and non-
responders were broadly similar in other work [162]. It does seem likely that those 
with low literacy levels or whose first language was not English are likely to be 
under-represented here, as is common in many such surveys [162]. A related 
limitation is that the sample size was too small to allow me to investigate the 
interplay of demographics and information used or found important on attendance 
at a local hospital. Further, some of the findings on attendance at a local hospital 
may have been affected by the sample size and it remains possible that they would 
have become statistically significant with more patients. Analyses presented in 
Appendix 2 use a larger sample and may be better powered to pick up differences. 
On the whole, there are few differences between the findings of the main analysis 
and these additional analyses. These additional analyses are however, include 
patients who stated that they were not offered a choice of hospital by their GP, as 
opposed to the main analysis which focused on those offered a choice.  
 
A limitation of this work is that patients were asked to tick all factors which were 
important to them and were not asked to make trade-offs or to rank importance. 
Such a method may lead to patients ticking many factors, and this may well have 
contributed to the high levels of importance given to many factors. This problem can 
be overcome using discrete choice or adaptive choice based conjoint analysis [193] 
although the structure of this data did not allow for this. Also, the design of this 
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study was retrospective and so recall bias should be considered a possibility. Other 
work has sought to overcome this limitation by asking patients both what 
information they have used in the past as well as the information they would use in 
the future [181]. Again, the structure of this data did not allow for this. Finally, this 
work used patients’ own perception of whether the hospital they attended was their 
local hospital, rather than working this out objectively using a measures of distance. 
It does seem reasonable to assume that patients would be aware of the hospital they 
attended was geographically the closest to where they lived.  A related issue is that it 
is not known how far individual patients may have lived form hospital, which may 
have had an impact on individual treatment decisions. Data on this was not 
available, although information on the size of the conurbation they lived in was 
available (and controlled for in the relevant analyses). 
 
4.6 Conclusions from this chapter 
These findings suggest that simply publishing information on healthcare 
performance is unlikely to be enough to motivate patients to choose between 
healthcare providers. More active involvement and support by GPs or by booking 
advisors may be needed if the ambition of patients choosing on the basis of quality is 
to be realised. The majority of patients surveyed here attended what they thought of 
as their local hospital for treatment, and the only factor associated with being less 
likely to attend locally was considering waiting time to be important. However, 
patients who obtained information from their family and friends or from their GP 
were also less likely to attend their local hospital, suggesting that primary care may 
be able to effectively direct people towards different hospitals. 
 
There are some differences among patients in terms of what is important to them 
and what information they use, which further suggests that a range of information 
and support may be required. Some patients are likely to benefit from help and 
support in order to make decisions that are in line with what is important to them. 
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Nonetheless, these differences across groups were not as stark as may have been 
imagined, and alleviate some of the concerns that some groups may be 
disadvantaged by the implementation of health policy emphasising patient choice of 
provider.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Chapter 5: Effects of high-profile investigations into hospital safety problems on 
patient utilisation 
5.1 Introduction 
Public reporting on quality lapses by care regulators has become more common in 
recent years and regulation has been strengthened in many countries in response to 
real or perceived failings in care [194, 195]. In England, this work is currently 
undertaken by the CQC, the regulator for health and social care in England. 
Alongside their more routine inspections, they occasionally undertake high-profile 
investigations into quality lapses by hospital trusts.  The findings from such 
investigations are often disseminated widely through print, online and broadcast 
media. Although these investigations into failings are primarily designed to 
stimulate improvements through the threat of regulatory sanctions, dissemination of 
their findings provides a level of transparency which may prompt changes in patient 
behaviour [9].  
 
Although there is limited evidence that the public release of performance data will 
impact on levels of patient utilisation [26] the majority of this research is limited to a 
select few reporting schemes. Reasons why there may not be an impact of the public 
release of performance information include that patients were not aware of the 
information and that they were not able to understand it [1]. It may be that in the 
absence of these barriers, changes in levels of patient utilisation may be more likely. 
Additionally, some previous information releases have been criticised as providing a 
limited amount of novel “news” on quality. Investigations and action by the 
healthcare regulator represent a special case, publishing information which paints a 
poor picture of quality and is disseminated widely by national and local media. 
Examination of healthcare regulator reports represent an opportunity to ascertain if 
there are changes in patient utilisation where simple data is presented painting an 
extremely negative picture of quality.  
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This study examines whether high-profile investigations into quality lapses at three 
NHS hospital trusts between 2007 and 2009 affected levels of patient utilisation at 
the organisations affected (the scandal trusts). My hypothesis for this study was that 
patients would respond to the publication and widespread dissemination of reports 
through the media by avoiding hospital trusts reported to have major lapses in 
quality. This response would result in decreased patient utilisation and increased 
numbers of patients who scheduled, but did not show up for, their first outpatient 
appointment at a hospital and did not cancel the appointment in advance.  
 
5.2 Methods 
Sample 
Three hospital trusts were chosen for this study, as the only three to have had 
investigations by the HC between 2004 and 2009 which continued to operate normal 
service during and after the investigations [196]. As the primary outcome measure in 
this work was patient utilisation levels, hospital trusts which were closed, or which 
closed down specific wards or sections of the hospital in response to concerns (such 
as closures of maternity services after concerns over care here) were excluded.  
 
The investigations at University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust (UHL) and at 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust (MTW) both concerned the management 
of Clostridium difficile. This pathogen is often associated with poor hygiene 
standards and the overuse of antibiotic therapy, and is an important cause of 
hospital-acquired diarrhoea. The investigation at Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust was prompted by apparent high death rates among emergency 
admissions, although the investigation was wide-ranging in scope.  
 
The UHL investigation was triggered by concerns raised during a routine inspection 
of infection control procedures.  Findings were published in a report in March 2007, 
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which found deficiencies in infection control practices in some parts of the trust. The 
investigation also prompted several media reports with sensational headlines, 
including “Superbug Claims 49 Lives in Top Hospital” making specific reference to 
the investigation [197]. The trust provides services for nearly one million people in 
the East Midlands area and is one of the busiest and largest in England.  
 
The MTW investigation was prompted by high death rates during two Clostridium 
difficile outbreaks as well as patient complaints in regard to this. The findings were 
published in a report in October 2007, which highlighted areas of poor management 
of outbreaks. Specifically, a system to monitor incidence of infectious diseases in the 
hospital and the infection control team were managed poorly [198]. Based in the 
Southeast of England, MTW provides general medical services to approximately half 
a million people, and has two main hospital sites. 
 
The Mid Staffordshire investigation was triggered initially by routine monitoring of 
mortality rates, as well as action by a local group of relative who had been affected 
by poor care at the trust.  The summary report was published in March 2009 and was 
critical of staffing levels, culture and governance at the trust [199]. Based in the West 
Midlands, the trust provides care to approximately 320,000 people and manages two 
hospitals. Since this report came out, the trust has been the subject of intense 
scrutiny, including a public inquiry which produced its final report in February 2013 
[200]. 
 
Selection of comparison providers 
In order to examine changes in patient utilisation at the scandal trusts I used four 
comparison groups.  
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The first comparison group was a group of fifteen NHS trusts with a similar volume 
of elective admissions before the reports were published. This was achieved using a 
Euclidean distance approach, which identified trusts with volumes as similar as 
possible to the scandal trusts, in the thirty months before report publication. This 
group is called the “volume comparison group”. 
 
The second comparison group was a group of the five geographically closest NHS 
trusts and is called the “geographical comparison group.” The geographically five 
closest hospital trusts to each of the scandal trusts were ascertained by using the NHS 
Choices website searching for the closest hospitals to the postcode of the scandal trust 
headquarters. Relevant hits were restricted to “Major Hospitals”, “NHS Hospitals”, 
“Independent hospitals with free NHS services” and “hospitals with an A&E.” For 
MTW mean distance to these five closest trusts was 16 miles, while this was 22 miles 
for UHL, and 17 miles for Mid Staffordshire. 
 
The third group was other hospital trusts in the same administrative region as the 
relevant trust (the “regional comparison group”). Region was based on Strategic 
Health Authorities – there are ten of these in England, and they have an average 
fifteen trusts each.  
 
The fourth comparison group comprised of all acute NHS trusts in England (the 
“national comparison group”), and results from this analysis are in appendix 3. This 
comparison group excluded the trust of interest for each analysis e.g. for the MTW 
analysis this group excluded MTW but included UHL and Mid Staffordshire. 
 
The rationale behind each of these choices was that the national comparison group 
was used to assess changes against concurrent national changes, and the regional 
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comparison group to compare to other trusts in the same healthcare economy. The 
geographical comparison group was used to assess if patients were shifting to other 
local providers after hearing of these negative reports, and volume comparison 
group was selected to examine providers which were as similar as possible in terms 
of patient utilisation levels. 
 
Data Sources 
Data for this study come from HES up to March 2006 and the Secondary Uses 
Service at the monthly level from April 2006 onward, and was provided by Paul 
Aylin and Alex Bottle at the Doctor Foster Unit, Imperial College London. HES is the 
national administrative database for hospital activity in England. It contains data on 
all admissions and outpatient appointments performed for the NHS, including 
patients whose treatment is funded by the service but performed in private hospitals 
[201] . Because HES data were not available for the whole study period, I used the 
identically sourced Secondary Uses Service for more recent data, applying the same 
data cleaning and quality checks that were performed on HES data. This source 
provided the same data but without some additional derived fields not required for 
this study. 
 
Outcome measures 
For this analysis I only included elective (non-emergency) admissions. The outcome 
measures were the count of overnight patients for planned medical and surgical 
procedures, outpatient appointments, and did not attend numbers for outpatient 
visits. Did not attend was defined here as patients who were scheduled for an 
appointment but did not arrive at the hospital, and had not cancelled the 
appointment in advance. 
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Statistical analyses 
The analysis presented here used difference-in-difference estimation, which is 
commonly used for policy evaluation [202]. This allowed me to compare the scandal 
trusts to each of the comparison groups in terms of their elective patient utilisation. I 
controlled for a range of covariates (see below). 
 
The primary analysis segmented time into three month categories, allowing 
examination of separate effects at three, six, nine and twelve months post baseline. 
This gives a picture of the short and slightly longer term effects of these negative 
reports. The data used is at the monthly level with indicator variables for these 
periods, which increases power compared with using data solely in three month 
increments. Effects in the post reporting period are relative to the patient utilisation 
in the 30 months pre-report publication, which was used as a baseline period. 
 
In order to investigate both whether there were any differences in outcomes after 
public reporting and changes in advance of this (as an anticipatory effect, or the 
effect of news of the investigation becoming known) two main analyses are 
presented here. The first uses data for the 30 months before report publication as a 
baseline period and then estimates changes in the 12 months after report publication. 
The second examines separate effects for the periods nine months, six months, and 
three months before publication of the investigation report. The purpose of these 
second set of analyses was to investigate whether information about poor hospital 
performance available before publication of the investigation report had an effect on 
patient utilisation.  
 
All analyses were adjusted for mean waiting times relative to other hospital trusts; 
sex; mean age; ratio of day cases to overnight cases; numbers of people on waiting 
lists; average (median) lengths of stay for elective admissions; numbers of 
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emergency admissions, and number of day beds (i.e. beds in wards open in the day 
but not overnight) at each trust.  
 
Some of these variables were used as they may have an impact on the capacity of a 
hospital to perform planned care. These were the ratio of outpatients to inpatients, 
the number of available day beds, median length-of-stay and numbers of emergency 
admissions. The number of people on waiting lists for surgery was included as this 
may enable providers to compensate for patients who cancel their admissions. Age 
and sex were included as these may be related to willingness to choose a different 
hospital for an operation. 
 
Both numbers of emergency admissions and number of day beds were log 
transformed to achieve a better marker of provider size. Including these two 
variables untransformed did not result in any significant differences to results 
reported here, and are not reported.  
 
As there was some concern that waiting times may have been correlated with the 
quality of a hospital, this variable was considered as potentially endogenous. There 
is also evidence that waiting times are correlated with demand for care [203]. 
Therefore, I used instrumental variable regression with the relative waiting time as 
outcome, against the lagged mean waiting time and the lagged total waiting time for 
other trusts. This method corrects the analysis for the fact that current waiting time 
may influence current demand for operations, as well as being influenced by 
demand factors in the past. Therefore, the instrumental variable regression uses a 
separate equation to remove this influence, and then in our final (second stage) 
model, the waiting times used as a covariate are the waiting times not influenced by 
demand in the past. 
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The second stage (difference-in-difference) analysis was a fixed effects model (with 
fixed effects at the trust level), using the variables listed above. The outcomes were 
log transformed so that differences can be interpreted as percentages.  
 
The three instrumental variables (waiting times lagged at 3, 6, and 12 months) were 
all significant at the p<0.001 level (suggesting that using waiting times as an 
instrument was a valid approach) and so these were included.  Table A8 shows the 
results of the instrumental variables without including pre-publication effects (the 
main analysis) and Table A9 shows the results from including pre-publication 
effects.  Both of these tables can be found in appendix 3. 
 
I analysed whether comparison groups were sufficiently similar to the scandal trusts 
by examining trends in each of the dependent variables by time. This was done after 
normalising these dependent variables for the explanatory variables mentioned 
above. The results from this can be found in appendix figures A1 to A3, and they 
indicate that there were similar trends in the comparison and scandal trusts. This 
suggests that the difference-in-difference approach is appropriate, as a similar trend 
in advance of the intervention period is one of the key assumptions of this analysis 
[202].  
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5.3 Results 
Tables 8 to 10 show differences between the scandal trusts and their comparison 
groups in the 12 months before report publication.  
Table 8: Summary statistics in 12 months before report publication for Maidstone 
and Tunbridge Wells and comparison groups 
  Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells Volume  group 
Geographical  
group Regional  group 
Inpatient admissions (SD) 687.7 (91.0) 687.3 (90.7) 643.2 (262.6) 552.8 (329.1) 
Daycase admissions (SD) 1,330.9 (170.1) 2,030.0 (569.1)* 1,766.1 (882.2) 1,609.9 (1058.8) 
Did Not Attends (SD) 622.0 (60.5) 607.0 (284.6) 933.5 (713.4)* 501 (413.5) 
Mean waiting time in days (SD) 121.3 (6.3) 85.8 (17.7)* 102.6 (15.7)* 156 (230.6) 
% male (SD) 46.3 (0.2) 51.0 (5.9)* 50.4 (1.9)* 50.1 (5.4)* 
Ratio of daycases:inpatients (SD) 1.9 (0.2) 3.0 (0.8)* 2.8 (0.7)* 2.5 (1.3) 
Number on waiting list (SD) 23,420.0 (2715.6) 28,292.3 (5190.9)* 25,863 (12233) 18,852.2 (14394.6) 
Mean age of patients (SD) 49.0 (5.1) 50.9 (3.1)* 48.9 (3.4) 51.1 (8.3) 
Emergency admissions (SD) 36,516.5 (1529.6) 30,160.1 (6,321.0)* 31,966.5 (15086.2) 20,869.1 (16,480.9)* 
Available day beds (SD) 39.5 (1.6) 52.6 (21.5)* 44.4 (16.7) 39.1 (19.1) 
* p≤0.05 
Before report publication, MTW had a similar number of inpatient admissions to all 
three of the comparison groups, although it had fewer daycase admissions (e.g. 
1,330.9 vs. 2,030.0 for the volume comparison group, p<0.001). MTW had fewer 
DNAs than the geographical comparison group (622.0 vs. 933.5, p=0.005), but not the 
other two comparison groups. MTW had a longer mean waiting time than both the 
volume and the geographical comparison groups (121.3 vs. 85.8, p<0.001 for the 
volume group), and a smaller ratio of daycases to inpatients (1.9 vs. 3.0, p<0.001 for 
the volume comparison group). MTW had fewer patients on the waiting list than the 
volume comparison group (23,420.0 vs. 28,292.3 p<0.001) and more emergency 
admissions than the volume and regional comparison groups (36,516.5 vs. 20,869.1 
for the regional group, p<0.001). 
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Table 9: Summary statistics in 12 months before report publication for University 
Hospitals Leicester and comparison groups 
  
University 
Hospitals 
Leicester Volume  group Geographical  group Regional  group 
Inpatient admissions (SD) 2,495.3 (249.4) 1,802.1 (432.8)* 994.0 (631.2)* 767.4 (615.1)* 
Daycase admissions (SD) 6,093.5 (434.7) 3,569.1 (1,292.2)* 2,452.4 (1,626.3)* 2,414.1 (1,850.1)* 
Did Not Attends (SD) 1,318.8 (119.8) 1,042.4 (771.3)* 809.3 (527.4)* 362.0 (395.6)* 
Mean waiting time in days (SD) 93.7 (7.8) 77.9 (17.4)* 90.5 (13.3) 72.4 (44.5)* 
% male (SD) 49.0 (1.6) 52.7 (4.1)* 50.7 (2.3)* 53.4 (9.5)* 
Ratio of daycases:inpatients (SD) 2.5 (0.2) 2.0 (0.6)* 2.7 (0.7) 2.5 (1.4) 
Number on waiting list (SD) 75,236.9 (3,316.1) 53,194.3 (17,936.2)* 28,826.9 (15,387.8)* 20,472.3 (19,733.7)* 
Mean age of patients (SD) 48.0 (0.0) 49.0 (5.3) 49.3 (0.8)* 49.5 (3.3)* 
Emergency admissions (SD) 75,636.4 (3,258.6) 47,299.3 (13,192.2)* 30,274.7 (15,047.0)* 20,469.1 (19,329.7)* 
Available day beds (SD) 209.2 (16.1) 140.1 (71.3)* 74.5 (61.1)* 89.7 (56.0)* 
* p≤0.05 
UHL had more inpatient admissions before report publication than all three 
comparison groups (2,495.3 vs. 767.4 for the regional group, p<0.001) and the same 
was true for daycase admissions (6,093.5 vs. 2,452.4 for the geographical group, 
p<0.001). UHL had more DNAs than all three comparison groups (1,318.8 vs. 362.0 
for the regional group, p<0.001) and a longer mean wait than the volume and 
regional comparison groups. UHL had more people on their waiting list (75,236.9 vs. 
53,194.3 for the volume group, p<0.001) and more emergency admissions than all 
three comparison groups (75,636.4 vs. 20,469.1 for the regional comparison group, 
p<0.001).  
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Table 10: Summary statistics in 12 months before report publication for Mid 
Staffordshire and comparison groups 
  
Mid Staffordshire Volume  group Geographical  group Regional  group 
Inpatient admissions (SD) 457.6 (51.7) 469.8 (66.7) 666.8 (122.5)* 627.5 (384.6)* 
Daycase admissions (SD) 1,417.6 (127.8) 1,501.4 (501.0) 1,847.3 (843.7)* 1,518.2 (1,105.7)* 
Did Not Attends (SD) 366.7 (38.0) 450.3 (367.1) 810.2 (454.4)* 626.8 (603.2)* 
Mean waiting time in days (SD) 73.1 (16.3) 71.2 (22.3) 67.2 (13.0)* 134.9 (735.5) 
% male (SD) 46.5 1.0) 49.6 (3.4)* 49.6 (3.7)* 49.3 (8.7) 
Ratio of daycases:inpatients (SD) 3.1 (0.3) 3.2 (1.0) 2.7 (1.2) 2.2 (1.3)* 
Number on waiting list (SD) 19,495.3 (503.2) 18,579.2 (5,862.0) 31,198.1 (11,297.3)* 21,823.5 (15,810.6) 
Mean age of patients (SD) 48.4 (0.5) 49.8 (3.9)* 49.9 (1.7)* 46.5 (11.4) 
Emergency admissions (SD) 18,883.1 (354.9) 21,544.8 (4,938.3)* 34,046.6 (10,472.6)* 25,538.4 (20,538.4) 
Available day beds (SD) 69.0 (1.7) 48.6 (13.0)* 51.5 (30.0)* 45.8 (32.6)* 
* p≤0.05 
Mid Staffordshire had fewer inpatient and daycase admissions before report 
publication than both the geographical and regional comparison groups (inpatients: 
457.6 vs. 666.8, p<0.001 for geographical comparison group, daycases: 1,417.6 vs. 
1,847.3, p=0.006 for geographical comparison group). Mid Staffordshire had more 
DNAs than both of these groups (366.7 vs. 626.8, p=0.018 for the regional group) and 
more day beds than all three comparison groups (69.0 vs. 48.6, p<0.001 for the 
volume comparison group). 
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Figure 2 shows the raw percentage differences in inpatient admissions between the 
three scandal trusts and their volume comparison groups. These chart is based on the 
difference between the logged numbers of admissions in each trust, divided by that 
number for their volume comparison groups, so that zero indicates that the scandal 
trusts had the same number of inpatients as their comparison groups. 
 
 
MTW had a similar number of inpatient admissions as their volume comparison 
group, although this was variable, being nearly 30% lower 12 months before report 
publication and being 12% higher than the comparison group at the time of report 
publication. 
 
UHL consistently had more inpatient admissions than their volume comparison 
group, reflecting their position as the largest NHS trust in England. This did 
however, seem to decline from around 12 months pre report publication.  
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Mid Staffordshire also had a similar number of inpatient admissions as their volume 
comparison group, although in this unadjusted data there is a suggestion that this 
declined 6 months after report publication. 
 
Changes in utilisation after report publication 
Inpatient admissions 
Of the three trusts examined, MTW was the only one to show a significant reduction 
in the number of elective inpatient admissions, which was evident for the volume, 
geographical and regional comparison group (Table 11). Compared with the volume 
comparison group, MTW had 11.9% (p=0.003) fewer patients at three months and 
14.0% (p<0.001) fewer at six months. MTW had 10.8% (p=0.002) fewer inpatient 
admissions at three months compared with the geographical comparison group. No 
statistically significant differences were found between UHL and Mid Staffordshire 
and any of the three comparison groups, although there was suggestion that UHL 
had fewer inpatients at 3 months than the volume comparison group (-5.4%, 
p=0.073).  
 
Daycase admissions 
A similar pattern was evident for day case admissions, with MTW showing 
statistically significant declines between three and six months after report 
publication compared with the volume, geographical and regional comparison 
groups (Table 12). MTW had a 16.2% (p<0.001) decline at three months and a 15.4% 
(p<0.001) decline at six months compared with the volume comparison group, and 
returned to non-statistically significant after this. There was also a 12.4% (p=0.001) 
decline at three months, and a 10.9% (p=0.004) decline at six months relative to the 
regional comparison group. There were few statistically significant differences 
detected for UHL other than a decline at three months after report publication 
relative to the geographical comparison group (-33.7%, p=0.050). Similarly, the only 
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statistically significant difference detected for Mid Staffordshire was a decline 12 
months after report publication relative to the geographical comparison group (-
9.2%, p=0.025). 
 
Did Not Attend numbers 
There were large increases in the numbers of DNAs at MTW compared with the 
volume, geographical and regional comparison groups three months after report 
publication (Table 13). These were 73.7% higher (p=0.006) compared with the 
volume comparison group, 37.4% higher (p<0.001) relative to the geographical 
group and 93.2% higher (p=0.001) compared with the regional comparison group. 
After the first three months, these returned to pre-reporting levels, although there 
was suggestion of the impact persisting at six months compared with the regional 
comparison group (53.8%, p=0.055). There were no statistically significant changes in 
the expected direction for UHL or Mid Staffordshire. Mid Staffordshire had fewer 
DNAs compared with all comparison groups from 6 to 12 months after publication 
(e.g. -40.5% six months after report publication, relative to the geographical 
comparison group (p<0.001)). 
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Table 11: Percentage changes in inpatient admissions after report publication  
  
Effect 3 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 6 
months post 
report (p value) 
Effect 9 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 12 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Volume comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -11.9 (0.003) -14.0 (<0.001) 0.3 (0.940) 5.0 (0.214) 
University Hospitals Leicester -5.4 (0.073) -3.6 (0.230) -4.5 (0.124) -3.3 (0.269) 
Mid Staffordshire 0.1 (0.967) 0.1 (0.977) 1.8 (0.637) -0.4 (0.924) 
Geographical comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -10.8 (0.002) -5.9 (0.097) 8.5 (0.089) 11.6 (0.021) 
University Hospitals Leicester -4.6 (0.178) -1.9 (0.588) -2.3 (0.503) 2.9 (0.405) 
Mid Staffordshire -2.2 (0.507) 0.1 (0.982) 2.7 (0.413) -3.5 (0.292) 
Regional comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -12.5 (0.001) -13.3 (0.001) -6.9 (0.101) -4.9 (0.266) 
University Hospitals Leicester 3.9 (0.355) 2.2 (0.623) -0.5 (0.901) 3.7 (0.403) 
Mid Staffordshire -14.7 (0.399) -20.5 (0.243) -23.4 (0.183) -32.0 (0.069) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
 
 
Table 12: Percentage changes in daycase admissions after report publication 
  
Effect 3 
months post 
report (p value) 
Effect 6 
months post 
report (p value) 
Effect 9 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 12 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Volume comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -16.2 (<0.001) -15.4 (<0.001) -3.2 (0.469) -0.2 (0.966) 
University Hospitals Leicester -33.7 (0.050) -19.8 (0.229) -17.3 (0.293) 8.1 (0.623) 
Mid Staffordshire 0.2 (0.960) -2.1 (0.581) 0.4 (0.906) -3.6 (0.337) 
Geographical comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -11.7 (0.001) -6.2 (0.090) 9.0 (0.084) 10.9 (0.036) 
University Hospitals Leicester -3.2 (0.385) -1.5 (0.688) -2.7 (0.481) 1.6 (0.681) 
Mid Staffordshire -6.0 (0.132) -5.2 (0.202) -2.3 (0.572) -9.2 (0.025) 
Regional comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -12.4 (0.001) -10.9 (0.004) -5.5 (0.183) -3.9 (0.367) 
University Hospitals Leicester 6.4 (0.137) 3.5 (0.429) 0.5 (0.918) 5.4 (0.227) 
Mid Staffordshire 2.4 (0.695) 4.3 (0.493) 4.7 (0.452) -1.9 (0.762) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
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Table 13: Percentage changes in did not attend numbers after report publication  
  
Effect 3 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 6 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 9 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 12 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Volume comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 73.7 (0.006) 35.8 (0.179) -16.6 (0.533) -28.8 (0.284) 
University Hospitals Leicester -13.2 (0.715) -19.5 (0.590) -13.1 (0.718) -18.2 (0.615) 
Mid Staffordshire -33.4 (0.135) -42.9 (0.059) -46.2 (0.042) -49.4 (0.029) 
Geographical comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 37.4 (<0.001) 2.2 (0.687) 11.0 (0.146) 10.4 (0.171) 
University Hospitals Leicester -5.5 (0.543) 3.8 (0.678) -0.7 (0.942) 8.1 (0.378) 
Mid Staffordshire -21.9 (0.015) -40.5 (<0.001) -38.5 (<0.001) -45 (<0.001) 
Regional comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 93.2 (0.001) 53.8 (0.055) -42.1 (0.165) -40.4 (0.201) 
University Hospitals Leicester -9.7 (0.256) -5.9 (0.505) -8.4 (0.343) 3.2 (0.717) 
Mid Staffordshire -16.3 (0.186) -26.1 (0.035) -30.6 (0.013) -34.3 (0.006) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
 
 
Changes in utilisation in anticipation of report publication 
Inpatient admissions 
There were declines in inpatient admissions at MTW nine months before report 
publication relative to all three comparison groups (e.g. -13.7%, p=0.001 compared 
with volume comparison group) (Table 14). There were no statistically significant 
differences in patient utilisation in the months closer to report publication. UHL had 
fewer patients at both 6 (-7.4%, p=0.018) and 3 (-8.5%, p=0.007) months before report 
publication, compared with the volume comparison group.  Mid Staffordshire had 
fewer inpatient admissions at 3 months compared with the geographical comparison 
group (-13.8%, p<0.001) and some suggestion of fewer patients than the regional 
comparison groups (-31.0%, p=0.094). 
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Daycase admissions 
MTW had fewer daycase admissions than all three comparison groups for almost 
every time period included here (the exception was 6 months before report 
publication, relative to the geographical comparison group) (Table 15). For example, 
relative to the volume comparison group MTW had 17.3% (p<0.001) fewer patients 
nine months before publication, 12.8% (p=0.004) fewer at six months, and 14.9% 
(p=0.001) fewer at three months. There were no significant declines in daycase 
numbers for UHL relative to any of the comparison groups. Mid Staffordshire had 
fewer daycases 3 months before publication relative to the geographical (-20.1%, 
p<0.001) and regional (-18.2%, p=0.005) comparison groups, but not the volume 
comparison group (-3.7%, p=0.354). 
 
Did Not Attend numbers 
MTW had more DNAs 6 and 3 months before report publication than the regional 
comparison group (e.g. +77.4%, p=0.007 at 6 months) (Table 16). However, MTW 
had fewer DNAs relative to the geographical comparison group 3 and 6 months 
before report publication (e.g. -22.4%, p=0.003 at 6 months). Results for the other two 
trusts also found that they had fewer DNAs in the months leading up to report 
publication relative to the comparison groups. E.g. Mid Staffordshire had 67.9% 
fewer DNAs at 3 months (p=0.003) relative to the volume group, while UHL had 
34.7% fewer DNAs (p=0.002) relative to the geographical group. 
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Table 14: Percentage changes in inpatient admissions before report publication  
  
Effect 9 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 6 
months pre 
report (p value) 
Effect 3 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Volume comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -13.7 (0.001) 3.4 (0.396) -3.1 (0.444) 
University Hospitals Leicester -1.6 (0.618) -7.4 (0.018) -8.5 (0.007) 
Mid Staffordshire 5.3 (0.171) 3.5 (0.371) -4.2 (0.279) 
Geographical comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -13.9 (<0.001) 3.9 (0.420) -4.4 (0.358) 
University Hospitals Leicester 2.9 (0.501) -5.1 (0.230) -7.6 (0.071) 
Mid Staffordshire -3.3 (0.345) -5.3 (0.133) -13.8 (<0.001) 
Regional comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -16.7 (<0.001) -1.2 (0.750) -8.7 (0.025) 
University Hospitals Leicester -1.6 (0.726) -7.1 (0.124) -6.4 (0.164) 
Mid Staffordshire -4.8 (0.791) -7.8 (0.672) -31.0 (0.094) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
 
 
 
Table 15: Percentage changes in daycase admissions before report publication  
  
Effect 9 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 6 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 3 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Volume comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -17.3 (<0.001) -12.8 (0.004) -14.9 (0.001) 
University Hospitals Leicester 1.5 (0.933) -2.5 (0.891) -5.8 (0.750) 
Mid Staffordshire 0.5 (0.901) 0.2 (0.960) -3.7 (0.354) 
Geographical comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -15.9 (<0.001) -3.4 (0.493) -10.8 (0.027) 
University Hospitals Leicester 9.2 (0.047) 1.9 (0.684) -0.8 (0.866) 
Mid Staffordshire -11.8 (0.006) -13.2 (0.002) -20.1 (0.001) 
Regional comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -20.3 (<0.001) -8.3 (0.026) -13.4 (<0.001) 
University Hospitals Leicester 1.7 (0.709) -3.7 (0.426) -2.0 (0.665) 
Mid Staffordshire -6.6 (0.299) -10.9 (0.090) -18.2 (0.005) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
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Table 16: Percentage changes in did not attend numbers before report publication  
  
Effect 9 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 6 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 3 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Volume comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -3.2 (0.906) 29.6 (0.282) 43.3 (0.114) 
University Hospitals Leicester -70.0 (0.084) -47.3 (0.241) -40.6 (0.315) 
Mid Staffordshire -73.0 (0.001) -64.9 (0.005) -67.9 (0.003) 
Geographical comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 6.5 (0.217) -22.4 (0.003) -15.6 (0.035) 
University Hospitals Leicester -16.4 (0.140) -13.8 (0.212) -34.7 (0.002) 
Mid Staffordshire -30.5 (0.002) -23.4 (0.016) -17.4 (0.081) 
Regional comparison group 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 15.2 (0.592) 77.4 (0.007) 78.3 (0.006) 
University Hospitals Leicester 5.8 (0.531) 11.7 (0.205) 11.0 (0.238) 
Mid Staffordshire -42.2 (0.001) -27.5 (0.032) -21.8 (0.091) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
Comparison of the three scandal trusts and the national comparison group are shown 
in Appendix 3: Table A10.  Results from the difference-in-difference analysis with 
this as a comparison group are in Table A11. No significant changes in any of the 
three outcomes and any of the scandal trusts were found in this analysis. Results from 
the difference-in-difference analysis using the national comparison group and 
examining anticipatory effects are shown in Table A12. Again, no significant 
changes in any of the three outcomes for any of the scandal trusts were found. 
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5.4 Discussion 
Main findings 
The results presented here do not provide strong support for the initial hypothesis 
that hospital trusts which are publicised as particularly poor performers will 
experience wholesale declines in levels of elective patient utilisation. I identified a 
decline at only one out of the three cases examined here, and this effect was 
temporary – only lasting six months. Analyses of the anticipation effects of the 
reports being released did find some evidence of these being present – that is, that 
changes in patient utilisation may have occurred as knowledge of these 
investigations spread throughout the community rather than when the results were 
published. These effects could reflect the response of patients (or their advocates) to 
information about poor performance. These effects were identified primarily 9 
months before report publication at MTW and 3 months before report publication at 
Mid Staffordshire. The investigation into MTW was announced in September 2006 
(that is, 13 months before the publication of the report in October 2007). It is possible 
then that the declines identified in inpatient and daycase admissions in the period 9-
6 months before report publication were in response to this announcement. The 
investigation into Mid Staffordshire was announced in March 2008 (that is, 12 
months before report publication in March 2009). The changes in patient utilisation 3 
months before report publication then, seem unlikely to have been caused by this 
announcement, although they may have been caused by spreading concern in the 
local health economy about quality of care at the trust.  The Mid Staffordshire 
investigation in particular was stimulated by intense local action and campaigning, 
and so it may be that around this time was when this message began to emerge.  The 
report into UHL was based on a routine hygiene inspection at the trust, and so did 
not involve the same degree of pre-release of information such as an investigation 
being established. 
 
The findings for DNAs were much larger than for either daycase or inpatient 
admissions (where the size of effect was broadly similar for both). MTW experienced 
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a 74% increase in DNAs in the first three months after report publication, compared 
with much smaller changes for the other outcomes. It is only possible to speculate on 
the reasons for this, but it may be that patients find it easier to not attend an 
outpatient appointment than to cancel planned surgery. It may also be that many 
patients waiting for outpatient appointments consider their health issues to be less 
serious than those who are booked in for an overnight stay, and thus are less 
concerned about delaying these healthcare contacts.  
 
Reasons for this lack of effect 
There are many possible reasons why there may have been a lack of wholesale 
changes in patient utilisation at trusts publicised as performing particularly poorly. 
These include that patients may not have been aware of these findings. Such an 
assertion is difficult to test, however, as already mentioned, these reports were 
widely disseminated by the media, and so it seems likely that patients would have 
known of these concerns. The fact that these reports presented a simple picture of 
(failing) trusts in some ways overcomes many of the concerns that patients may have 
had difficulty in understanding the content of these reports, and that the “quality 
signal” may not have been clear. This has been a common criticism of many 
reporting initiatives, which make unrealistic cognitive demands on patients or those 
choosing a location for care [19, 170].  A second possible reason may be that patients 
were in fact making rational decisions based on the fact that the reported problems 
were unlikely to affect them. This work did not disaggregate patients other than to 
examine inpatients and daycases, under the assumption that there may be a 
differential effect between these two groups (based on the assumption that 
inpatients may be more at risk of any poor care than daycases). The issues identified 
at both UHL and MTW were related to hygiene control – specifically into problems 
around Clostridium Difficile. This is a problem which most commonly affects older 
people, and it is possible that for this reason many patients may have felt that these 
risks did not apply to them. Aside from this basic epidemiology, it is also possible 
that many patients simply assumed that any problems would not affect them. For 
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example, the investigation into MTW identified 90 deaths where C. Difficile 
probably or definitely was responsible [198], and so people may have thought that 
this was unlikely to happen to them. In contrast, the issues identified at Mid 
Staffordshire were concentrated in Accident and Emergency but seem to have 
affected a wide range of patient groups. This means that patients attending for 
planned operations may also have considered that these risks did not apply to them 
(although the reports did also identify systemic failings across the whole hospital).  
 
It is possible that the publication of these reports did not tell patients anything which 
they did not already know (i.e. they may have contained no novel “news”). Thus, in 
this case it may be that patients and those in the local health economy (of UHL and 
Mid Staffordshire) were already aware of problems and so my analysis did not pick 
up a difference in patient utilisation. This idea has been examined recently in work 
on the association between the reporting of quality measures for cardiac surgery and 
market shares. This confirmed that the effect of these reports on numbers of patients 
for cardiac care varied according to the perceived quality of a hospital before these 
reports were released [70]. The effect of announcements of this kind, and the degree 
of “news” which they may contain, has not been studied previously. 
 
The report into MTW was published in October 2007 – which was a time of 
heightened public worries about hospital associated infections. For example, it was 
around this time that the Daily Mail swabbed MRSA from a number of public places, 
including a doorknob at the Department of Health [204]. At the height of this 
“superbug scare” the public also identified hospital associated infections as one of 
the main problems facing the NHS [205] and it may be that the MTW spoke to pre-
existing concerns about such infections.  
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Other reasons why there may not have been large effects are the structural 
impediments to choice. These include choice not being available to them (the GP not 
offering it to them), or the alternative providers which could have been attended 
being further away than patients willing to travel.  The only trust where this analysis 
suggested a conclusive decline in patient utilisation was MTW. Although this work 
did not directly examine geographical factors, MTW is geographically close to 
London, which may mean that patients here may have had an increased availability 
of other hospital options. Nonetheless, previous work has identified that most areas 
of England have access to at least one other hospital within sixty minutes travel time 
[156].  
 
Policy implications 
The reports examined here were highly critical, widely disseminated reports from 
the health care regulator, and there is no simple “read-across” to the wider debate on 
public reporting. Nonetheless, similarities do exist, and it may be expected that such 
reports would motivate changes in patient behaviour as other more traditional 
initiatives. The findings here suggest that relying on the patient selection pathway 
may be overly optimistic – as with a lack of wholesale changes across hospital trusts 
which were an extreme case of public reporting, it seems unlikely that more routine 
initiatives will motivate change through a change in patient utilisation. There may 
however, be changes from such initiatives through, for example, institutions being 
afraid of regulatory action. Such high-profile public reporting may also stimulate 
action through concerns about reputation [31], or due to ongoing monitoring by 
regulators. Many countries are committed to the public and patients having access to 
such information – a commitment which is partly driven by an increasing feeling 
that patients have a general “right to know” such information. Many countries have 
also experienced a rise in healthcare regulation, a trend which has been noted in a 
number of countries and billed as a rise in the “regulatory state” [195]. 
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This study demonstrates that even when there is a very clear message on quality 
from public reporting, the numbers of patients attending the affected organisations 
may not change. These findings then, are similar to those from the NYCRS, which 
found that performance data did not change the market share of organisations, even 
though it did find that they were stimulated to improve [38]. Taking these findings 
together, that work suggested (as did others) that designing public reporting to 
impact on the reputation of providers may be more effective than relying on changes 
in patient utilisation. This suggestion is supported by my work, which finds that 
levels of patient utilisation are very hard to shift. 
 
5.5 Strengths and Limitations 
There are strengths to this study and the methods employed here. This is, as far as I 
am aware, the first research in England to examine the issue of whether high-profile 
regulatory reports are associated with changes in patient utilisation. However, this 
analysis has some limitations. First, the sample was small, as only three hospital 
trusts had major investigations by the HC and continued to operate normal services 
after report publication. Second, this analysis does not directly address questions of 
patient choice, but uses patient numbers to examine the issue of whether hospital 
trusts with negative reports have reduced levels of patient utilisation. Third, 
although I used four comparison groups, I cannot be certain that the changes in 
patient utilisation observed were directly affected by negative reporting. In order to 
ascertain this, I would need more detailed data on referral patterns from GP 
practices, individual-level data on patient movements and patient surveys. 
 
I was not able to assess any possible impact of constraints on patient choice, and how 
this may have prevented patients from being able to avoid a failing hospital. Such 
constraints may well have included the role of the GP, who are responsible for acting 
as gatekeepers, and also have the responsibility for offering choice to patients.  
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As I used aggregate data, this did not include resident post codes, or any 
geographical breakdown of where patients lived. Access to this data would have 
allowed me to calculate the distance of patients to specific hospitals, and the role 
which this may have played.  Nonetheless, the average distance between the scandal 
trusts and those in the geographical comparison group was approximately twenty 
miles, so it does seem likely that a majority of patients had access to an alternative 
provider. The aggregate data also did not allow a breakdown of differential effects 
across different hospital sites, and the analyses here are all at the NHS trust level. 
Although all of the reporting was at the NHS trust level, it is possible that changes in 
patient utilisation may have differed across hospital sites due to geography or the 
perception of the problems being localised to particular hospitals or wards within 
them. I was also unable to examine whether there were differential effects for 
different clinical specialties, although as these reports tended to focus on whole 
hospital quality issues, it is questionable what this may have added. 
 
There were also major changes in the NHS during the period covered by this work. 
This included a small increase in the provision of care (free at the point of care) at 
ISTCs [125].  It seems unlikely however that these changes would have a major 
impact on my findings, due to the use of the difference-in-difference approach and 
the use of four separate comparison groups.  
 
5.6 Conclusions from this chapter 
This work demonstrates that highly publicised quality failings did not have 
substantial impact on patient utilisation in two out of three hospital trusts affected. 
There was a fall in one case, but this was not sustained. This reminds us that simple 
assumptions about the power of information to drive patient utilisation and choices 
are likely to be unrealistic [206]. This needs to be borne in mind by policy makers, 
who need to be cautious against any such reliance on these mechanisms alone to 
drive quality improvements.  
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Chapter 6: Effects of high-profile public reporting on utilisation and quality of 
care in maternity services 
6.1 Introduction 
There has been an increase in public reporting of healthcare quality in England, 
which has been intended to improve health system performance via several 
mechanisms. The main policy focus however, is on the selection pathway where 
patients use performance information to inform their choices on where to receive 
care. Associated competition between providers as they compete to increase their 
market share through attracting patients is then intended to increase quality [9, 26]. 
 
Little support is provided by existing evidence for the selection pathway as a 
mechanism for health system improvement. A 2008 systematic review concluded 
that public reporting of performance data did not influence patient choice of 
hospitals [10]. The evidence for a positive impact of the public release of 
performance data on quality at organisations affected is more positive however [26]. 
The lack of effect on patient utilisation has been suggested to be due to patients 
lacking motivation to seek this information coupled with difficulties understanding 
any performance data they do come across [11]. Much of the previous research 
however has been in the U.S. and has focused on schemes releasing quality 
information for cardiac surgery.  Explanations for the positive impacts of publicly 
releasing data on quality of care in the absence of changes in patient utilisation 
include that this information stimulates improvements in care either due to concern 
about patient choices in the future [9], or through concern around the impact of this 
information on reputation [1].   
 
In this study I test the hypothesis that high-profile public reporting of maternity care 
quality influenced levels of patient utilisation at the organisations involved. The 
example I use is a HC report in 2008 which presented simple data showing the ten 
best and ten worst maternity providers in the country and received widespread 
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media coverage. The hypothesis is based on the assumptions that pregnant women 
may be more proactive in seeking (and more responsive when receiving) publicly 
reported information than other groups. They may also have greater scope than 
patients for other types of care to use this to inform their choice of provider. I also 
investigate whether there are differences across socio-demographic groups and in 
the distance that patients travel to receive care. Finally, I will investigate whether 
this public reporting is associated with changes in patient reported quality as 
measured in two patient surveys.  
 
6.2 Methods 
Sample 
The HC, the healthcare regulator in England before it was subsumed into the CQC, 
published Towards Better Births [207] in July 2008. This report provided scored 
assessments of all NHS trusts in England providing maternity services, with 25 
indicators grouped around the themes of clinical focus, women centred care, and 
efficiency and capability of services. The assessments were based on a patient 
survey, a web based survey for service managers, and a staff survey. The patient 
survey was, at the time, the largest ever maternity patient survey undertaken in 
England, and contacted 26,000 women who had recently given birth in June 2007.  
The web based survey for service managers focused on issues such as staffing 
arrangements and policies, while the staff survey was completed by frontline staff at 
around half of all trusts, and achieved 4,950 responses. 
 
Information gathered from the patient survey was published on a website called 
BirthChoiceUK in November 2007 [208]. Here, patients could link to the patient 
survey reports for trusts, including details on their performance on individual 
questions. In these reports scores were displayed for individual NHS trusts 
alongside information on whether their performance on individual questions was 
better than, as, or worse than expected. Neither this website nor the HC report 
129 
 
ranked hospital trusts. In January 2008 the information from the patient survey was 
featured in a large number of national media outlets (e.g. the BBC, The Times, and 
The Daily Telegraph). The reports were also featured in a number of local news 
outlets. These stories all focused on the ten “best” and “worst” performers for 
maternity care in England (for example, there were headlines such as “Maternity 
units falling short”) [209]. Details of how these media providers came to this list of 
the ten best and worst providers are not clear, although all media stories were using 
the same list. However, the object of this study is to examine whether the public 
release of information itself has an impact, and is not concerned with whether 
information in the public domain is technically correct.  
The ten best and worst hospital trusts identified were: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Best hospitals 
 Stockport NHS Foundation Trust    
 Gateshead Health NHS Trust 
 North Cumbria Acute Hospitals NHS Trust   
 Northern Devon Healthcare NHS Trust 
 Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 
 County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust 
 Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust 
 Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust 
 Hull and East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust 
 Wirral University Teaching Hospital NHS Trust 
Worst hospitals 
 West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust 
 Newham University Hospital NHS Trust 
 Barking, Havering and Redbridge Hospitals NHS Trust 
 Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
 Homerton University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
 Mayday Healthcare NHS Trust 
 Bromley hospitals NHS Trust 
 Luton and Dunstable NHS Foundation Trust 
 Bart’s and the London NHS Trust 
 St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust 
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Data was available for 146 NHS trusts providing maternity services in England for 
the study period (2006/07 to 2010/11). 35 hospital trusts were excluded as they had 
fewer than 100 maternity admissions in any of the six month periods in the study 
period. This was because these trusts exhibited high levels of variability in their 
maternity admission numbers, but also because I have assumed that there were 
idiosyncrasies with these trusts (such as their not having a fully functioning 
maternity unit at some point). One of the trusts in the worst group (Bromley NHS 
hospitals trust) merged into South London Healthcare NHS Trust during the study 
period (in April 2009). This trust was also excluded, as mergers can have a large 
effect on patient utilisation levels [210] and this would have made any effects more 
difficult to detect. Two specialist women’s hospital trusts were also excluded. This 
meant that the final sample contained 108 NHS hospital trusts, comprising ten trusts 
branded the best, nine branded the worst, and a national comparison group of the 
remaining 89. 
 
Data sources 
Data for this study come from maternity HES data, which was provided by Mauro 
Laudicella at Imperial College London. This captures all admissions to hospital 
funded by the NHS in England. Previous work has found that this data covers 96% 
of all births in England [211], with the remainder being home births or data errors. 
Data from HES was merged with other data sources to make some composite 
variables. Information on the number of bed days available for maternity admissions 
came from the Department of Health [212] and demographic data are from 
population projections complied by the Office for National Statistics [213]. The 
geographical position of hospital trust headquarters data came from the NHS 
Organisation Data Service [214].  
 
All analyses in this study were at the NHS trust level, rather than at the level of 
individual hospital sites. Geographical distance measures were calculated using 
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Pythagoras’ Theorem calculating the straight line distance between the population 
weighted centroid of each patient’s Lower Super Output Area (available in HES) and 
the headquarters of the hospital trust where they were admitted. 
 
Data on patient reported quality of care is from the NHS Maternity Survey. This is a 
postal survey available to UK researchers through the UK Data Service 
(http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/) and was conducted in 2007 and 2010. In 2007 the 
survey had a response rate of 59% (achieving a final sample size of 26,042 women) 
and the 2010 survey had a response rate of 52% (final sample size 24,488).  
 
Outcome measures 
The main outcome measure in this study was counts of women admitted for 
delivery of a baby, which was planned for that hospital. I also included a number of 
secondary outcome measures in order to investigate whether there were differential 
impacts in specific groups. These were:  
1. Percentage of women giving birth by C-section 
2. Percentage of deliveries to women over the age of 35 years 
3. Percentage of deliveries to women from the 20% most deprived areas in 
England  
4. Percentage of deliveries to women from the 20% least deprived areas in 
England  
5. Percentage of women admitted to the hospital trust which was the closest 
to them (i.e. shortest in terms of geographical distance between home 
LSOA and hospital trust headquarters) 
6. Average distance travelled by women to attend 
 
The rationale for examining C-sections was that there may have been differential 
effects by clinical need and that women having a planned C-section may have a 
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different clinical picture than women having another form of delivery. The rationale 
for outcomes two to five was in order to investigate differences across these basic 
age and deprivation characteristics. The rationale for examining percentage of 
women attending their closest trust was in order to examine whether public 
reporting may have increased the willingness of women to bypass a closer trust in 
order to attend one which has been publicised as providing good particularly good 
care. This measure has been used in previous work and has the advantage that it is 
less “messy” than the data on average distances, and represents an easier measure to 
understand [168]. Average distance was examined in order to assess whether the 
reports may have impacted on the areas which patients came from to attend these 
trusts. 
 
The 20% most and least deprived areas in England were ascertained using the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation income score for their Lower Super Output Area, based on 
the national ranking of area-level deprivation. An LSOA is a small administrative 
area, comprising on average 1,500 addresses and there are 32,482 of these small areas 
in England [188].   
 
All outcomes were aggregated into six month time periods. This was due to the fact 
that analyses using three month time periods exhibited a lot of variability in 
numbers which made estimation of effects problematic. Preliminary analyses 
however, did not suggest that results would have been substantially if using three 
month time periods. The baseline for all analyses was set as the period from 
September 2007 to March 2008. This means that the baseline period incorporates 
when the relevant information first came into the public domain (in November 2007 
on the BirthChoiceUK website) as well as the high-profile media reporting (in January 
2008). 
 
133 
 
The outcomes used from the patient surveys were the percentage of women replying 
excellent, very good, or good to the questions: how would you rate the care received 
during your pregnancy? /…during your labour and birth? /…during your care after the 
birth? Responses were on a five point scale of these options plus “fair” and “poor.” 
After making these responses binary they were converted to percentages using the 
total number of women who answered these questions as the denominator. These 
three questions were used as they were the three which related most directly to 
overall quality of care (other questions included detail on for example, the 
cleanliness of clinical and non-clinical areas, as well as whether women were left 
alone when they would have liked not to be [215]). 
 
Analysis 
The analysis presented in this study uses a difference-in-difference design, which is a 
quasi-experimental method commonly used for policy evaluation [202]. Using this 
method I compared the numbers of maternity admissions for trusts publicised as 
being the best or the worst in the country relative to various comparison groups. 
This allowed an assessment of whether the release of this information was associated 
with changes in admissions at the affected trusts. All of the models included a fixed 
effect term at the trust level in order to take account of systemic differences between 
providers which did not change over time. The log of the difference between the 
scandal trusts and comparison groups was used so that estimations can be 
interpreted as percentages. 
 
Two separate difference-in-difference analyses were conducted: First, I compared the 
best and worst group individually to the national comparison group. For this 
analysis, other NHS trusts within 10km of the best or worst trusts were excluded as 
their patient utilisation levels may have been affected if patients moved here from 
the best or worst trusts, which would amplify any possible effects. Second, I 
compared the best and worst groups to matched comparison groups. These matched 
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comparison groups were constructed using propensity score matching, and 
comprised the three most similar trusts in terms of their propensity score. That is, 
the values for this group were a weighted average of the three most similar trusts, 
where the weights were based on the propensity score. Propensity score matching 
was based on the year 2006/07 (the financial year before the information was made 
public). 
 
Propensity score matching is a statistical method which aims to create comparator 
groups which are similar to the treated trusts in terms of observable characteristics. I 
first constructed a probit model of how likely every trusts in the data was to be in 
the worst or best group. A separate model was constructed for the best and the 
worst group separately, where in each, the outcome is the probability being in this 
group. This analysis is based on modelling the probability of being in either the best 
or the worst group so that it should be possible to find comparators which, based on 
their observable characteristics, had a similar probability of being in either the worst 
or the best group.  
 
A large number of potentially relevant variables were examined: the annual number 
of maternity admissions and available maternity beds, the occupancy of maternity 
beds (worked out as the number of beds divided by the number of admissions), the 
number of whole time equivalent GPs in the catchment area, the number of persons 
aged 15-34 in the catchment area, the percentage of the catchment area which is 
classified as urban, the number of other NHS trusts  within 5/10/20km and the 
mean income score from the IMD for the area. Other variables based on the admitted 
patients were also included: the percentage of deliveries which were by C-section, 
percentage of women over the age of 35, percentage of women from the 20% least 
and most deprived areas, as well as the percentage of women attending for whom 
the hospital trust they attended was the closest geographically. 
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Standard balancing tests are based on assessing whether the propensity score 
matched comparison group is more similar to the treated groups than an unmatched 
group, and uses t-tests. These tests revealed that number of admissions in the past 
year combined with level of deprivation in the local catchment area were the most 
appropriate variables to use to construct the matched comparison groups. These 
tests also revealed that the overall number of maternity admissions was similar 
between the treated group and the comparison groups, and so I did not examine 
graphically whether these trends were parallel (as I did in chapter 5, where 
propensity score matching was not used). 
 
Analysis of the survey data compared changes between 2007 and 2010 used two 
comparison groups. First, each group was compared with the national comparison 
group, before being compared with a group of ten trusts which had similar scores in 
2007. This was achieved by finding the ten trusts with the most similar scores on 
each of the three questions to the mean of the worst and best group separately. The 
differences in percentage change between the two surveys were calculated using z-
tests. For the survey analysis I also applied population weights provided by the 
survey team, which are designed to take account of differences in age groups and 
parity status between different hospital trusts.  It should be noted that the survey in 
2007 formed part of the ratings assigned by the HC to trusts, and so it is to be 
expected that the best trusts perform better and vice versa. I have not undertaken 
formal statistical testing on the differences between the groups in individual years, 
as this is left to examine changes between 2007 and 2010. 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
I conducted a number of sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of the results. 
These included examining whether changing from excluding other trusts within 
5km to 20km changed results, using a different baseline period, and changing the 
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number of trusts included in the matched group from three to five. These analyses 
can be found in appendix 4. 
 
Finally, the survey analysis was performed using the same trusts which were 
matched on the basis of propensity score matching, rather than on survey scores. 
This gives the comparison to the same group used in the analyses of patient 
utilisation. These results are also in appendix 4. 
 
6.3 Results 
Differences between the best, worst and national comparison groups in 2006/07 are 
shown in Table 17. The best group had fewer maternity admissions (3,283 vs. 4,574, 
p=0.021 and a lower occupancy rate (63.0% vs. 77.3%, p=0.089) than the national 
comparison group. The worst trusts had more maternity admissions than the 
national comparison group (5,309 vs. 4,574, p=0.215), and a similar occupancy rate 
(79.2% vs. 77.3%, p=0.834) to the national group. The best and worst trusts groups 
each had a smaller percentage of women from the most affluent fifth of England 
(10.5%, 9.4% and 17.0% respectively, p=0.089 and p=0.061), and higher IMD income 
scores than nationally (0.176, 0.167 and 0.136 respectively, p=0.012 and p=0.067). The 
worst group had more other NHS trusts in a 10km radius than the best group (20 vs. 
12), and nearly half of all admissions for the worst group were for women living in 
the most deprived fifth of England (45.7% vs. 26.0% nationally, p=0.006). The 
percentage of the catchment area which was urban was higher in the worst group 
than the national group (96.9% vs. 88.0%, p=0.014) and they had a larger population 
aged 15-34 in the catchment area (1,501,304 vs. 477,915, p<0.001). Both of these reflect 
the fact that eight of out of nine of the worst group were based in London.  
 
Findings from propensity score matching are presented in appendix 4, table A13. 
This indicates that compared with the national comparison group the best group had 
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fewer admissions and a higher IMD income score, but that the comparison group 
generated by matching was more similar in terms of these variables. After matching, 
the mean number of admissions in the best and matched group were 3,283 and 3,612 
(p=0.530) and the IMD income scores were 0.176 and 0.180 (p=0.812).  After 
matching, the worst group and matched comparison group had 5,309 and 5,227 
admissions respectively (p=0.931) and IMD income scores of 0.167 and 0.166 
(p=0.951). 
 
Table 17: Summary statistics for best and worst rated maternity trusts and national 
comparison group, 2006/07 
  Best Worst  National comparison group  
Hospital trusts 10 9 89 
Annual number of maternity admissions (SD) 3,283 (1,328)** 5,309 (1,654) 4,574 (1,685) 
Number of maternity beds (SD) 53.6 (25.2) 70.8 (21.8) 64.5 (27.4) 
Occupancy of maternity beds% (SD) 63.0 (11.9)* 79.2 (25.0) 77.3 (26.6) 
Number of WTE GPs 5.8 (1.7) 4.9 (0.9) 5.4 (1.1) 
Catchment area population aged 15-34 253,707 1,501,304** 477,915 
% catchment area which is urban 83.0 (17.0) 96.9 (5.3)** 88.0 (10.5) 
Number of NHS trusts within 5km 9 12 - 
Number of NHS trusts within 10km 12 20 - 
Mean income score for area from IMD 2004 0.176 (0.033)** 0.167 (0.044)* 0.136 (0.047) 
% of deliveries by C-section 9.3 (0.9) 7.6 (2.8)** 9.9 (1.9) 
% of deliveries to women>35 years old 17.5 (2.5)* 21.4 (6.2) 20.3 (5.0) 
% of deliveries from deprived mothers
┼
 29.4 (13.2) 45.7 (33.5)** 26.0 (18.3) 
% of deliveries from affluent mothers
┼
 10.5 (6.6)* 9.4 (9.5)* 17.0 (11.8) 
% of deliveries for which trust was closest 84.4 (17.5) 76.0 (14.5) 79.0 (19.3) 
┼ 
Defined as mothers living in the 20% most and least deprived areas nationally as defined by the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 
* Significantly different to national comparison group at p≤0.10 
** Significantly different to national comparison group at p≤0.05 
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Impact of public reporting on maternity admissions 
For the best trusts group there were no statistically significant changes in overall 
numbers of maternity admissions either before or after public reporting (Table 18). 
For example, 6 months post-baseline the best group had +2.2% more admissions 
(p=0.397). There were also no statistically significant changes for the percentage of 
women having a C-section. There was a small but statistically significant decrease (-
1.1%; p=0.009) in maternity admissions in women age over 35 years in the best trusts 
19-24 months post baseline, which persisted until the end of the study period. 
Results from the national comparison analysis (Table A14) were similar, showing no 
change in overall numbers, and a small decline in the percentage of women aged 
over 35 years 19 months after baseline. 
 
For the worst trusts there were also no statistically significant changes in the overall 
number of maternity admissions before or after public reporting (Table 19). For 
example, 6 months post-baseline the worst group had -2.0% fewer admissions 
(p=0.622), which increased to -6.4% (p=0.112) 7-12 months after public reporting. 
Effects on the percentage of women from the 20% most, or least, deprived areas of 
the country were negligible. The worst trusts performed more C-sections after public 
reporting from 13 months after public reporting until the end of the study period 
(e.g. +1.7%, p=0.007 at 13-18 months). There was a small but significant increase in 
the percentage of women over the age of 35 from 19 months after report publication 
to the end of the study period (e.g. +1.3%, p=0.009 at 19-24 months). Results from the 
national comparison analysis Table A15 were similar for overall admissions (no 
change from matched analysis), deprivation (negligible changes), and the increase in 
mothers over 35 (although this began 13-18 months after public reporting here, 
rather than 19-24months afterwards).  Results for C-sections were also similar. 
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Impact of public reporting on distance travelled for admission  
The average distances travelled for admission to the best, worst and national groups 
are shown in Table 20. This shows that women travel further to attend the best 
trusts than for either the national comparison group or the worst group (14.4km, 
9.2km and 4.7km respectively for the baseline period). Examining the raw distances 
travelled there did not appear to be any large changes in this measure for any of the 
groups over the study period. Results from the difference-in-difference analysis 
comparing the best group to their matched comparison group showed no 
statistically significant changes at any point during the study period. For the worst 
group, women travelled an extra 0.2km (p=0.029) to attend 13-18 months after public 
reporting, and an extra 0.3km (p=0.001) 25-30 months after public reporting.  
 
The percentage of women attending their geographically closest trust in the best, 
worst and national comparison groups are shown in Table 21. The best trusts were 
geographically the closest for a higher percentage of women attending than in either 
the national comparison group or the worst group (84.3%, 81.1% and 76.4% 
respectively at baseline). Examining the raw percentages it seems that there may 
have been a small decline of these percentages for the worst group over time (from 
76.4% to 74.7% = -1.7%) and a slightly smaller fall for the national comparison group 
(from 81.1% to 79.3% = -0.8%). This trend was not apparent for the best group of 
trusts. Results from the difference-in-difference analysis show no statistically 
significant changes before or after public reporting, for either the best or the worst 
group.  
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Table 18:  Percentage changes in maternity admissions in the best trusts, relative to baseline (matched analysis) 
  Pre baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months 7–12 months   6 months   6 months   7–12 months   13–18 months   19–24 months 25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Number of admissions 3.6 (0.164) 2.0 (0.450) -0.7 (0.786) Reference 2.2 (0.397) 2.3 (0.368) 2.9 (0.268) -0.6 (0.819) 2.1 (0.407) 2.3 (0.381) 
% births by C-section 0.6 (0.156) -0.4 (0.415) 0.8 (0.075) Reference -0.4 (0.391) 0.1 (0.887) -0.1 (0.796) -0.5 (0.259) -0.5 (0.278) 0.3 (0.464) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.7 (0.097) -0.3 (0.541) 0.0 (0.944) Reference -0.1 (0.837) -0.1 (0.786) -0.5 (0.244) -1.1 (0.009) -1.1 (0.009) -0.9 (0.039) 
%  deprived mothers -0.7 (0.184) -0.7 (0.176) -1.5 (0.003) Reference -0.8 (0.106) -0.5 (0.308) -0.0 (0.932) -0.6 (0.270) -0.6 (0.257) -0.4 (0.478) 
% affluent  mothers -0.2 (0.527) -0.3 (0.398) 0.4 (0.221) Reference -0.3 (0.489) -0.5 (0.201) -0.0 (0.965) 0.0 (0.993) -0.8 (0.028) -0.5 (0.179) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
 
Table 19: Percentage changes in maternity admissions in the worst trusts, relative to baseline (matched analysis) 
  Pre baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months 7–12 months   6 months   6 months   7–12 months   13–18 months   19–24 months 25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Number of admissions 0.0 (0.998) 4.2 (0.294) 2.0 (0.613) Reference -2.0 (0.622) -6.4 (0.112) -3.0 (0.456) -1.4 (0.727) -3.1 (0.437) -1.5 (0.708) 
% births by C-section -0.6 (0.351) -0.8 (0.188) -0.1 (0.843) Reference 0.7 (0.258) 1.2 (0.062) 1.7 (0.007) 1.2 (0.057) 1.6 (0.013) 2.1 (0.001) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.2 (0.717) 0.6 (0.238) 0.3 (0.515) Reference 0.5 (0.296) 0.7 (0.177) 0.1 (0.056) 1.3 (0.009) 1.0 (0.053) 1.4 (0.005) 
%  deprived mothers -0.4 (0.434) -0.4 (0.435) -0.1 (0.893) Reference -0.4 (0.419) -0.7 (0.196) -1.3 (0.022) -0.8 (0.163) -1.0 (0.081) -0.9 (0.091) 
% affluent mothers 0.2 (0.537) 0.2 (0.572) 0.1 (0.715) Reference 0.0 (0.946) 0.1 (0.787) 0.2 (0.622) -0.1 (0.794) 0.3 (0.487) 0.3 (0.423) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
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Table 20: Mean distance (in km) travelled for maternity admissions in best and worst group, with difference-in-difference 
estimates using matched comparison groups 
  Pre baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Best group mean (SD) 14.4 (15.9) 14.2 (15.6) 14.5 (15.9) 14.4(1.5.5) 14.5 (15.5) 14.4 (15.6) 14.6 (15.7) 14.1 (15.0) 14.4 (15.4) 14.4 (15.4) 
Coefficient (p value)  0.1 (0.669) -0.1 (0.682) 0.3 (0.126) Baseline 0.3 (0.088) 0.3 (0.114) 0.2 (0.228) 0.1 (0.635) 0.01 (0.947) 0.1 (0.694) 
Worst group mean (SD) 4.6 (5.0) 4.6 (5.4) 4.6 (5.1) 4.7 (5.4) 4.7 (5.3) 4.7 (5.2) 4.8 (6.1) 4.8 (5.8) 5.0 (6.8) 4.8 (5.8) 
Coefficient (p value) -0.1 (0.214) -0.1 (0.578) -0.1 (0.311) Baseline 0.0 (0.995) 0.0 (0.942) 0.2 (0.029) 0.1 (0.223) 0.3 (0.001) 0.2 (0.097) 
National mean (SD) 9.3 (9.3) 9.3 (9.3) 9.3 (9.3) 9.2 (9.3) 9.2 (9.3) 9.3 (9.3) 9.4 (9.4) 9.4 (9.5) 9.5 (9.6) 9.4 (9.5) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
Mean distance worked out as straight line distance from population weighted centroid of Lower Super Output Area to NHS Trust Headquarters 
 
Table 21: Percentage of admissions for which the trust attended was the closest, for best, worst and national groups. Difference-
in-difference estimates between best and worst groups and matched comparison groups 
 
Pre baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Best group mean (SD) 84.3 (17.19) 84.4 (17.48) 84.1 (17.34) 84.3 (17.54) 84.0 (16.28) 83.9 (17.39) 83.9 (17.18) 84.2 (16.86) 84.4 (17.10) 84.1 (16.81) 
Coefficient (p value)  0.2 (0.622) 0.5 (0.250) -0.5 (0.242) Reference -0.3 (0.510) -0.3 (0.492) -0.3 (0.406) 0.1 (0.864) 0.5 (0.252) -0.2 (0.639) 
Worst group mean (SD) 76.4 (14.37) 76.0 (14.51) 75.9 (14.39) 76.2 (14.48) 75.7 (14.21) 75.7 (14.61) 75.3 (14.18) 74.9 (14.45) 74.3 (14.36) 74.68 (14.83) 
Coefficient (p value) 0.2 (0.702) 0.1 (0.863) -0.2 (0.795) Reference -0.5 (0.466) -0.5 (0.400) -0.9 (0.149) -1.3 (0.044) -1.9 (0.003) -1.5 (0.018) 
National mean (SD) 81.1 (15.32) 80.9 (15.30) 79.3 (17.98) 79.2 (18.16) 80.2 (16.11) 80.1 (16.33) 79.6 (16.74) 79.4 (16.73) 79.0 (16.76) 79.3 (16.54) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold.  
Mean distance worked out as straight line distance from population weighted centroid of Lower Super Output Area to NHS Trust Headquarters 
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Impact of public reporting on perceived quality of maternity care  
In the maternity survey in 2007 the best trust group was performing better than the 
national comparison group and the worst group less well (Table 22). From 2007 to 
2010 the best group improved more slowly than the national picture on all three of 
the outcomes (e.g. +5.8% for overall care after birth compared with +8.4% nationally, 
p<0.001). Over the same time period, the worst trusts improved at a faster rate than 
the national comparison group on all outcomes (e.g. +7.7% for overall care during 
labour compared with +4.4% for the national group, p<0.001).  
 
In the analysis comparing the best trusts to a group of trusts matched on their 2007 
survey scores, results were more mixed. In this analysis the best group improved 
faster on one measure (care during labour, +4.4% vs. +1.0%, p<0.001), and less well 
on one (care after birth +5.8% vs. +10.5%, p<0.001).  There was some suggestion that 
the best trusts performed better on the third measure of care during pregnancy 
(+3.1% vs. +2.3%, p=0.057). In the matched analysis, the worst group performed less 
well on one outcome (care during pregnancy, +6.5% vs. +9.5%, p<0.001), similarly on 
one outcome (care during labour, +7.7% vs. 7.7%, p=0.963) and better on one 
outcome (care after birth +15.4% vs. 13.6%, p=0.037). 
 
Table A16 in the appendix gives the results of this analysis using a propensity score 
matched comparison group (the same comparison groups as in the difference-in-
difference analyses). These show that using this comparison group, the best group 
made slower improvements on all three outcomes (e.g. +5.8% vs. +11.3% for care 
after birth, p<0.001). It should be noted however, that this comparison group had 
lower scores on all three outcomes in 2007, and so more “room to improve”. 
Compared with the propensity score matched group, the worst group performed 
better on all three outcomes (e.g. +15.4% vs. +9.2% for care after birth, p<0.001). It 
should be noted that this comparison group had higher scores in 2007 on all three 
outcomes than the worst group. 
143 
 
 
Table 22: Percentage of women rating their care positively during pregnancy, labour and after birth, before and after public 
reporting  
    Nationally  
Best group 
(p-value 
difference 
from 
national 
group) 
Controls matched on 
2007 score (p value 
difference from best 
group) 
Worst group 
(p-value 
difference 
from national 
group) 
Controls matched on 
2007 score (p value 
difference from worst 
group) 
During pregnancy 
2007 87.9 91.9 91.7 81.9 81.8 
2010 92.4 95.0 94.0 88.4 91.3 
Change in % +4.5 +3.1 (<0.001) +2.3 (0.057) +6.5 (<0.001) +9.5 (<0.001) 
During labour 
2007 89.0 92.9 92.5 81.7 82.3 
2010 93.4 95.7 93.5 89.4 90.0 
Change in % +4.4 +2.8 (<0.001) +1.0 (<0.001) +7.7 (<0.001) +7.7 (0.963) 
After birth 
2007 80 85.2 76.7 65.4 72.8 
2010 88.4 91.0 87.2 80.8 86.4 
Change in % +8.4 +5.8 (<0.001) +10.5 (<0.001) +15.4 (<0.001) +13.6 (0.037) 
 
Rating care positively defined as percentage of women stating that their care was “good”, “very good”, or “excellent.” 
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Sensitivity analyses 
Results from the difference-in-difference analysis were similar for patient utilisation 
and percentage of women attending the closest trust when using 5 trusts in the 
comparison group rather than 3 (Tables A17 and A18). Results were also similar 
when excluding other NHS trusts within 20km, rather than 10km as in the main 
analysis (Tables A19 and A20). Analyses using April 2007 to September 2007 as a 
baseline rather than September 2007 to March 2008 are presented in Tables A21 and 
A22. These were broadly similar for the best group, in that they showed no 
statistically significant changes in patient utilisation. However, this analysis did find 
the best group to have fewer C-sections from 7-36 months after baseline (e.g. -1.2%, 
p=0.009 at 7-12 months) and an increase in mothers from the most deprived areas in 
England from 13 to 30 months after baseline (e.g. +1.0%, p=0.045 at 13-18 months). 
Results for the worst group were similar, although did show a statistically 
significant decline in overall admissions 13-18 months after the baseline (-8.5%, 
p=0.038). 
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6.4 Discussion 
Main findings 
Findings from this study indicate that public reporting on the quality of maternity 
services in England in late 2007/early 2008, which received widespread coverage in 
the media, had no significant impact on utilisation or perceived quality of services. I 
found that the overall number of maternity admissions did not significantly decrease 
in the nine hospital trusts widely reported as providing the worst maternity care in 
England and did not increase in the ten trusts reported as the best. The percentage of 
women rating their care positively during pregnancy, labour and after birth 
increased more in the worst rated trusts compared with the national comparison 
group. This improvement however, was not greater than in a group of trusts with 
similar patient reported quality scores at baseline. This suggests that this effect may 
have been due to regression to the mean and that high-profile public reporting may 
not have stimulated internal improvements in quality within organisations 
publicised as providing the worst maternity care in England.  
 
Although there were no statistically significant differences in patient utilisation 
identified in either the worst or the best group, it should be noted that for the worst 
group, all of the coefficients after baseline were negative. This implies that changes 
in levels of patient utilisation at the worst trusts were increasing at a slower pace 
than in their matched comparators. It may be that although there were some small 
effects on patient utilisation, these were not sufficiently large to achieve statistically 
significance. This however, does mean that there are still no large conclusive changes 
in patient utilisation.  
 
Comparison with previous work and policy implications 
The release of these specific reports on the quality of care have not been studied in 
detail previously, However, anecdotal evidence recently presented to the Nuffield 
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Trust in interviews with service managers suggests that providers ranked as most 
well performing in these maternity reports did experience a surge in demand for 
maternity care, and that this caused problems in managing this extra demand within 
capacity constraints [216]. It is possible that these effects were too modest to be 
picked up as statistically significant, and that even small changes may have caused 
capacity problems. 
 
My findings are consistent with previous research which suggests that public 
reporting is unlikely to drive major improvements in health system performance 
through the mechanism of patient selection [26, 28].  The findings here provide only 
limited support for the change in care delivery pathway, whereby organisations are 
motivated by the release of data on their quality relative to peers. It also provides 
limited support for the theory of the selection pathway as there were only weak 
effects on patient utilisation, and the reputation pathway – as organisations 
publicised as poorly performing did not improve conclusively more than other 
organisations. These findings concur with those from a randomised trial of releasing 
information to the public on quality of obstetric care, which found no associated 
changes in market share. This study did however, find increases in obstetric quality 
after information release, although this was based on selected quantitative 
indicators, such as adverse events, as opposed to the patient reported outcomes used 
here [31]. Work in South Korea has examined the impact of publishing performance 
data on C-section rates (in the context of these being widely viewed as being too 
common) have found inconsistent results [217, 218]. Research on releases of public 
information on the quality of obstetric care in Missouri did note improvements on a 
number of outcomes, but these were primarily around issues such as breast feeding 
support or car seat programmes [219]. Additionally, this research focused on 
surveying staff at the hospitals involved on their intentions to make changes to 
processes, rather than patient reported outcomes as I have used here.   
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Few previous studies have examined the impact of public reporting in subgroups 
which may be more responsive to performance information. I found that the worst 
trusts experienced an increase in the percentage of admissions from women over the 
age of 35 years, at the same time as a decrease in the best trusts. This raises the 
possibility that older women may be less sensitive to such public release of 
information, possibility as they may feel a greater loyalty to local providers. Another 
possibility is that these women may have given birth in these hospitals before, which 
led them to pay less attention to this published information. No changes were 
identified in the analyses of numbers of C-sections which indicates that there are not 
differential effects in what may be considered a different clinical group. 
 
I did not identify any changes in the distance travelled by women attending the best 
trusts. It might have been expected that after the release of information that these 
were the best trusts in the country, women may have been prepared to travel further 
in order to be treated there, particularly in light of the fact that these trusts were 
operating at a lower occupancy rate than the national average. Women attending the 
best trusts were travelling much further to give birth than the national average, but it 
is difficult to know whether this is because women travelled further and bypassed 
other options to be treated here, or whether this is because they are primarily based 
in rural areas. The distances travelled to attend the worst trusts were much smaller 
than for the best group, although again it is difficult to ascertain if this is because 
they are all based in London. In order to maintain consistent levels of patient 
utilisation if many women do not want to attend, these trusts would need a high 
degree of demand, and it seems likely that this would exist as they are based in areas 
with many people between the ages of 15 and 34 years. I identified increases in the 
average distance travelled to attend the worst trusts after they were reported on as 
being the worst in the country, although these effects were small (around 0.2km). 
This may indicate that these trusts are able to substitute any women who decide to 
be treated elsewhere with women from further afield who were less sensitive to 
these reports on quality. 
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The findings on the percentage of women attending the best and worst trusts for 
whom these were geographically the closest provided slightly different findings. 
There were no changes in the percentages of women attending for whom the 
hospital they were treated in was geographically the closest, for either the best or 
worst trusts. The percentage of women attending for which the trust was their 
closest was higher for the best group than either the national average, or the worst 
group. This would suggest that the distance findings are driven by these trusts being 
in more rural areas, where they are the closest hospital for a more dispersed 
population, rather than patients more actively “seeking them out” at the expense of 
other providers. The percentage of women attending the worst trusts for whom this 
was the closest hospital was found here to be lower for the worst group. However, 
as eight of out nine of these were based in London, there are some methodological 
issues identifying the closest hospital. Using the straight line distance method as 
used here may not fully reflect the reality of transport links or travel time, and so 
this finding may be an artefact. However, previous work has pointed to this measure 
as preferable to using actual distances, as it is less variable and more truly attempts 
to capture whether people have bypassed another potential hospital [168]. 
Nonetheless, further work taking account of travel times (especially as this has been 
shown in some cases to have a stronger effect than waiting times on choice of 
hospital [220] would allow these issues to be explored more fully. 
 
6.5 Strengths and limitations 
This is the first study that I are aware of that has examined changes in utilisation 
after high-profile maternity reporting, and correlated this reporting against patient 
experience measures. This study has a number of strengths and limitations. 
Strengths of this study include that 96% of all births that take place in England occur 
in  NHS hospitals and so are captured by this nationally representative data [211]. 
Measures of quality used are derived from previously validated surveys which were 
designed to be representative of the women attending the relevant hospital trusts. I 
tested the robustness of findings with several sensitivity analyses and the findings 
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from these were broadly consistent with those from the main analyses. Weaknesses 
of the study include that while I employed a robust study design, which took the 
underlying trend in admissions into account, I cannot be confident that the 
relationship between the public release of information and changes in secondary 
outcomes were causal. More detailed data covering patient flows, referrals and 
patient surveys would be required to determine this. During the study period there 
were concurrent changes in the NHS in England, the effects of which cannot be 
entirely ruled out, such as reconfiguration of some maternity services and changes in 
guidelines for the management of patients. Nonetheless, given the efforts to match 
NHS trusts to different comparison groups it seems unlikely that such structural 
changes may have affected these results.  
 
The quality data used in this study comes from only three measures of the overall 
patient experience of maternity care in England, although these were the three most 
closely linked to overall rating [215]. Although not a main focus of the study, it 
would have been preferable to use more detailed data on travel times for the 
analysis I undertook on changes in distance to maternity services, and also to have 
used the individual hospital site they were admitted to. These data were 
unfortunately not available for this study.  
 
6.6 Conclusions from this chapter 
Despite policy emphasis that the public release of information is key mechanism for 
quality improvement, I identified limited evidence to support this in the context of 
maternity care in England. This findings caution against simplistic assumptions that 
being publicised as a good or poor quality provider is sufficient to drive 
improvements through market pressures alone. I did however, find some evidence 
that women over the age of 35 years may be more likely to attend worst trusts and 
less likely to attend best trusts after the public release of information, indicating that 
some women may be less sensitive to this type of reporting than younger women. 
The changes in three patient reported quality measures here provided only weak 
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evidence of the worst hospital trusts responding to these reports by making quality 
improvements which are greater than comparable organisations. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Summary of main findings 
Analysis of a patient survey from four local health economies found that the 
majority of patients attend what they consider to be their local hospital for treatment. 
While patients are interested in aspects such as the quality of care which they will 
receive, they do not rely on official performance information to find out about this, 
and the main sources of information are the GP and their own experience or that of 
their family and friends. The only factor which was associated with being less likely 
to attend a non-local hospital was waiting times. Overall there were few differences 
between socio-demographic groups in terms of what they found important and the 
information sources they used to find out about hospital care.  
 
Effects of high-profile reporting into poor performance by the healthcare regulator 
on patient utilisation were found for only one out of three NHS trusts examined. 
These effects were of approximately 15% reduction in inpatient utilisation, and 
persisted for six months. For MTW, the size of the effects was similar for overnight 
inpatient admissions and daycase admissions however larger effects were detected 
for the percentage of patients who booked, but did not attend their appointments. 
There was additionally some evidence of anticipation effects – i.e. changes in patient 
utilisation in the run up to regulator reports being published.  
 
No effects on patient utilisation were found for NHS hospital trusts publicised as 
either the best or the worst places in the country for maternity care in late 2007/early 
2008. There were small increases in the percentage of women attending the worst 
hospitals that were over the age of 35 years old, and concurrent decreases in the best 
hospitals. Analysis of the distance women travelled to give birth found that these 
did not change substantially over the study period. Analysis of three patient 
reported outcomes on the quality of care presented a mixed picture. Compared with 
the national average, the worst hospital trusts improved at a faster rate after the 
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regulator reports were published. After matching to hospital trusts with similar 
scores at baseline however, the worst group performed better on one measure and 
less well on one. 
 
7.2 Limitations of this work 
The results chapters in this thesis have considered the limitations of their individual 
methods and analyses, and here I will focus on more general limitations of the thesis. 
A key criticism of this thesis is the use of health service utilisation as a proxy 
indicator for patient choice rather than more directly assessing whether patients 
have actively chosen their care. The focus of this work was at the hospital trust level, 
and was aimed at assessing whether the incentives exist for hospital providers to 
ensure that they perform well in public ratings. So directly assessing patient choices 
was outside the scope of this thesis. Detail on the degree to which patients attending 
both the scandal and maternity trusts had heard about these reports and whether they 
had used them in their decision making would have allowed me to investigate this 
more fully. However, there would have been a number of problems with this 
approach – it would have been extremely difficult to track patients who had been 
treated at the relevant hospitals at the relevant times, and given that the instances 
here studied were over five years ago, it is likely that patients may not have been 
able to accurately recall whether or not they have utilised the relevant information. 
In addition, it is not feasible to use prospective study designs to examine the impact 
of reports at the scandal trusts on utilisation. The reputational damage studies for 
example, were based on a major programme to release data for all hospitals in a 
geographical area and reporting on their previous performance [31].  Such an 
approach does not guarantee that there are any instances similar to the scandal trusts 
revealed in the reports, as the majority of trusts are not the subject of such events. 
 
Another concern relates to which instances of public reporting to include. The 
scandal trust case study was chosen based on a “if not now, when?” rationale i.e. 
examining high-profile scandals which were publicised in the media is perhaps the 
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most likely scenario to expect a change in patient utilisation. Having failed to find 
definitive effects here, it might be assumed unlikely that there will be effects of other 
information releases (which are likely to be less high-profile and more difficult to 
interpret) on patient utilisation. The three trusts used in this thesis represent the only 
three cases investigated by the HC which stayed in full operation during and after 
the investigations [196], and so these were necessarily the cases chosen. I could have 
chosen a specialty other than maternity for the second part of this work, although 
maternity was decided to satisfy both the criteria of there being a national report on 
the area, and patients having (in theory at least) a choice of where to have their care. 
Other national reports focused on areas such as community mental health care, or 
services for people with learning disabilities [121]. Additionally, being younger and 
with more formal educational qualifications than a general hospital population 
means that this was considered to be a patient group which may be particularly 
receptive to the use of public reported information. 
 
All three of the results chapters are based on data from early in the implementation 
of policies promoting greater information flows to support patient choice of provider 
in England. This means that it is possible that if similar research were repeated in the 
future, findings may differ as implementation becomes more embedded in the 
health system and individuals and organisations become used to it. Nonetheless, 
although the public release of quality information is relatively new in England, it is 
much older in the U.S.  There is mixed evidence on whether the much greater public 
release of information is associated with changes in patient utilisation in the U.S. [26] 
and findings are far from conclusive.   
 
On the issue of whether the maternity reports and associated publicity were 
associated with changes in patient reported quality, this thesis does not include 
examination of any potential mechanisms for effects. There are a variety of ways in 
which organisations may react to public ratings [38], some of which are likely to be 
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more effective than others. I also could have chosen to investigate more specifically 
whether being publicised as a poor performer was associated with improvements in 
care more directly. This approach is however, open to the criticism that every 
organisation is likely to make efforts to improve after being publicised as being a 
poor performer [22]. Again, such research was outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
7.3 Comparison with previous literature 
Here I will discuss possible reasons for the lack of effects on patient utilisation found 
with reference to published literature in the field. These reasons can be broadly 
divided into the three categories of aspects of the information released, aspects of the 
patients expected to choose, and structural factors in the healthcare system. I will 
also discuss the findings on the patient reported outcomes, distance travelled for 
maternity care and evidence of inequalities. 
 
7.3.1 Patient utilisation 
Aspects of the information released 
Under the selection pathway, in order for information to have an effect on quality 
through patient utilisation, patients first need to be able to access, obtain and 
understand the information [9]. The information releases in this work both came 
from the English healthcare regulator at the time and received coverage in both 
national and local media. For the maternity trusts, information on the relative 
performance of different maternity units was also available on the website 
BirthChoiceUK. It is difficult to test the degree to which this information was 
disseminated at the time and the degree to which the information may have 
penetrated local communities. I did conduct preliminary work using the google 
news search function to assess the degree of coverage of these reports over time. 
Problematically, only large national websites are able to archive content for a long 
enough period of time to be useful for this study, so I was unable to pursue this 
work further. The findings in chapter 4 of this thesis found that patients on the 
whole were not aware of official reports on the quality of care and only 6% of 
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patients had heard of the performance of their local hospitals from these. Use of local 
media and newspapers was found to be higher, but still used by less than three out 
of ten patients. These overall findings suggest that it may have been the case that 
patients were not aware of the information in these reports when choosing their 
hospital.  
 
This issue has been described as the “Watergate problem” of attempting to discern 
who knew what, and when did they know it [48]. This has given rise to three models 
of the effects which may be expected from releases of performance information on 
patient utilisation. The first model is the implicit knowledge model - that patients, or 
their referring doctors are aware of the quality at respective hospitals from informal 
sources such as conversations form family and friends. These informal sources of 
information of information act much quicker than the public reporting of 
information, and so by the time these are published there are no further effects (this 
then, is a very similar idea to these reports not conveying any “news” to patients).  
From the survey work presented here it does seem that patients are interested in 
quality and gain information on this from a variety of sources, so it may be that 
when these reports were published people already knew the information contained 
in them.  
 
The second of these models is the phone book model and it is this model which is most 
optimistic that releases of information on quality of care will impact patient 
utilisation. Here patients and their referring doctors are not aware of the quality of 
care and once reports are published they are used as the sole source of information 
for hospital choices. This seems an unlikely model at face value, particularly in 
supposing that referring doctors have no knowledge of quality of care where they 
send their patients (and is not in keeping with evidence on cardiologists in particular 
[46]). The lack of effects on patient utilisation found here also suggest that either 
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these reports were not used as this phone book on quality, or people were already 
aware of the quality of care at these providers. 
 
The third such model is the media model which is similar to the phone book model in 
that the quality of care is not known by those choosing hospitals. However, here the 
costs of processing the quality information in its raw form are so high that unless 
represented as simplistic stories by the media it will not be used. Both of the cases 
studied here involved dissemination of simple messages by the media but did not 
show large effects on patient utilisation. We can assume that this model is not an 
accurate description of the cases studied here as the survey analysis in chapter 4 
found that patients were using a variety of sources other than the media to find out 
about quality of care. 
 
Patients prefer information which is directly targeted and relevant to them, finding 
this helpful in choosing [221] and it may be the case that they did not feel that the 
information releases here were directly relevant to them. This seems more likely to 
be the case for the scandal trusts (where the issues in two out of the three cases 
focused on hospital associated infections which are more common in certain groups, 
while my measure of patient utilisation comprised all patients) but less so for the 
maternity study. For MTW I did identify slightly larger falls in daycase admission 
numbers (-16%) than for inpatients (-12%).  Although daycases may have been at 
lower risk of a hospital associated infection they may have been booked to attend for 
less serious health concerns and felt that it was potentially less damaging to them to 
not attend. However, in the maternity work the information released directly 
concerned the quality of maternity care and I did not find an effect among women 
attending for maternity care. Nonetheless, patients may have felt that even though 
the reports were regarding the same clinical area, they were still not relevant to 
them. 
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One of the main criticisms of many early attempts to release information to the 
public on quality of care was that it was difficult to understand [170] and that it was 
misguided to expect that there would be changes in patient utilisation from such 
releases. The information releases studied in this thesis do not fit into the same 
category as previous performance data focused on technical indicators or numerical 
reports alone. The reporting studied here was mediated to the public through the 
media using dramatic headlines painting a black-and-white picture of quality, and  
contained a mix of hard and soft information, which has been claimed to be the most 
effective in changing patient behaviour [222]. Thus it seems unlikely that the 
information releases studied here were difficult for patients to understand. Previous 
work  in the U.S. has concluded that the (slightly) more complex findings of 
rankings data released in a national news magazine was enough to change levels of 
utilisation [94]. Furthermore, press reports of single unexpected events have been 
found to be associated with reductions in patient utilisation [48] and these reports 
can be considered similar to these insofar as they painted an unequivocal picture of 
quality.  
 
The public may have been able to understand the information but may have felt that 
it “didn’t tell them anything they didn’t already know”. This issue of the “news” 
content of these information releases is difficult to test empirically without being 
able to construct a measure of perceived quality in advance of the reports coming 
out. The difference-in-difference technique used here was designed to have 
eliminated any differences in the long terms trends in patient utilisation at the 
treated hospital compared with others. This should control for long term gradual 
changes due to information circulating on the quality of care, in order to isolate the 
effect of the regulator reports alone.  Scrutinising the trends in patient utilisation in 
appendix 3 and the differences in admissions before the baseline between the 
maternity trusts and comparison groups in chapter 6 indicate that this was reasonably 
successful, which strengthens the results found here. Also, the number of 
comparison groups used and propensity score matching strengthen confidence in 
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these analyses. Research on the NYCRS has attempted to take account of the 
perceived quality of a hospital in advance of information release, and found that 
once perceived quality was taken into account the NYCRS reports did have an 
impact on patient utilisation [70]. This work constructed a model using age, sex, 
ethnicity and travel distance to estimate the quality that would be expected from a 
hospital in advance of the public release of information. This approach correlated 
these factors with quality and made the implicit assumption that these four factors 
capture all of the variation in patient utilisation, in order to define any additional 
effects as the effect of the reports cards. This research did not use any form of asking 
people in the local area how they perceived care in their local hospitals, which 
would have been preferable.  
 
I have examined this issue in a different manner, and investigated whether there 
were any changes in patient utilisation in advance of the reports coming out. This 
approach found that there was some evidence of changes in patient utilisation in 
advance of the reports being published. These were mainly for MTW, and the largest 
effects were apparent as an increase of DNAs in the nine months before report 
publication. This would corroborate the theory that other information (such as 
knowledge of the ongoing investigations) may impact patient utilisation, and also 
potentially that newer information may be more likely to have an impact on patient 
utilisation than subsequent information releases [36].  Such information could be 
communicated through both informal channels such as general conversations with 
friends, as well as formal channels such as through GPs and other health 
professionals. In situations without the formal release of performance data, it is 
assumed that the effects of patients being more likely to attend higher quality 
providers is due to the influence of informal information [223]. It has been noted that 
the potential for releasing public information to improve quality is greater if the 
information which would otherwise be used is imprecise [224]. It may be that in 
these instances, the other information on hospital quality was not added to by these 
reports. 
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The timing of information release has also been shown to be important, and the 
selection pathway assumes that patients should access to this information when it is 
decided where they will have their treatment. In reality however, decisions over 
where to be treated are often more complex than this. For example, in the last decade 
the use of mechanisms such as referral centres have become more common [225]. 
There is also a time lag between when patients book their care and when they are 
treated (and show up in the data here). For maternity, the expectation is that the 
hospital for a delivery is booked by 14 weeks of pregnancy, so if women were aware 
of the information when it came out, they should appear in the first or second six 
month period after the release of the information.  For the scandal trusts, the 
examination of DNA numbers after the release of information was intended to pick 
up these more immediate effects and for MTW a much larger effect was found than 
for inpatient or daycase numbers. This would support the idea that at least some 
patients may respond to information being made public by not attending their pre-
booked appointment, even though they found out the information after making the 
booking. These much larger effects reflect differences in the timing of being offered 
choice. It should also be remembered that in the pilots of choice policy which 
showed large numbers of patients moving hospital they were offered a choice while 
on the waiting list rather than at the point of referral [166].  
 
Other research in the U.S. on cardiac surgery patients has also noted that there may 
be impacts insofar as patients avoiding poor providers, but less so for seeking out 
good quality providers [70]. While this thesis did not detect any statistically 
significant changes in patient utilisation for either the best or the worst maternity 
providers, the point estimates did suggest larger effects in the worst hospital trusts 
than the best (6% vs. 2%). Also, the comparatively larger effects for the scandal trusts 
(of around 15%, albeit only in one case out of three) are larger than reported in many 
previous studies [26]. Together, this lends support to the idea that avoidance of poor 
providers is more likely than seeking out good, and that of Berwick’s negative and 
positive mechanisms [9], negative effects are more likely.   
160 
 
Patient level factors 
Another set of reasons why I may not have found a definitive effect of the two 
releases of information examined here are related to the patients involved. Despite 
what some have termed as a general rise in consumerism and a general right to 
know over the last two decades [155] the majority of patients still attend the hospital 
provider which is geographically closest to them [168]. This is borne out in the 
findings from chapter 4 where 70% of patients attended what they considered as 
their local hospital, and may suggest a lack of willingness to travel further on the 
part of some patients. This “inherent bias” for local providers has been found to 
affect all patients, even more so for those with poor health or travelling by bus [76]. 
Qualitative research has concluded that many patients view health care as a 
relational rather than a transactional process [189] and that they do feel that it is a 
market commodity where choosing would be appropriate [226]. Although they may 
be keen about the accountability which comes with the release of information [227], 
they do not like the idea of patient choice being used to improve quality. Focus 
groups to inform the dissemination of information by CHI found that patients in 
general did not like the idea of shopping around and preferred there to be the same 
standard of care everywhere [74]. The only factor identified in this thesis which was 
associated with patients being less likely to attend their local provider was a shorter 
waiting time, and this effect was small. In contrast, in this thesis patients who were 
concerned with the reputation, quality of care or standard of facilities were all more 
likely to attend their local hospital. Many patients may be reluctant to attend a non-
local provider, in particular, older people and those with complex chronic diseases 
do not travel far and prefer local treatment [228], and these people make up a high 
proportion of people treated in hospital. Patients who are aware of their right to 
choose however, are more likely to attend a non-local provider, and awareness of 
choice increased between 2006 and 2010 from 29% to 54% [75]. I do not however, 
know the degree to which patients in the areas covered by this study were aware of 
their ability to choose or were offered a choice by their GP. If these were low, it may 
go some way to explaining the lack of effects found here. The NPCS data however, 
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did not show particularly marked geographical variation in the percentage of 
patients offered a choice at the point of referral [75].  
 
One of the suggested reasons why choice of provider may not be as popular with 
patients as other forms of choice is that hospital choices are, per se, ‘unfriendly’ 
[164]. This is due to the fact that in choosing between healthcare providers there 
tends to be a variety of information on different criteria, all of which are considered 
important by the patient, and which are often conflicting. For example, patients may 
have to trade off various factors which are all important to them, such as location, 
overall quality, average risk and being treated with respect. Work on designing 
report cards to assist Americans in choosing healthcare have also noted that patients 
find it difficult to reconcile conflicting or contradictory information [170], as have 
cognitive interviewing techniques [229]. The ability of patients to make “rational” 
choices has been questioned by many who have concluded that due to a lack of 
clarity and the unfriendly nature of choices, only a minority of patients can be 
expected to make such choices [174]. Thus, it may have been the case that in the 
instances studied here, many patients were too choice-averse to avoid bad providers 
or attend good providers. 
 
Patients may not have considered that the aspects of care reported on in these 
instances were important to them. Or they may have given more weight to other 
aspects such as the location of the hospital, rather than ideas of vague concepts such 
as “quality” [170].  Factors such as patient experience [79] and having been treated at 
a hospital before [181] have all been found to be more important to patients than 
other factors. Public information on quality of care has even been found to have a 
limited impact on patient choices among those who have previously used such data 
for comparisons, who subsequently based decisions on their own experiences as well 
as that of family and friends [193]. It is difficult to disentangle the information 
released by these reports, but it is possible that these clear cut proclamations on 
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quality of care were outweighed by concerns such as patients own experience and 
the expertise of doctors [84]. Although quality of care is often named as an important 
factor in decision making by patients, this may incorporate a variety of meanings to 
patients, incorporating both clinical quality, but also other factors such as reputation 
[76].  So, although patients may have been aware of particular issues regarding the 
hospitals studied here, they may have been more interested in factors other than 
those reported on.  
 
Structural level factors 
There are also a variety of structural factors which may explain the lack of effects 
found here. Patients may simply not have been offered a choice of where to have 
their treatment, leading to a lack of large changes in patient utilisation at the 
organisations concerned. During the time period for this study, there has been an 
increase in the proportion of patients offered a choice of provider when referred by 
their GP, from 30% in May/June 2006 to 49% in February 2010 [75]. Patients who are 
not offered a choice are likely to attend the hospital their GP sends them to, and 
these decisions may be driven by relational factors, rather than published 
information on quality of care [230]. In addition to being intended to offer of choice 
to their patients when referring, evidence also suggests that GPs play a key role in 
decisions by their patients of where to be treated [231]. Most people consider health 
professionals their primary source of information on where to be treated (similar to 
the findings of the patient survey here) [232], and a study of patients due to undergo 
surgery found that a majority relied on the opinion of their GP as to where to attend 
[62]. Some patients even report that they would rather their GP made the choice for 
them, rather than being active choosers themselves [233], possibly due to fear of the 
negative consequences of the decisions. It should be noted however, that advice 
from GPs and other professionals does not completely outweigh information from 
other sources [76], and so effects of these reports may still have been expected. GPs 
have been found to distrust some forms of official performance information [78], but 
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no research to my knowledge has investigated how reporting such as that studied 
here may affect their referral decisions.  
 
Although there have been increases in the percentage of patients being offered 
choice of provider for elective care nationally, implementation of patient choice 
policies has been variable across the country [185]. In the early stages of the 
programme, GPs reported problems with the Choose and Book system which was 
intended to assist offering choice to patients [144], and baseline measurement found 
that many patients were not being offered a choice of provider [234]. Work 
comparing the implementation of patient choice policies in the four countries of the 
United Kingdom has found that there was no effective policy network in England to 
support the implementation of these policies, and that the reforms were often 
insufficiently understood at local levels [147]. This meant that despite the large 
differences in rhetoric with a focus on choice of hospital in England, there were few 
differences in the choices offered to patients across the four nations.  In addition, 
these policies were often subordinated to other aims such as reducing and managing 
waiting lists [147] and other concerns such as CQC ratings were viewed as more 
important [235]. Interviews with 41 GPs and a variety of managers in England 
between April 2008 and September 2009 found that Choose and Book was being 
used to limit the choices available to patients [236]. Instead of being used to offer a 
wide range of choice to patients, it was reported as being an important mechanism to 
control waiting lists via excluding choice of individual specialist, and was used to 
offer a maximum of five providers (at the time when patients were intended to be 
offered choice of any provider).  Local historical factors and relationships are noted 
by those “on the ground” as playing a particularly prominent role in the salience of 
patient choice reforms in different locations [237].  However, there has been some 
suggestion that managers of acute trusts may have begun to adopt more competitive 
strategies by 2008 [238], and so it is possible that as time goes on these policies will 
become more embedded in local health economies. 
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Geographical factors and the size of populations has also been mentioned by health 
service providers as a barrier to offering choice to patients [236] and service 
managers are of the view that competition is geographically based [146]. Such factors 
may have played a role in the lack of effects identified in this thesis. Despite most 
people living within a reasonable distance of a hospital [156], and rises in the 
mobility of populations in general, this has not been evenly spread throughout the 
country [175] and it may be that the  hospital trusts I have studied here were in 
locations which made it difficult for them to travel to another provider. The analysis 
of the average distance travelled by women to deliver a baby was found not to have 
changed over the time period here, except for small changes among the worst 
hospitals.  Also, despite the fact that occupancies were lower among the best 
hospitals than the national average, they did not experience increases in patient 
utilisation. For the scandal trusts, the only hospital which showed an effect was 
MTW, which is geographically closer to London and so it may be that there was 
simply a greater availability of alternatives for patients wishing to avoid MTW than 
the other two hospital trusts I studied.  
 
7.3.2 Effects on patient reported quality 
The analysis of patient reported quality at the maternity trusts in this thesis did not 
identify a definitive effect of either being reported as the best or worst hospital in the 
country. This is in contrast with other research which has found that the reputation 
pathway is a good way to generate improvements among providers publicised as 
providing poor quality care  [31].  There were however, national improvements on 
all three patient reported quality measures between the two surveys (in 2007 and 
2010), and so it may have been that as there were large changes nationally, the worst 
trusts simply did not improve at a faster pace than the national average, although 
they did make some improvements. 
 
The information releases on which the original reputational damage research was 
based were explicitly aimed at increasing quality [1]. They were part of efforts to 
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stimulate improvement in healthcare via publication of performance data and with 
this as the primary aim, were carefully designed in order to encourage use by 
patients and the public. This was not the case in either of the cases examined in this 
thesis. For example, the national report by the HC on the quality of maternity care 
was designed to assess how good maternity care was across England, and point out 
instances of both good and bad practice [207]. The release of this information into the 
public domain (via both news agencies and the BirthChoiceUK website) were 
designed to inform potential patients and those interested about quality, but not 
with the specific aim that quality would be improved by such information. The HC 
did claim that its previous investigation into the quality of maternity care at 
Northwick Park hospital did improve the quality of maternity care across England 
[121]. This however, may well have been due to focusing attention on common 
problems, rather than through any mechanism of patient choices.  
 
Some commentators have argued that in order for any release of information to have 
an impact, it should be designed specifically to inflict reputational damage [117] and 
that public disclosure of information alone is a weak strategy for improvement [17].  
The instances studied here may not have had the high-powered incentives as other 
previous schemes. The reports examined in this thesis were not public disclosure of 
information alone however (as there were also efforts by the HC to stimulate 
improvements), and in some senses the maternity reports can be considered similar 
to the previous system of star ratings.  The star ratings system was utilised between 
2001 and 2004 and was designed specifically to inflict reputational damage on 
providers, although there is controversy over whether this was positive for quality 
of care [216]. Star ratings led to widespread sackings of Chief Executives and there 
was anecdotal evidence that the impact of these was acutely felt “on the ground.” 
For example, there were reports of nurses requesting changing rooms so as not to 
have to get the bus in their uniform and be associated with hospitals publicised as 
receiving no stars out of a potential three [95]. Previous releases of information have 
not always had this effect – for example the CRAG indicators in Scotland were not 
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taken seriously by managers due to their lack of credibility and the lack of incentives 
associated with them [61]. The maternity reports in this thesis were not however, 
designed to inflict such damage and may not have gained such traction on the 
ground as star ratings. Alternatively, it could be that these reports stimulated 
improvements across the whole of England (as the Northwick Park investigation is 
claimed to have [121]) and that this is why the effects among the worst group were 
not different to these overall changes. It is difficult to judge how likely this is, 
although the patient reported outcomes do indicate improvements between 2007 
and 2010.  
 
7.3.3 Impact of high-profile public reporting on distance travelled  
In analysis of the maternity trusts I did not find large changes in the distances 
travelled for care at either the best or worst trusts. In fact, the only statistical 
significant changes identified were in the opposite direction to that expected, with 
the average distance travelled to attend the worst providers increasing after they 
were publicised as being the worst providers in the country. Part of the rationale for 
examining the distances travelled to attend these providers before and after these 
reports was in order to discern whether providers may be able to substitute any 
patients who are avoiding them (due to their poor rating) with other patients from 
further afield. This increase in the distance travelled for the worst trusts may 
indicate that this is the case, and that faced with some patients attending other 
hospitals after this information was released, the worst trusts were able to make up 
this shortfall in patient utilisation with other patients (perhaps less sensitive to these 
quality signals).  
 
I did not find changes in the average distance travelled to attend the best trusts. This 
is in some ways contrary to what may be expected from economic theory, which 
postulates that as it becomes known that quality is particularly good at these 
providers, the willingness to travel to be treated here would increase [55]. It should 
also be noted that the policy implication that patient choices would drive 
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improvements is based on the idea that at least some patients will choose to be 
treated in a non-local hospital in order to generate the required incentives to 
improve [175].  There is no previous work which has investigated whether the public 
disclosure of information on quality of care has had an impact on the distances 
travelled for admission, so it is not possible to directly compare my findings here to 
other work. Although the best trusts studied had lower occupancy rates than the 
national average, anecdotal evidence from service managers indicated that the best 
trusts experienced a surge in demand after this report was published [216]. This 
surge was then linked to problems managing demand [216], even though my 
analysis did not detect any significant effects on numbers. Although not relevant for 
maternity, it may also be that in general, hospitals with high demand then have 
longer waiting times, which may blunt any effects of performance information on 
patient utilisation. The measure of occupancy I have used here is a rather crude one 
(constructed using the annual number of maternity admissions from HES, and the 
reported number of maternity beds on the 1st of April each year), and so it may not 
provide an accurate representation of the pressures experienced at the service level. 
If these hospitals were in fact, already operating close to capacity, the lack of 
distance effects may indicate that although the reports may have stimulated an 
increased interest in being treated here, these women may have had their referrals 
declined. It is also possible that the comparatively low occupancy rates among these 
hospitals is one of the reasons they perform better on  a number of measures, and 
that they were unwilling to risk this in order to treat more patients.  
 
Patients attending the worst providers travelled much shorter distances to be treated 
at these hospitals than both the national average and the best hospitals. It is difficult 
to disentangle whether these findings are driven by greater demand for the best 
hospitals, and lower demand for the worst hospitals, but these factors seem unlikely 
to be the whole story. Previous research before the introduction of patient choice 
policies on the distance travelled to hospital has identified that people living in 
deprived areas tend to travel less far for treatment [156]. All of the worst hospital 
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trusts were based in urban deprived areas (with all but one in London) which seems 
likely to explain at least part of the reason why these patients travelled less far e.g. 
almost 97% of the patients treated in the worst hospitals came from what has been 
classified as an urban area. The distance findings do not indicate any large changes 
in average distance of the percentage of women attending their closest hospital. 
Previous research examining the distances travelled for first outpatient 
appointments between 2006/07 and 2010/11 has also found that these did not 
change substantially over a similar time period as my study [168]. Together, this 
suggests that trends in distances travelled for care were similar for the best and 
worst maternity trusts as the national picture. 
 
7.3.4 Inequalities 
I have found limited evidence of a differential impact of the information releases 
studied here across different socio-demographic groups. This is in keeping with 
other work which has not found an increase in inequality in terms of the utilisation 
of secondary care services [157, 158]. The LPCP identified that the risks of patient 
choice damaging equity can be reduced by providing support for making healthcare 
choices, and assistance with costs of transport [152]. The analysis of the scandal trusts 
did not include examination of differential effects across population groups due to a 
lack of available data, but this was included in the maternity study. There was no 
indication of the deprivation profile of either the best or the worst hospital trusts 
changing after these reports were released, nor was there any evidence of there 
being a differential effect for women attending who received a C-section. There was 
some suggestion here that women over the age of 35 years old became more likely to 
attend the worst hospitals after these reports were published. This echoes concerns 
by some that it would be population groups such as older people who would be 
disadvantaged in choice policy as other more information savvy people take up the 
places they would otherwise have had [151, 152]. Two important things must be 
borne in mind here: first, that pregnant women are a much younger group than 
those receiving healthcare in a general hospital setting, as the average age of women 
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giving birth is just under 30 years old (in 2011 [239]), compared with an average age 
of 51 years for other admissions [240]. Second, older women are more likely to have 
given birth before.  Being treated at a hospital previously is a strong predictor for 
attending it again [181] and it may well be that many of these women had received 
other care, or had previous children in these hospitals, and were then less receptive 
to the information released. This seems a more likely reason for the effects observed 
here. It was unfortunately not possible with the available data to examine whether 
the women in this study had given birth previously, and if they had done so in these 
hospitals.  
 
7.4 Policy implications 
My thesis has examined the information and aspects of care which were important 
to patients when making choices of where to attend hospital. It also examined 
whether two special cases of the public release of performance data, which overcome 
issues of patients not seeing or understanding information, had an impact on patient 
utilisation at the organisations involved. My key findings are that there are only 
limited socio-demographic differences in information use; that patients are unlikely 
to use official performance data when making hospital choices; and that there is 
limited support for the assumption that such information releases will result in 
changes to patient utilisation at the organisations involved. 
  
My findings of limited socio-demographic differences in terms of information use 
and the lack of effects for individual groups in the maternity analysis alleviates 
concerns that reliance on the use performance information by patients to choose a 
place of care may disadvantage certain groups. While support was provided in the 
form of PCAs during pilots of patient choice, these have not been in place since the 
policy has been rolled out nationally. While there is little in this work to suggest that 
these policies have harmed equity [158] this will have to be monitored, given the 
lack of PCAs in the national roll-out of these policies. While PCAs were not 
examined directly in this thesis, I did find that although telephone line booking 
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advisors were not commonly used, their use was more common among non-White 
groups. Healthcare choices are often high stakes decisions made under pressure and 
some patients are likely to benefit from having someone to guide them through the 
process [164]. Although increasing in popularity, simply presenting data on websites 
may not be enough to encourage patients to make choices in line with their 
preferences, and more active involvement may be needed [178]. This role could 
potentially be fulfilled by GPs in their discussions with patients over where to attend 
hospital, as their opinions are given high weight by patients. However, work from 
early implementation of the scheme reveals that the majority of GPs may feel that 
patients do not want choice [90], that the systems are not in place to support choice, 
and that an infrastructure is needed in order to help patients to choose effectively 
[164]. The survey work presented here also affirms that patients use a variety of 
information sources on different aspects of care and reiterates previous calls that a 
range of information sources are needed to satisfy the information needs of patients 
[155, 241].  
 
As I did not detect any changes in patient utilisation, as well as a lack of an impact 
on patient reported quality, this thesis provides limited support for the selection, 
change, or reputational damage pathways. These two information releases, which 
overcame two of the reasons for a limited impact of previous information – access to 
and understanding of the information – produced only limited and unsustained 
effects on patient utilisation. Although official reports on the quality of care are far 
from the only information on quality of care available to patients, it should be 
remembered that if patients are choosing providers without taking quality into 
account, then an important incentive for providers to improve is weakened [242]. It 
may have been expected that high-profile scandals, widely disseminated by the 
media would have had an impact even if routine and technical reporting of 
indicators such as mortality rates had not. It might also have been expected that 
pregnant women, who are younger and on average have more educational 
qualifications than the general hospital population, would have moved in response 
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to media reporting of good or poor care, particularly as (at least in theory) they have 
some choice over where they are admitted. The findings here that there were no 
large changes in patient utilisation suggest that the incentives for hospitals to attract 
more patients were not working well during this time period.  The lack of effect 
identified in both of these cases means that I cannot conclude that the selection 
pathway was operating in England between 2007 and 2009. The lack of effect on 
quality among maternity trusts publicised as performing badly in national reports 
means that I cannot conclude that either the change pathway or the reputational 
damage pathway has resulted in improvements in these cases.   
 
Nonetheless there were some changes in patient utilisation. For example at MTW 
there were falls of over 15% of inpatients after the reports were released, and an 
increase of over 70% in DNAs. It has been claimed that to stimulate quality 
improvements, large changes are not needed [10] and that changes in the region of 
five to ten percent may be enough to create the incentives for providers to improve 
[85]. However, this assertion has not been empirically tested in healthcare settings 
and is not supported by my finding that the worst maternity trusts experienced a 
small (6%) decline in patient utilisation, but experienced inconsistent improvements 
in quality.  Extension of public reporting schemes in countries such as Canada [243] , 
Denmark [244] and the Netherlands [245] should be carefully evaluated for their 
impacts.  
 
A variety of other benefits were intended to flow from these reforms, such as 
increases in safety and value for money, which will not be considered here.  
Nonetheless, the lack of large effects on patient utilisation and patient reported 
quality in this thesis call into question whether the continued reliance on public 
reporting is a sensible strategy in the future. There is a lack of research on the 
relative effectiveness of different reporting schemes [27] although a U.S. RCT did 
compare  the degree to which publicly releasing quality information was associated 
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with improvements compared to a pay-for-performance program [246]. This was 
unable to conclude whether there were larger improvements in quality from either 
of these two mechanisms, although it did note that more research was needed on 
whether the improvements witnessed justified the costs of either programme. In the 
English context there is similarly a lack of evidence on the costs compared with the 
benefits of systems of public reporting. However, as the government is now 
intending to release a greater range of performance data on a range of public 
services [131] it seems that such moves are here to stay.  Nonetheless, policymakers 
should consider whether the expected benefits of such systems are likely to 
outweigh the costs. The optimal balance between performance data driving patient 
choice versus contracting mechanisms designed to improve quality should also be 
considered [247]. 
 
Evaluation of the wider set of reforms which the increased release of public quality 
information was based has proved controversial. Two studies have recently 
concluded that these reforms did improve quality in the NHS [91, 248]. These two 
studies both used HES data to quantify whether the 28 or 30-day mortality rate from 
MIs fell in hospitals which were based in areas of England which were more 
competitive (based on measures of market concentration constructed from data on 
patient flows from small geographic areas). The authors make the case that these MI 
mortality rates are a valid indicator of overall hospital quality and are well 
correlated with other measures, although others have drawn attention the fact that 
there are large variations in quality across different services in the same hospitals 
[249].  Further work by the same research group has also concluded that hospitals in 
these more competitive areas may be spurred into having better management 
processes (which provides one potential mechanism by which increased competition 
at the area level may translate into improved outcomes [250]). The authors claim that 
quality of care may have improved through the operation of the selection pathway – 
with patients preferentially attending hospitals which were better suited to their 
level of severity [91].  Hospitals which performed better witnessed larger increases 
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in their elective MI patient utilisation (12.6% growth between 2003 and 2007, vs. 9.0% 
best quartile compared with worst) and greater increases in the distances travelled 
by these patients. Changes in the distances travelled were small however (at most a 
change of 0.3km between 2003 and 2007).  
 
Although the findings in this thesis are not directly comparable to this work on MI 
mortality, they do present a rather different picture. Both of the MI studies 
considered January 2006 as the “policy-on” date, even though we know that not all 
patients were offered choice of provider at this time, peaking at 49% in February 
2010 [75, 239]. I did not find that there were large changes in patient utilisation in the 
two instances examined here, which ranged in time from March 2007 to March 2009 
– when a greater percentage of patients were being offered choice of provider by 
their GP. It is possible that this is because the patients at the scandal and maternity 
trusts were systematically different to the MI patients. The differences in the quality 
findings may be explained by the fact that the measures used here were patient 
reported, rather than the 28 or 30-day mortality outcomes used in the MI studies. 
Together, this means that care is needed when interpreting these studies – the case 
for changes in patient utilisation is not comprehensive, and at the moment the effects 
of market-like competition on quality of care only concerns mortality from heart 
attacks.  
 
While use of public release of information to drive patient utilisation and quality is 
not well supported by the available evidence these efforts are likely to be useful in 
ensuring transparency [206]. There is now an increasing interest in the concepts of 
shared decision making [251] and proponents  argue that choice of where to be 
treated is less important to patients than being involved in the decisions about their 
care as  a whole [252]. On the basis of the findings of this thesis, it is not possible to 
conclude whether this assertion is true, but it does seem that even high-profile 
information did not lead to changes in patient utilisation, and so effects from other 
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information releases can be considered unlikely. Other reasons to release data also 
include promoting trust in the health system [206], and it should be remembered 
that one of the reasons why England first introduced the system of star ratings and 
the associated release of information was to restore public confidence, which had 
been severely damaged by the findings from the Bristol inquiry [253]. 
 
7.4.1 Implications for regulators 
The two instances of information release studied in this thesis both involved the 
collection and dissemination of data by the healthcare regulator. This data was also 
relayed to the public through the media who published stories on the quality 
findings generated by the regulator. There has been a lack of previous work which 
has focused explicitly focus on information generated by regulators. Regulators can 
be viewed as a special case in that they release a plethora of information on the 
quality of care into the public domain, and this takes a variety of forms.  The overall 
aims of the HC were to inspect, inform and improve services, and it claimed that 
their information (both their collection of it, and their dissemination of it) was seen 
as their core strength [121], and noted in a final report that they often achieved good 
media coverage of their work. For example in an audit from January 2007 which 
found that coverage of the HC’s work was up 30% on the year before.   
 
Following criticism over the handling of previous cases in the Mid Staffordshire 
Public Inquiry [200], recommendations in the government response to this [254], and 
criticism of previous methods [255], major changes are underway at the CQC (the 
successor to the HC). They have appointed a new powerful Chief Inspector of 
Hospitals [256] as part of a more stringent regulatory regime, designed to take 
greater account of information such as the Family and Friends Test [257]. It is not 
clear whether any new rating regime will gain favourable and extensive coverage in 
the media, and the role which this may play in how people feel about the quality of 
their local services. The Secretary of State for Health recently asked the Nuffield 
Trust to conduct a review into the need and viability of a new system of hospital 
175 
 
ratings in England. This concluded that the public would benefit most from such 
information being published by a trusted third party, such as the CQC [216]. It is not 
clear what form any information releases from the new Chief Inspector of hospitals 
will take but there are some general lessons to be drawn. In the Annual Health 
Checks system (the HC system for rating the quality of hospital trusts) it was 
explicitly expected that these would inform decision making by patients [121]. The 
findings in this thesis indicate that two high-profile instances which were 
unequivocal on quality of care, and widely disseminated to the public, had only 
limited effects on patient utilisation. This suggests that any future systems of the 
CQC may be more fruitfully aimed at encouraging a culture of accountability, and 
driving improvement through working with providers, rather than relying on the 
notion that the selection pathway will stimulate improvements in quality of care. 
 
7.4.2 Increasing presence of information 
Since 2010, after the study period of this thesis, there has been an increase in the 
amount and types of information available on the performance of healthcare 
providers. These can be considered as the increased use and functionality of NHS 
Choices, the provision of new data such as the Family and Friends test and surgery 
specific data, and more informal information from social media such as twitter and 
websites designed to allow patients to comment on their care.  
 
In December 2013 the NHS Choices website had 32.9 million page views from 21.6 
million unique visitors [258]. Patients can now leave free text comments on the 
quality of their care on the website, both for secondary and primary care, and these 
are increasing in number [258]. The presence of such ratings has found to be variable 
across England, with some GP practices much more likely to be rated than others 
[259]. Nevertheless, the majority of ratings were on the site left were positive, and 
were (modestly) associated with other measures of patient experience generated 
from traditional patient surveys [259]. The associations with process measures of 
quality (such as blood pressure control) were weak however. Together these 
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findings somewhat allay concerns by some health professionals that such services 
will be used to unfairly criticise aspects of their service [260], but do not wholly 
suggest that this data is well aligned to quality.  There are also additional concerns 
that currently the number of ratings for individual providers is low, and that 
younger, more urban and more affluent people are more likely to rate their care on 
such sites [259]. It should be noted however, that NHS Choices is not solely aimed at 
informing patient choices, and use of the information by providers to inform and 
improve their care (a voice mechanism then, rather than a choice mechanism) has 
been noted [261].  
 
More information is now being released as part of the NHS Commissioning Board 
drive to increase transparency and promote patient choice of provider [110]. From 
the summer of 2013 data has been available at the consultant level on ten types of 
surgery (the list includes adult cardiac surgery, vascular surgery, bariatric surgery, 
orthopaedic surgery, and head and neck surgery), on the webpages of the 
professional bodies responsible. This information is linked to from the NHS Choices 
website. The design of these information collections and publication was heavily 
informed by the introduction of heart surgery mortality data by the Society for 
Cardiothoracic Surgery   which was associated with falls in mortality [262]. Those 
behind the Society for Cardiothoracic Surgery  program noted that the 
improvements rested heavily upon gaining (and maintaining) buy-in from the 
clinicians and surgeons involved, and that without this there are significant risks of 
unintended consequences in such systems [263]. In addition to support from the 
professions there are also the attendant issues that measures need to be agreed, and 
a consensus needs to be reached on what data are suitable for public release and 
which are not [264]. There are also methodological debates over data quality [265] 
and the issues of risk-adjustment, which is no panacea for all methodological ills 
[266, 267] to be overcome. 
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Another information source on the performance of hospitals for patients is the 
Family and Friends test, which has been released for both Accident and Emergency 
and inpatient services separately since August 2013 [268]. This test gives information 
month by month at hospital trust, site and ward level, and is based on responses to 
the statement “How likely are you to recommend our <ward/A&E department/maternity 
service> to friends and family if they needed similar care or treatment?” [268]. Responses 
to this question then range from extremely likely to extremely unlikely (and include 
an option for don’t know) which are then then collated into a “net promoter score.” 
This score takes proportion of people who respond that they are “extremely likely” 
to recommend the service and subtracts the respondents in the three categories 
“neither likely nor unlikely”, “unlikely” and “extremely unlikely” to give a score 
from 0 to 100 [111]. While the test has been criticised for giving trusts free rein over 
how to collect responses, and ambiguity in the question [269], the results have been 
found to have some relation to other measures of quality [270]. Analysis using 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (a method which indicates whether the 
relative performance of providers is the same using two different methods) found a 
weak correlation of 0.21, although this was statistically significant (p=0.001).   
 
There is also now a wealth of information available on healthcare through social 
media platforms such as twitter. It has been suggested that such information could 
be used to monitor performance of healthcare [271], and the Department of Health 
has suggested that such information could be aggregated for this purpose [272]. 
There is even now a beta website which allows tracking (and quantification of the 
sentiment) of what people are saying about the NHS overall [273].  Despite policy 
enthusiasm for such approaches, recent research on the degree to which twitter 
messages contain useful information on quality has suggested caution is needed. 
This found for example, that only 11% of tweets to NHS hospitals were concerned 
with quality of care, which may limit the usefulness of such approaches [274]. 
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Outside of information directly collected by official agencies, there are now a 
number of websites such as www.iwantgreatcare.org  and 
www.patientopinion.org.uk . Both of these websites allow patients both to provide 
scores from one to five on their perception of a number of aspects of their care, and 
also to leave free text comments on it. Although there is an increasing suggestion 
that providers are using narratives and stories provided by these forums in order to 
direct their improvement efforts [261], it is not clear whether they are being used by 
patients directly to choose healthcare providers. These websites however, are 
characterised as part of a general move to shift power in healthcare to patients as 
opposed to professionals, and are driven by forces deeper than health policy, such as 
a general right to know and increasing technology [275]. There are additionally a 
variety of local initiatives underway. One hospital for example, the University 
Hospitals of South Manchester has launched its own initiative and now publishes a 
variety of throughput and outcomes data for all of their cardiologists and 
cardiothoracic surgeons [276]. This system published information on how each 
consultant performs against national standards, as well as an overall patient 
reported score of their consultations and scores for individual aspects of 
communication. Other research has claimed that information such as the ratings of 
hospitals given by the staff who work there could be utilised by patients to inform 
their choices [277], with the implication (again) that this would improve services. It 
is not clear whether any of these sources of information will be used by patients, and 
more research is needed into why patients may use this information, whether they 
use it alongside other information and whether these sources may impact on where 
they seek care [278]. 
 
One of the potential risks of this proliferation of information is that, with such a 
wide variety of information available, patients may become more confused, as more 
information is not always better [279]. Studies have already noted the detrimental 
effect of having too much information, particularly if this is conflicting [170], and 
one study in the North East of England found over 200 websites providing 
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information on the quality of orthopaedic surgery [187].  Similar concerns over too 
much information have been expressed regarding having different websites using 
different methods to provide discrepant ratings of quality of care and leading to 
confusion on the part of patients [280]. Some of these have also been criticised for 
relying too greatly on numbers [281] and presenting too much information [229] to 
be useful to most patients. Work on designing websites to encourage patients to 
make choices of “good quality” hospitals (or at least to steer them towards these) has 
found this to be extremely challenging, and some approaches such as ordering 
hospitals from best to worst made patients less likely to choose the best hospitals 
[84]. Such findings highlight that moves to steer patients towards hospitals with 
particular attributes can be difficult and the increased presence of such websites 
should not be considered an easy fix. 
  
7.5 Unanswered questions and future research 
There are some unanswered questions from this thesis which could be fruitfully 
explored in other work. The two information releases studied in this thesis were 
both prompted by the healthcare regulator which is also now undergoing substantial 
changes. A review by the NHS Medical Director into 14 hospital trusts with higher 
than expected mortality rates focused on the need for clear accountability and 
concerted efforts to improve quality across the NHS [282]. The CQC has since 
announced a new regulatory approach, promising tougher action when standards 
are breached and more hospital inspections [283]. This new regime promises to 
publish a lot of data on the performance of providers and these could be monitored 
to ascertain if they are associated with changes in patient utilisation, or on quality of 
care.  
 
I did consider examining the HC Annual Health Checks, which provided a four way 
rating of hospital performance and were followed up over time. This would have 
allowed me to examine the effect of changing position from a good rating to a bad 
one (or vice versa), which may be explored in future work.  However, part of the 
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rationale in examining the cases I have chosen here is that if providers involved in 
major scandals, or named as the best/worst in the country, did not experience an 
impact on their patient utilisation, it seems unlikely that these more sedate reports 
are likely to impact substantially on numbers. Nevertheless, such research could 
further explore some of the ideas from this thesis, as could investigation of other 
information releases (for example, Doctor Foster’s annual report which names their 
“trusts of the year”). 
 
Increasing amounts of information on the performance of hospitals has been noted 
previously, and these may all be fruitfully explored for effects on patient utilisation 
and quality. For example, publication of outcome information on ten types of 
surgery [138] may change patient flows across England towards centres with better 
outcomes. The publication of data from the Family and Friends Test may also 
stimulate changes in patient flows, and as it offers information on specific wards 
may be preferred by some patients as more relevant than trust level information. 
Research on the views of patients in terms of the information they have used and 
their experiences of choice of provider policies would also be welcome.  
 
Further work could use more formal methods to examine the degree of news 
coverage of other information releases and relate this to patient utilisation. It would 
also be of interest to examine waiting times more directly as these may be affected by 
public reporting [284]. For example, the effects of positive public reports may be 
blunted by increases in waiting times, or hospital trusts publicised as poor providers 
may not witness changes in their overall levels of patient utilisation as they may use 
a fall in demand to shorten their waiting lists. Additionally, this thesis has used a 
small amount of patient reported outcome data, and further research could capitalise 
on the increasing amount of this which is now available [247]. 
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There are many changes currently underway in the NHS in England which may in 
future change the conclusions from my findings. Since 2010 the Government has 
embarked on wide-reaching reforms of the NHS in England [132], and how these 
materialise in practice is yet to be seen. After much debate the Health and Social Care 
Act was published in 2012 [285]. This set out that patients will have choice “with 
respect to aspects of health services provided to them” extending choice of provider 
for secondary treatment to choice of aspects of treatment itself. The Health and Social 
Care Act also opens the NHS up to greater competition from the independent sector, 
which may impact on the degree to which future performance information leads to 
changes in patient utilisation. During the time period of this study, there has been an 
increase in ISTCs in England. These were first introduced in 2003 as part of the 
“overlapping reforms” of New Labour, and were a central part of the strategy to 
increase capacity and reduce waiting times [125]. Previous research has 
characterised the patient population treated by these centres [286] as well as the 
changing proportion of operations  they undertake [287]. These found that they 
tended to treat patients who were on the whole healthier and that by 2011/12 they 
undertook nearly one in five NHS funded hip and knee operations.  It is not clear 
what impact a possible increase in independent provision may have in the future.  
Between 2006/07 and 2010/11 the number of providers an average GP refers to were 
found to increase from 12 to 18, indicating a possible increasing willingness to refer 
to more providers [168]. A shift of patients away from their closest hospital towards  
ISTCs has also been noted [168]. Although this does not tell us anything about why 
these patients may have attended these providers, or what role information may 
have played in these decisions, it suggests that an increasing use of the independent 
sector may lead to referrals becoming less concentrated at the closest hospitals to 
patients.  Research from the Netherlands has indicated that the distance to the 
nearest hospital has an impact on the likelihood of patients seeking out information 
when they need hospital treatment, although there are some socio-demographic 
differences in this [288]. It should be remembered that ISTCs carry out a limited 
range of procedures however on a limited range of patients [289], and so the 
relevance of this to other parts of the health service may be questioned. Future work 
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could investigate further whether increased provision in local areas means that 
patients become more sensitive to quality information on providers.   
 
Another change in the Health and Social Care Act which may impact on these issues is 
the abolition of PCTs in favour of CCGs. These CCGs are designed to give local 
clinicians greater control over budgets and how services are commissioned in their 
local areas [290]. With GPs in theory having more responsibility for these budgets 
there is the possibility that they will change what they base referral decisions on 
(indeed research on GP fundholding suggested that this raised the threshold for 
referral in fundholding practices [291]) and may be more active in directing patient 
choices. Future evaluation could examine whether this occurs in practice and 
whether the incentives for quality are then weakened or strengthened for hospital 
providers. Research could also evaluate whether certain GP practices (or CCGs) are 
more or less sensitive to making changes in referral decisions on the basis of official 
information releases. Furthermore, the work in this thesis could be extended by 
examining referral patterns from individual GP practices after the publication of 
regulator reports.  Recent work has investigated the relationship between quality of 
care at general practices and patient utilisation [292], and this could be extended to 
examine whether specific information releases impact upon this. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined two special cases of the public release of quality 
information where effects on patient utilisation may have reasonably been expected. 
Despite an increase in patients being offered choice of provider, and this information 
being widely disseminated with unequivocal messages on quality, large changes in 
patient utilisation were not found. The limited and unsustained effect identified in 
these two cases calls into question whether any system of publicly releasing 
information will impact on patient utilisation in the future. In addition, the effects of 
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being publicised as a poor provider on quality of maternity care were inconclusive, 
but did not suggest that providers were stimulated to make improvements at a 
greater pace than their peers. Future moves to release more granular and detailed 
information on the quality of care may be justified by the increased transparency 
they bring, but should not be assumed to drive patient utilisation at the healthcare 
providers involved, or improvements in quality of care.   
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Appendix 2: Additional tables to accompany chapter 4 
Table A1: Characteristics of the sample 
*Median self-rated health was 75 
  Characteristic  number % 
Age in years 16 - 35 228 10 
 
36 - 50 473 22 
 
51 - 65 712 33 
 
66 - 80 608 28 
  80 and over 160 7 
Sex Male  934 43 
  Female 1,247 57 
Ethnicity White  1,958 90 
 
Mixed and non-white 170 8 
  Missing 53 2 
Self-rated health* Below average 1,022 47 
 
Above average 900 41 
  Missing 259 12 
GP visits in last year 1 or less 122 6 
 
2 -- 5 1,106 51 
 
6 -- 9 622 29 
 
10 and over 294 13 
  Missing 37 2 
Employment status In paid work 1,246 57 
 
Not in paid work 746 34 
  Missing 189 9 
Level of education No formal qualifications 683 31 
 
Below degree level 815 37 
 
Degree level and higher 311 14 
  Missing or other 372 17 
Urban/rural city/large town/suburbs 1,069 49 
 
small town 589 27 
 
village/rural area 423 19 
  Missing 100 5 
Past experience of local hospital Generally good 1,482 68 
 
Generally bad 74 3 
 
Mixed 473 22 
 
No previous experience 124 6 
  Missing 28 1 
  Total 2181 100 
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Table A2: Important factors when choosing a hospital 
  
Reputation 
Personal 
Experience Cleanliness 
Location of 
hospital 
Timing of 
appointment 
Waiting 
time 
Family 
Experience 
Quality of 
food 
Quality of 
care 
Standard of 
facilities 
Overall 81.1 73.1 93.4 68.9 64.9 78.1 53.0 43.5 93.5 90.5 
16 - 35 76.3 73.1 90.0 69.7 60.5 75.8 58.0 30.0 94.2 87.5 
36 - 50 79.6 69.3 91.3 68.5 66.9 77.1 53.6 33.5 90.4 87.9 
51 - 65 79.5 67.7 91.5 65.3 65.3 80.3 49.5 41.9 92.0 89.4 
 66 - 80 84.9 80.0 *97.4 70.6 62.5 76.8 54.3 *56.1 97.6 *94.6 
81 + 87.0 84.2 97.6 78.8 71.6 79.5 53.7 66.2 94.6 93.2 
Male 79.7 66.8 91.4 65.7 62.3 74.7 45.4 43.5 90.9 88.3 
Female 82.1 *77.6 94.7 *71.1 66.7 80.5 *58.5 43.5 *95.4 92.0 
White 81.2 73.6 93.8 68.5 63.9 78.1 53.1 42.3 93.8 90.9 
Non white 79.8 69.9 88.8 71.0 *78.0 78.7 53.3 53.9 90.9 87.4 
Below average self-rated health 81.6 74.3 94.1 69.1 66.4 81.0 49.9 47.3 94.8 90.3 
Above average self-rated health 79.9 70.7 92.0 67.9 61.3 *74.8 54.2 36.3 92.1 90.4 
GP visits in last year: Once 74.5 55.8 91.1 65.0 65.5 77.2 57.4 24.5 85.2 81.1 
GP visits in last year: 2-5 times 79.6 72.6 92.8 67.8 61.8 75.4 53.7 40.2 93.0 89.6 
GP visits in last year: 6-9 times 84.4 72.6 93.8 69.5 65.8 81.4 50.2 *48.9 95.7 92.1 
GP visits in last year: more than 10 81.4 *78.9 94.6 73.3 72.8 81.6 54.0 50.0 94.7 93.2 
In paid work 77.2 68.8 90.9 67.3 67.3 79.1 54.8 29.0 89.4 86.8 
Not in paid work 83.3 75.2 94.3 70.3 *63.2 *77.5 52.8 51.7 95.7 92.7 
No formal qualifications 86.3 80.5 95.7 75.6 71.2 79.1 55.5 62.5 95.4 92.4 
Below degree level 80.8 *70.3 94.8 *63.4 *63.6 78.8 *51.5 *34.8 94.4 90.8 
Degree level and higher *70.2 *61.5 *85.0 *65.0 *51.0 77.2 45.4 *21.2 87.1 87.2 
City/large town/suburbs 81.6 75.3 93.4 71.3 67.1 79.2 52.5 44.0 94.6 91.0 
Small town 81.3 70.3 92.8 69.0 64.1 77.3 54.0 43.2 93.1 91.1 
Village/rural area 78.6 68.5 93.7 61.0 58.5 76.6 51.6 40.1 91.1 87.6 
n 795   803 819 821 796 805 758 731 784 779 
*Indicates statistical significant difference at the 5% level. These derived from a logistic regression model also adjusting for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year 
(one or less, two to five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); 
employment status (in paid work, not in paid work). 
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Table A3: Percentage of patients stating they heard about performance of hospitals in their area from various sources 
  Personal 
experience 
Family 
experience 
Local 
media Newspapers Gossip GP 
official 
reports Internet 
Local 
hospital 
advert 
Other 
hospital 
advert  
Overall 55.7 52.1 28.2 21.5 20.6 13.3 6.7 3.4 13.0 11.8 
Age 16 - 35 56.6 57.0 28.9 18.9 20.2 14.9 5.3 6.6 15.7 18.0 
age 36 - 50 54.1 48.6 31.9 *21.6 22.2 13.3 6.3 6.8 12.9 13.7 
age 51 - 65  53.8 53.1 32.2 *24.4 23.5 10.8 *8.0 2.8 11.7 10.2 
Age 66 - 80 57.6 51.8 23.0 21.1 17.6 14.6 6.3 *1.0 14.4 10.6 
Age 80 + 60.6 51.9 18.1 14.4 15.0 16.9 5.6 0.6 8.9 7.8 
Male 50.7 48.9 24.8 19.0 18.6 12.0 6.4 2.5 13.6 12.1 
Female *59.4 54.5 *30.7 *23.5 22.1 14.3 6.9 4.1 12.5 11.7 
White 56.3 52.8 29.0 22.3 21.7 12.8 6.9 3.1 11.7 10.3 
Non white  46.5 45.3 20.6 17.1 *10.0 20.0 6.5 7.1 *30.4 *30.9 
Below average self-rated health 56.4 50.0 25.8 20.0 20.4 13.0 5.6 3.3 12.0 11.4 
Above average self-rated health 56.6 55.6 32.2 24.1 21.6 13.1 *8.3 3.8 13.0 11.4 
GP visits in last year: Once 36.9 50.8 27.9 15.6 12.3 7.4 3.3 2.5 8.7 4.9 
GP visits in last year: 2-5 times *55.0 *56.2 28.5 *22.9 *21.3 10.9 7.2 2.9 12.3 11.8 
GP visits in last year: 6-9 times *58.2 47.7 30.5 *21.7 *20.3 *16.2 6.1 4.3 13.9 11.8 
GP visits in last year: more than 10 *61.2 48.0 23.8 19.0 *22.4 *18.0 7.8 3.7 14.7 15.7 
In paid work 55.5 54.4 32.4 24.0 23.3 12.5 6.8 4.0 11.2 11.6 
Not in paid work 56.6 51.8 27.0 20.9 19.6 13.6 6.6 3.0 14.1 11.2 
No formal qualifications 56.8 46.4 21.5 17.9 17.3 13.8 4.0 1.0 14.7 11.0 
Below degree level 55.7 *55.5 *30.1 *23.3 *22.8 12.5 *6.4 3.7 11.9 11.2 
Degree level and higher 55.9 *59.8 *39.5 *25.7 *23.2 13.2 *13.5 *7.1 11.5 12.1 
City/large town/suburbs 55.8 52.6 28.3 23.3 20.1 12.5 6.5 3.9 14.2 12.7 
Small town 57.0 52.5 29.7 21.6 22.8 *13.1 7.1 3.2 13.1 12.7 
Village/rural area 55.6 53.7 29.1 *19.4 19.6 *16.3 7.3 2.4 10.2 8.4 
n  1,604  1,604  1,604  1,604  1,604  1,604  1,604 1,492  1,415 1,336 
*  Indicates statistical significant difference at the 5% level. These derived from a logistic regression model also adjusting for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in 
the past year (one or less, two to five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large town/suburbs, small 
town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work).  
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Table A4: Percentage of patients stating they used different sources of information to choose the hospital they attended 
  
GP Leaflet 
NHS 
Choices 
Hospital 
Website 
Other 
website 
Family and 
friends 
Own 
experience 
Someone 
else at GP 
Referral 
centre 
staff 
Telephone 
booking line 
advisor 
None of 
these 
Overall 21.0 3.1 2.1 1.4 0.4 8.9 21.7 0.5 1.9 4.6 5.2 
Age 16 - 35 21.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.8 13.6 19.3 1.8 1.8 5.3 4.4 
age 36 - 50 23.5 2.5 3.0 2.3 0.2 9.7 23.9 0.4 2.7 5.1 5.7 
age 51 - 65  19.0 3.2 2.0 *0.7 *0.6 *6.7 20.8 0.0 1.7 5.5 4.4 
Age 66 - 80 20.2 3.8 1.6 *1.0 0.0 *9.7 21.5 *0.3 1.8 3.8 5.4 
Age 80 + 25.6 1.9 0.0 *0.6 0.0 *6.3 23.1 1.3 0.6 1.3 7.5 
Men 21.1 3.9 2.5 1.5 0.4 7.9 18.5 0.6 2.5 4.7 4.7 
Women 21.0 2.6 1.8 1.3 0.4 9.6 *24.1 0.3 *1.4 4.5 5.5 
White 20.2 3.0 2.0 1.4 0.4 8.9 22.1 0.4 1.7 4.3 5.4 
Non White  29.4 4.7 2.4 1.2 1.2 10.0 17.6 1.2 4.7 *8.2 2.4 
Below average self-rated health 20.5 2.3 1.6 0.8 0.5 8.7 20.5 0.5 1.7 3.7 5.2 
Above average self-rated health 20.3 3.8 2.8 1.9 0.4 9.2 *24.0 0.3 1.9 5.6 5.1 
GP visits in last year: Once 21.3 0.8 1.6 0.8 0.8 14.8 15.6 0.8 0.0 2.5 4.1 
GP visits in last year: 2-5 times 19.8 *2.9 2.3 1.4 0.3 9.2 22.4 0.5 2.3 5.1 5.4 
GP visits in last year: 6-9 times 22.8 *3.4 2.1 1.1 0.3 6.6 22.2 0.5 1.0 5.3 5.5 
GP visits in last year: more than 10 22.8 *4.8 1.7 2.4 1.0 9.5 21.4 0.3 2.7 2.7 4.1 
In paid work 20.6 2.8 2.9 2.0 0.4 8.8 21.8 0.5 2.1 6.0 5.5 
Not in paid work 20.8 3.5 1.6 *1.2 *0.5 9.0 21.3 0.2 1.7 3.4 5.1 
No formal qualifications 23.0 4.4 1.2 1.2 0.1 6.7 18.4 0.3 1.9 3.8 5.6 
Below degree level 19.5 *2.8 2.8 *1.7 *0.5 8.2 23.8 0.5 1.7 5.6 4.3 
Degree level and higher 22.5 *1.9 2.6 1.6 1.0 11.6 22.5 0.0 1.9 3.9 6.1 
City/large town/suburbs 19.5 4.1 2.0 1.3 0.7 7.9 22.1 0.7 2.1 3.6 4.9 
Small town 22.8 3.2 2.2 1.5 0.2 8.1 21.9 0.2 1.5 7.0 6.3 
Village/rural area 21.7 1.2 2.4 1.4 0.2 11.1 20.1 0.0 1.4 4.0 4.5 
n 1,604  1,604  1,492  1,604  1,064  1,604  1,604  585  1,513  1,604  1,604  
*  Indicates statistical significant difference at the 5% level. These derived from a logistic regression model also adjusting for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year 
(one or less, two to five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); 
employment status (in paid work, not in paid work).  
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Table A5: Logistic regression model of attending local hospital by important factors when 
choosing a hospital 
Importance of various factors in hospital choice (n): 
% 
attending 
local 
hospital AOR * 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Reputation (750) No 67.9 --- --- 
  Yes 78.7 1.56 1.00 ; 2.46 
Personal experience (757) No 63.6 --- --- 
  Yes 82.8 2.69 1.76 ; 4.09 
Cleanliness (769) No 55.7 --- --- 
  Yes 78.9 2.53 1.35 ; 4.76 
Location of hospital (773) No 60.0 --- --- 
  Yes 85.7 3.78 2.56 ; 5.56 
Time of appointment (748) No 73.7 --- --- 
  Yes 79.5 0.92 0.62 ; 1.35 
Waiting time for appointment (755) No 79.5 --- --- 
  Yes 75.5 0.67 0.42 ; 1.07 
Family experience (715) No 74.3 --- --- 
  Yes 78.4 1.31 0.90 ; 1.91 
Quality of food (690) No 72.2 --- --- 
  Yes 82.7 1.47 0.96 ; 2.26 
Quality of care (736) No 57.6 --- --- 
  Yes 78.0 2.49 1.23 ; 5.04 
Standard of facilities (734) No 61.0 --- --- 
  Yes 78.8 2.43 1.30 ; 4.58 
* These results adjusted for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year (one or less, two to 
five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large 
town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work); and past experience of hospital 
(generally good; generally bad; mixed, no previous experience).  Only those respondents offered a choice included in these analyses (N = 
1033 – 50.1% of responders). 
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Table A6: Logistic regression model of attending local hospital by sources of information 
on local hospital performance used 
Heard about performance of hospitals in your area from (n): 
% attending 
local hospital AOR * 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Personal experience (1,524) No 76.8 --- --- 
  Yes 79.5 1.14  0.88 ; 1.48 
Family experience (1,524) No 80.0 --- --- 
  Yes 76.8 0.83 0.64 ; 1.07 
Local media (1,524) No 73.8 --- --- 
  Yes 78.2 1.01 0.76 ; 1.33 
Gossip (1,524) No 79.7 --- --- 
  Yes 72.7 0.80 0.59 ; 1.08 
GP (1,524) No 78.2 --- --- 
  Yes 78.7 1.04 0.71 ; 1.52 
Internet (1,524) No 78.6 --- --- 
  Yes 70.8 0.61 0.33 ; 1.11 
Official reports (1,524) No 78.3 --- --- 
  Yes 79.0 1.21 0.73 ; 2.00 
Newspapers (1,524) No 78.1 --- --- 
  Yes 79.0 1.19 0.87 ; 1.61 
Seen advert for local hospital (1,355) No 76.3 --- --- 
  Yes 88.0 1.98 1.22 ; 3.21 
Seen advert for other hospitals (1,281) No 76.9 --- --- 
  Yes 79.6 0.87 0.56 ; 1.35 
* These results adjusted for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year (one or less, two to 
five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large 
town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work); and past experience of hospital 
(generally good; generally bad; mixed, no previous experience).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
Table A7: Logistic regression model of attending local hospital by sources of information 
used in choosing hospital 
Sources of information used to choose hospital (n): 
% attending 
local 
hospital AOR * 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
GP (1,524) No 78.7 --- --- 
  Yes 76.7 0.76 0.57 ; 1.03 
Leaflet (1,524) No 78.3 --- --- 
  Yes 77.2 0.69 0.35 ; 1.36 
NHS Choices (1,524) No 78.6 --- --- 
  Yes 66.4 0.56 0.26 ; 1.21 
Hospital Website (1,524) No 78.6 --- --- 
  Yes 53.4 0.40 0.17 ; 0.96 
Other website (1,524) No 78.3 --- --- 
  Yes 76.3 0.77 0.14 ; 4.11 
Family and friends (1,524) No 79.9 --- --- 
  Yes 60.2 0.39 0.26 ; 0.57 
Own experience (1,524) No 77.2 --- --- 
  Yes 82.0 1.36 0.99 ; 1.87 
Someone else at GP (1,524) No 78.3 --- --- 
  Yes 88.6 0.77 0.05 ; 10.54 
Staff at a referral centre (1,524) No 78.6 --- --- 
  Yes 49.2 0.28 0.10 ; 0.74 
Telephone booking line advisor (1,524) No 78.7 --- --- 
  Yes 68.6 0.55 0.32 ; 0.96 
None of these sources (1,524) Used at least one 78.1 --- --- 
  Used none 81.5 1.08 0.61 ; 1.89 
* These results adjusted for age group, sex, ethnicity (white, mixed/non-white), number of GP visits in the past year (one or less, two to 
five, six to ten, more than ten), EQ-VAS self-rated health, education (no qualifications, less than/more than degree); urban/rural (city/large 
town/suburbs, small town, village/rural area); employment status (in paid work, not in paid work), and past experience of hospital 
(generally good; generally bad; mixed, no previous experience).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
Appendix 3: Additional tables and figures to accompany chapter 5 
 
Table A8: F-statistics for the strength of the instruments using a) discretionary 
inpatient hospital numbers b) day surgery hospital numbers c) did-not-attend 
numbers as outcomes. Without including pre-publication effects 
  F Statistic p value F Statistic p value F Statistic p value 
  Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells University Hospitals Leicester Mid Staffordshire 
Volume comparison group 
Inpatient 389.4 <0.001 427.8 <0.001 258.3 <0.001 
Day surgery 456.0 <0.001 647.7 <0.001 503.9 <0.001 
Did not attend 446.1 <0.001 757.5 <0.001 668.3 <0.001 
Geographical comparison group 
Inpatient 137.4 <0.001 512.4 <0.001 122.5 <0.001 
Day surgery 137.4 <0.001 512.4 <0.001 122.5 <0.001 
Did not attend 137.4 <0.001 512.4 <0.001 108.8 <0.001 
National comparison group 
Inpatient 2458.6 <0.001 3544.0 <0.001 1471.8 <0.001 
Day surgery 2458.7 <0.001 3541.9 <0.001 1472.5 <0.001 
Did not attend 2257.5 <0.001 3074.4 <0.001 1477.4 <0.001 
Regional comparison group 
Inpatient 90.1 <0.001 126.9 <0.001 253.5 <0.001 
Day surgery 90.1 <0.001 126.9 <0.001 248.9 <0.001 
Did not attend 90.1 <0.001 133.4 <0.001 241.9 <0.001 
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Table A9: F-statistics for the strength of the instruments using a) discretionary inpatient 
hospital numbers b) day surgery hospital numbers c) did-not-attend numbers as 
outcomes. Including pre-publication effects 
  F Statistic p value F Statistic p value F Statistic p value 
  Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells University Hospitals Leicester Mid Staffordshire 
Volume comparison group 
Inpatient 394.2 <0.001 438.1 <0.001 254.0 <0.001 
Day surgery 455.4 <0.001 621.9 <0.001 519.1 <0.001 
Did not attend 446.1 <0.001 720.1 <0.001 702.3 <0.001 
Geographical comparison group 
Inpatient 131.1 <0.001 501.7 <0.001 118.0 <0.001 
Day surgery 131.1 <0.001 501.7 <0.001 118.0 <0.001 
Did not attend 131.1 <0.001 501.7 <0.001 101.8 <0.001 
National comparison group 
Inpatient 2457.6 <0.001 3544.1 <0.001 1463.6 <0.001 
Day surgery 2457.6 <0.001 3542.0 <0.001 1464.4 <0.001 
Did not attend 2256.0 <0.001 3074.5 <0.001 1468.2 <0.001 
Regional comparison group 
Inpatient 88.8 <0.001 150.1 <0.001 250.6 <0.001 
Day surgery 88.8 <0.001 150.1 <0.001 245.8 <0.001 
Did not attend 88.8 <0.001 150.0 <0.001 239.4 <0.001 
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Figure A1: Change in discretionary inpatient hospital admission, before and after 
report publication, in scandal trusts (red) relative to comparisons (blue)of: five 
geographically proximate hospitals (first row), volume comparison groups (second 
row), regional comparison groups (third row), and national comparison group 
(fourth row). Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells (MTW), University Hospitals 
Leicester (UHL) and Mid Staffordshire (MS) 
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Figure A2: Change in daycase hospital admissions, before and after report 
publication, in scandal trusts (red) relative to comparisons (blue)of: five 
geographically proximate hospitals (first row), volume comparison groups (second 
row), regional comparison groups (third row), and national comparison group 
(fourth row). Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells (MTW), University Hospitals 
Leicester (UHL) and Mid Staffordshire (MS) 
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Figure A3: Change in did-not-attend numbers, before and after report publication, 
in scandal trusts (red) relative to comparisons (blue)of: five geographically 
proximate hospitals (first row), volume comparison groups (second row), regional 
comparison groups (third row), and national comparison group (fourth row). 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells (MTW), University Hospitals Leicester (UHL) 
and Mid Staffordshire (MS) 
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Table A10: Mean (standard deviation) monthly statistics in 30 months pre report 
publication for treated trusts and national comparison group 
  
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
National comparison 
group 
 Monthly inpatient admission numbers 693.7 (84.4) 656.0 (528.6) 
Monthly day surgery admission numbers 1,482.2 (212.1) 1,555.2 (1,285.0)* 
Monthly did not attend numbers 605.2 (61.1) 379.5 (488.6) 
Mean waiting time (days) 118.2 (7.5) 97.7 (269.6) 
Patient Gender (% male) 46.1 (0.3) 51.3 (97.6)* 
Ratio of day surgery cases to inpatient 2.1 (0.2) 2.2 (1.3)* 
Number of people on waiting list 22,544.4 (1,931.1) 19,801.1 (17,235.9) 
Mean age of patients 49.0 (0.0) 48.2 (8.2) 
Emergency admission numbers (monthly) 36,856.8 (1,103.3) 20,603.3 (17,002.0)* 
Day beds available number 40.4 (1.2 62.1 (51.9)* 
  
University Hospitals Leicester 
National comparison 
group 
 Monthly inpatient admission numbers 2,495.3 (249.4) 785.5 (494.1)* 
Monthly day surgery admission numbers 6,093.5 (434.7) 1,939.2 (1,109.7)* 
Monthly did not attend numbers 1,318.8 (119.8) 656.6 (501.1)* 
Mean waiting time (days) 93.7 (7.8) 95.9 (270.7) 
Patient Gender (% male) 49.0 (1.6) 49.4 (5.3) 
Ratio of day surgery cases to inpatient 2.5 (0.2) 2.7 (1.0) 
Number of people on waiting list 75,236.9 (3,316.1) 27,325 (14,595.0)* 
Mean age of patients 48.0 (0.0) 49.4 (4.6) 
Emergency admission numbers (monthly) 75,636.4 (3,258.6) 29,284.0 (12,954.4)* 
Day beds available number 209.2 (16.1) 64.2 (48.7)* 
  
Mid Staffordshire 
National comparison 
group 
 Monthly inpatient admission numbers 457.6 (51.7) 786.1 (511.3)* 
Monthly day surgery admission numbers 1,417.6 (127.8) 2,179.8 (1,224.3)* 
Monthly did not attend numbers 366.7 (38.0) 746.9 (532.2)* 
Mean waiting time (days) 73.1 (16.3) 78.5 (271.6) 
Patient Gender (% male) 46.5 1.0) 49.6 (5.1) 
Ratio of day surgery cases to inpatient 3.1 (0.3) 3.0 (1.0) 
Number of people on waiting list 19,495.3 (503.2) 30,132.7 (15,633.3)* 
Mean age of patients 48.4 (0.5) 49.9 (4.7) 
Emergency admission numbers (monthly) 18,883.1 (354.9) 30,832.5 (14,297.9)* 
Day beds available number 69.0 (1.7) 70.3 (55.4) 
* Statistically significantly different at p≤0.05 
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Table A11: Percentage change in inpatient admission, daycase admission, and did not 
attend numbers relative to national comparison group 
  
Effect 3 
months 
post report 
(p value) 
Effect 6 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 9 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Effect 12 
months post 
report (p 
value) 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -1.0 (0.888) 5.0 (0.477) 2.1 (0.766) 2.5 (0.728) 
University Hospitals Leicester 1.3 (0.860) 5.1 (0.478) 2.6 (0.713) 6.7 (0.352) 
Mid Staffordshire -1.6 (0.829) 0.0 (0.999) 3.7 (0.629) 0.9 (0.907) 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -2.8 (0.596) -0.5 (0.917) 0.1 (0.986) -0.3 (0.948) 
University Hospitals Leicester -4.1 (0.499) -1.1 (0.854) -2.8 (0.643) -0.2 (0.980) 
Mid Staffordshire -1.2 (0.816) 2.3 (0.645) 2.3 (0.645) 1.9 (0.703) 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 2.9 (0.884) -12.6 (0.522) -14.5 (0.465) -18.9 (0.342) 
University Hospitals Leicester 3.2 (0.872) -2.2 (0.911) 8.5 (0.665) 1.5 (0.938) 
Mid Staffordshire -8.3 (0.622) -7.8 (0.641) -14.3 (0.395) -17.0 (0.312) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
Table A12: Percentage change in inpatient admission, daycase admission, and did not 
attend numbers relative to national comparison group 
  
Effect 9 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 6 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Effect 3 months 
pre report (p 
value) 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -4.1 (0.571) 2.6 (0.715) 0.6 (0.933) 
University Hospitals Leicester 5.2 (0.480) 2.7 (0.711) 3.1 (0.674) 
Mid Staffordshire 2.8 (0.719) 0.5 (0.951) -3.7 (0.631) 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -8.4 (0.117) -2.3 (0.671) -4.2 (0.429) 
University Hospitals Leicester 2.6 (0.671) -0.5 (0.938) -3.9 (0.533) 
Mid Staffordshire 1.3 (0.807) -1.5 (0.770) -5.0 (0.333) 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells -10.8 (0.594) -10.1 (0.615) -13.8 (0.494) 
University Hospitals Leicester 1.9 (0.925) 1.2 (0.952) -0.2 (0.993) 
Mid Staffordshire -3.6 (0.833) -2.4 (0.887) -9.3 (0.589) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold 
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Appendix 4: Additional tables to accompany chapter 6 
 
Table A13: Balancing tests from propensity score matching 
Variable Sample 
Best group 
National comparison 
group* % bias   t-test (p-value) 
Admissions Unmatched 3283 4495 -82.5 
 
-2.31 0.023 
  Matched 3283 3612 -22.4 72.9 -0.64 0.53 
IMD income score Unmatched 0.176 0.135 102.1 
 
2.72 0.008 
  Matched 0.176 0.180 -9.9 90.3 -0.24 0.812 
Variable Sample 
Worst group 
National comparison 
group** % bias   t-test (p-value) 
Admissions Unmatched 5309 4429 51.4 
 
1.43 0.156 
  Matched 5309 5227 4.8 90.7 0.09 0.931 
IMD income score Unmatched 0.167 0.137 67.3 
 
1.89 0.062 
  Matched 0.167 0.166 2.9 95.6 0.06 0.951 
* This national comparison group excludes hospitals within 10km of the best group 
** This national comparison group excludes hospitals within 10km of the worst group 
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Table A14: Percentage changes in maternity admissions in the best trusts, relative to baseline (matched analysis) 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 0.3 (0.915) 0.4 (0.882) 0.3 (0.906) Reference 0.7 (0.774) 1.1 (0.660) 2.1 (0.409) -0.2 (0.939) 1.0 (0.701) 2.2 (0.399) 
% births by C-section 0.8 (0.065) -0.1 (0.815) 0.8 (0.075) Baseline -0.3 (0.560) -0.1 (0.835) -0.4 (0.332) -0.6 (0.226) -0.6 (0.187) 0.3 (0.488) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.3 (0.528) -0.3 (0.529) 0.0 (0.994) Baseline 0.1 (0.903) -0.0 (0.975) -0.5 (0.271) -1.0 (0.019) -0.9 (0.027) -0.8 (0.055) 
%  deprived mothers -0.4 (0.424) -0.6 (0.216) -1.3 (0.013) Baseline -0.7 (0.196) -0.3 (0.502) 0.4 (0.420) -0.1 (0.830) -0.3 (0.601) -0.0 (0.933) 
% affluent mothers -0.5 (0.143) -0.5 (0.142) 0.2 (0.612) Baseline -0.1 (0.753) -0.2 (0.673) 0.2 (0.522) 0.3 (0.411) -0.6 (0.133) 0.0 (0.945) 
% attending closest hospital -0.0 (0.972) 0.3 (0.500) -0.3 (0.404) Baseline -0.4 (0.305) -0.3 (0.454) -0.7 (0.096) -0.3 (0.484) 0.3 (0.500) -0.4 (0.390) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
 
Table A15: Percentage changes in maternity admissions in the worst trusts, relative to baseline (matched analysis) 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 1.5 (0.712) 4.1 (0.315) 0.9 (0.815) Baseline -3.1 (0.439) -6.1 (0.133) -4.6 (0.256) -1.9 (0.630) -3.7 (0.358) -1.9 (0.631) 
% births by C-section -0.3 (0.617) -0.4 (0.481) -0.0 (0.979) Baseline 0.8 (0.213) 1.1 (0.076) 1.6 (0.011) 1.2 (0.061) 1.5 (0.019) 2.4 (0.000) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.1 (0.865) 0.4 (0.492) 0.2 (0.762) Baseline 0.7 (0.157) 0.8 (0.105) 1.3 (0.014) 1.5 (0.004) 1.3 (0.009) 1.6 (0.002) 
%  deprived mothers -0.6 (0.304) -0.7 (0.203) -0.0 (0.987) Baseline -0.4 (0.430) -0.8 (0.131) -1.3 (0.022) -0.7 (0.194) -0.8 (0.126) -0.9 (0.094) 
% affluent mothers -0.0 (0.940) -0.0 (0.959) -0.1 (0.756) Baseline 0.2 (0.590) 0.3 (0.415) 0.5 (0.177) 0.3 (0.385) 0.5 (0.178) 0.8 (0.040) 
% attending closest hospital -0.1 (0.918) -0.3 (0.590) 0.7 (0.276) Baseline -0.5 (0.433) 0.5 (0.464) -0.4 (0.489) -0.8 (0.215) -1.2 (0.058) -0.8 (0.189) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses  
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Table A16: Percentage of women rating their care positively during pregnancy, labour and after birth before and after public 
reporting using propensity score matched control group 
 
Rating care positively defined as percentage of women stating that their care was “good”, “very good”, or “excellent.” 
 
 
 
 
    
Nationally  
Best group (p-
value difference 
from national 
group) 
Propensity score 
matched controls 
(p value difference 
from best group) 
Worst group (p-
value difference 
from national 
group) 
Propensity score 
matched controls 
(p value 
difference from 
worst group) 
During pregnancy 
2007 87.9 91.9 85.1 81.9 87.2 
2010 92.4 95 90.1 88.4 92.4 
Change in % +4.5 +3.1 (<0.001) +5.0 (<0.001) +6.5 (<0.001) +5.2 (<0.001) 
During labour 
2007 89 92.9 86.3 81.7 88.8 
2010 93.4 95.7 92.6 89.4 94.1 
Change in % +4.4 +2.8 (<0.001) +6.3 (<0.001) +7.7 (<0.001) +5.3 (<0.001) 
After birth 
2007 80 85.2 75.1 65.4 80.0 
2010 88.4 91 86.4 80.8 89.2 
Change in % +8.4 +5.8 (<0.001) +11.3 (<0.001) +15.4 (<0.001) +9.2 (<0.001) 
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Table A17: Percentage change in maternity admissions in the best trusts relative to baseline. Results from matched analysis, 
using 5 control hospitals rather than 3 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months 
 
6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 3.1 (0.226) 1.8 (0.498) 0.5 (0.845) Baseline 2.6 (0.307) 3.2 (0.219) 3.23 (0.212) -0.6 (0.820) 1.4 (0.583) 0.2 (0.939) 
% births by C-section 0.6 (0.208) -0.4 (0.443) 0.8 (0.098) Baseline -0.4 (0.441) -0.1 (0.904) -0.20 (0.656) -0.4 (0.416) -0.3 (0.504) 0.3 (0.480) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.6 (0.144) -0.2 (0.601) 0.1 (0.734) Baseline -0.1 (0.780) -0.2 (0.622) -0.60 (0.151) -1.1 (0.010) -1.3 (0.003) -0.9 (0.027) 
%  deprived mothers -0.7 (0.200) -0.5 (0.290) -1.5 (0.004) Baseline -0.9 (0.081) -0.5 (0.368) 0.01 (0.992) -0.5 (0.354) -0.7 (0.200) -0.2 (0.697) 
% affluent mothers -0.1 (0.828) -0.2 (0.649) 0.5 (0.159) Baseline -0.2 (0.593) -0.5 (0.167) -0.12 (0.743) -0.0 (0.926) -0.9 (0.021) -0.6 (0.121) 
% attending closest hospital -0.8 (0.043) 0.2 (0.616) -0.4 (0.381) Baseline -0.4 (0.386) -0.3 (0.414) -0.28 (0.487) 0.1 (0.826) 0.6 (0.183) 0.0 (0.931) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
Table A18: Percentage change in maternity admissions in the worst trusts relative to baseline. Results from matched analysis, 
using 5 control hospitals rather than 3 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 1.0 (0.786) 4.2 (0.298) 1.8 (0.661) Baseline -1.1 (0.778) -5.6 (0.168) -1.8 (0.662) -0.6 (0.888) -2.3 (0.563) -0.4 (0.920) 
% births by C-section -0.7 (0.289) -0.8 (0.181) -0.2 (0.762) Baseline 0.7 (0.303) 1.1 (0.071) 1.6 (0.011) 1.2 (0.053) 1.6 (0.015) 2.1 (0.001) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.1 (0.814) 0.6 (0.209) 0.4 (0.477) Baseline 0.6 (0.259) 0.7 (0.162) 1.0 (0.044) 1.3 (0.009) 1.0 (0.053) 1.4 (0.005) 
%  deprived mothers -0.6 (0.280) -0.5 (0.381) -0.2 (0.653) Baseline -0.5 (0.316) -0.8 (0.152) -1.4 (0.013) -0.8 (0.126) -1.1 (0.040) -1.0 (0.081) 
% affluent mothers 0.3 (0.469) 0.2 (0.552) 0.2 (0.629) Baseline 0.0 (0.951) 0.0 (0.979) 0.2 (0.702) -0.1 (0.877) 0.2 (0.612) 0.2 (0.561) 
% attending closest hospital 0.3 (0.681) -0.0 (0.979) -0.2 (0.783) Baseline -0.5 (0.468) -0.5 (0.403) -0.9 (0.138) -1.2 (0.051) -1.8 (0.004) -1.4 (0.029) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
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Table A19: Percentage change in maternity admissions in the best trusts relative to baseline. Results from matched analysis, 
excluding trusts within 20km radius 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 4.5 (0.084) 3.2 (0.221) -0.4 (0.880) Baseline 2.5 (0.330) 1.7 (0.521) 1.8 (0.479) -1.7 (0.521) 1.7 (0.518) 1.5 (0.556) 
% births by C-section 0.6 (0.165) -0.3 (0.467) 0.8 (0.083) Baseline -0.4 (0.430) 0.1 (0.851) -0.2 (0.714) -0.4 (0.343) -0.4 (0.417) 0.4 (0.353) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.7 (0.108) -0.3 (0.477) 0.0 (0.941) Baseline -0.1 (0.820) -0.2 (0.721) -0.5 (0.217) -1.1 (0.009) -1.1 (0.008) -0.9 (0.040) 
%  deprived mothers -0.6 (0.216) -0.6 (0.207) -1.5 (0.004) Baseline -0.8 (0.120) -0.5 (0.363) -0.0 (0.943) -0.5 (0.337) -0.5 (0.306) -0.3 (0.560) 
% affluent mothers -0.2 (0.642) -0.2 (0.563) 0.5 (0.169) Baseline -0.2 (0.631) -0.4 (0.248) 0.0 (0.991) 0.0 (0.920) -0.8 (0.041) -0.4 (0.231) 
% attending closest hospital 0.1 (0.797) 0.4 (0.290) -0.5 (0.253) Baseline -0.3 (0.499) -0.3 (0.542) -0.3 (0.515) 0.1 (0.726) 0.6 (0.136) -0.0 (0.938) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
 
Table A20: Percentage change in maternity admissions in the worst trusts relative to baseline. Results from matched analysis, 
excluding trusts within 20km radius 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 2.7 (0.501) 6.0 (0.139) 2.1 (0.610) Baseline 0.2 (0.956) -4.4 (0.272) -1.2 (0.772) -0.3 (0.950) -2.5 (0.539) -0.1 (0.987) 
% births by C-section -0.6 (0.379) -0.9 (0.163) -0.1 (0.832) Baseline 0.7 (0.273) 1.2 (0.066) 1.7 (0.009) 1.2 (0.065) 1.6 (0.014) 2.1 (0.001) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.2 (0.749) 0.6 (0.276) 0.4 (0.476) Baseline 0.6 (0.251) 0.7 (0.143) 0.9 (0.065) 1.4 (0.009) 1.0 (0.052) 1.4 (0.006) 
%  deprived mothers -0.5 (0.397) -0.4 (0.470) -0.1 (0.863) Baseline -0.5 (0.403) -0.7 (0.172) -1.3 (0.018) -0.8 (0.168) -0.9 (0.101) -0.8 (0.146) 
% affluent mothers 0.2 (0.611) 0.1 (0.726) 0.1 (0.848) Baseline 0.0 (0.963) 0.1 (0.809) 0.2 (0.579) -0.1 (0.763) 0.2 (0.561) 0.3 (0.388) 
% attending closest hospital 0.3 (0.618) 0.1 (0.862) -0.1 (0.840) Baseline -0.4 (0.510) -0.5 (0.427) -0.8 (0.191) -1.2 (0.057) -1.8 (0.006) -1.3 (0.034) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
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Table A21: Percentage change in maternity admissions in the best trusts relative to baseline. Results from matched analysis, 
using April 2007 to September 2007 as baseline 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions 4.3 (0.097) 2.7 (0.305) Baseline 0.7 (0.786) 2.9 (0.264) 3.0 (0.242) 3.6 (0.169) 0.1 (0.966) 2.8 (0.272) 3.0 (0.252) 
% births by C-section -0.2 (0.710) -1.2 (0.010) Baseline -0.8 (0.075) -1.2 (0.009) -0.7 (0.101) -0.9 (0.042) -1.3 (0.004) -1.3 (0.005) -0.5 (0.289) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.7 (0.084) -0.3 (0.496) Baseline -0.0 (0.944) -0.1 (0.782) -0.1 (0.732) -0.5 (0.217) -1.1 (0.008) -1.1 (0.007) -0.9 (0.033) 
%  deprived mothers 0.9 (0.089) 0.9 (0.094) Baseline 1.5 (0.003) 0.7 (0.158) 1.0 (0.045) 1.5 (0.004) 1.0 (0.055) 1.0 (0.059) 1.2 (0.021) 
% affluent mothers -0.7 (0.065) -0.8 (0.040) Baseline -0.5 (0.221) -0.7 (0.057) -0.9 (0.014) -0.5 (0.205) -0.5 (0.225) -1.3 (0.001) -0.9 (0.011) 
% attending closest hospital -0.8 (0.045) 1.0 (0.020) Baseline 0.5 (0.242) 0.2 (0.607) 0.2 (0.627) 0.1 (0.733) 0.6 (0.181) 1.0 (0.022) 0.3 (0.482) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses 
 
Table A22: Percentage change in maternity admissions in the worst trusts relative to baseline. Results from matched analysis, 
using April 2007 to September 2007 as baseline 
  Pre Baseline Baseline Post baseline 
  13–18 months  7–12 months 6 months   6 months  7–12 months 13–18 months 19–24 months  25 -30 months  31-36 months  
Admissions -2.0 (0.614) 2.2 (0.584) Baseline -2.0 (0.613) -4.0 (0.319) -8.5 (0.038) -5.0 (0.213) -3.4 (0.393) -5.2 (0.201) -3.6 (0.379) 
% births by C-section -0.5 (0.462) -0.7 (0.262) Baseline 0.1 (0.843) 0.8 (0.185) 1.3 (0.040) 1.8 (0.004) 1.3 (0.036) 1.7 (0.008) 2.2 (0.001) 
% births by mothers >35 -0.5 (0.312) 0.3 (0.594) Baseline -0.3 (0.515) 0.2 (0.692) 0.4 (0.482) 0.6 (0.203) 1.0 (0.047) 0.7 (0.193) 1.1 (0.030) 
%  deprived mothers -0.4 (0.517) -0.4 (0.518) Baseline 0.1 (0.893) -0.4 (0.501) -0.6 (0.246) -1.2 (0.031) -0.7 (0.207) -0.9 (0.106) -0.9 (0.119) 
% affluent mothers 0.1 (0.800) 0.1 (0.841) Baseline -0.1 (0.715) -0.1 (0.766) -0.0 (0.925) 0.1 (0.898) -0.2 (0.532) 0.1 (0.741) 0.2 (0.662) 
% attending closest hospital 0.4 (0.521) 0.3 (0.666) Baseline 0.2 (0.795) -0.3 (0.637) -0.4 (0.559) -0.7 (0.235) -1.1 (0.077) -1.8 (0.006) -1.3 (0.034) 
Statistically significant findings at p≤0.05 in bold. P values in parentheses
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